Allahabad HC Upholds Murder Conviction Based on Dying Declaration of Woman Set Ablaze by Brother-in-Law

A Division Bench dismissed the criminal appeal of Tilluka @ Manoj, convicted under Section 302 IPC for setting his sister-in-law Satyavati ablaze, holding the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate on the day of the incident to be fully reliable, voluntary, and free from any vitiating factor.

The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has dismissed the criminal appeal of Tilluka @ Manoj, who challenged his conviction and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC imposed by the Special Judge (D.A.A.)/Additional Sessions Judge-III, Agra on 25 October 2019. The Division Bench, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi, delivered its judgment on 2 July 2026, with the opinion authored by Justice Munir. The Bench found the dying declaration of the deceased Satyavati — recorded within hours of the incident by an Additional City Magistrate — to be truthful and voluntary, capable of sustaining conviction on its own. Along the way, the Bench clarified the procedure for contradicting a witness with a prior Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, identifying a procedural misstep by the Trial Court that nonetheless did not affect the outcome.

The Incident and the Case Before the Trial Court

The prosecution's case, as set out in the written report (Ex.Ka.1) dated 6 July 2015, arose from events on the morning of 2 July 2015 at about 6:30 a.m. in Village Hirner, Police Station Shamsabad, District Agra. Satyavati was at home while her husband, informant Mahipal (PW-1), was at his workplace. According to the prosecution, Tilluka @ Manoj — a cousin of Mahipal living in the same neighbourhood — along with his father Misrilal, brother Vinod, and mother Hari Devi, had been using the informant's hearth for cooking while Tilluka's own house was under renovation.

About a month before the incident, Tilluka had borrowed Rs. 5,000 from Satyavati, promising repayment within a month. On the morning of 2 July 2015, when all four accused came to cook and Satyavati demanded return of the money, they became agitated and left. Half an hour later, Misrilal allegedly exhorted Tilluka to douse Satyavati in kerosene and set her afire. Hari Devi and Vinod caught hold of her while Tilluka doused her in oil and set her ablaze using a matchstick. Smoke drew neighbours to the spot. Satyavati was taken to Ishwari Devi Memorial Hospital, Rajpur Chungi, Agra.

The Additional City Magistrate-II, Agra, J.P. Chauhan (PW-7), recorded Satyavati's dying declaration on 2 July 2015 itself, having received a memo from the District Magistrate's office to do so. The victim was subsequently shifted to Sarojini Naidu Medical College (S.N.M.C.), Agra, where she died on 14 July 2015 due to septicaemic shock resulting from ante-mortem burn injuries. The FIR, initially registered under Sections 307 and 506 IPC, was converted to Section 302 IPC following her death.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against Tilluka @ Manoj alone under Sections 302 and 506 IPC. The other three named accused — Misrilal, Vinod, and Hari Devi — were not charge-sheeted, the Investigating Officer having found no evidence against them. Charge was framed by the Sessions Judge, Agra, on 16 December 2015. The prosecution examined ten witnesses and produced documentary exhibits including the dying declaration (Ex.Ka.11), the post-mortem report (Ex.Ka.4), the medico-legal report (Ex.Ka.14), and the inquest report (Ex.Ka.5). The Trial Court convicted Tilluka @ Manoj and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 25,000, and one additional year in default.

Arguments on Appeal

Counsel for the appellant advanced several grounds of challenge. The FIR was lodged on 13 July 2015, eleven days after the incident, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The dying declaration referred to vegetable oil, while the post-mortem report indicated the smell of kerosene — a discrepancy, it was argued, that undermined its reliability. PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3 were not eyewitnesses, and the Trial Court wrongly relied on their hearsay evidence. It was further submitted that the appellant, along with his mother and others, had arranged for Satyavati to be taken to the hospital, a circumstance inconsistent with guilt, which the Trial Court ignored.

The State's Additional Government Advocate opposed each submission, contending that the dying declaration was found reliable and trustworthy by the Trial Court, that PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3 corroborated the dying declaration, and that no illegality or perversity infected the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence.

The Dying Declaration: Validity and Weight

The Bench examined the dying declaration (Ex.Ka.11) in detail. It was recorded in question-and-answer form by PW-7, the then Additional City Magistrate-II, Agra, on 2 July 2015 at Ishwari Devi Nursing Home. Satyavati stated that she had been cooking vegetables when her devar (brother-in-law) Tilluka poured vegetable oil on her and set her afire, and that she had no quarrel with anyone, not even her husband. The thumb impression of her right foot was taken. A doctor endorsed the declaration certifying that the patient was conscious and able to give her statement.

The Bench addressed the argument that the doctor's certificate was inadequate in form, referencing the conflict that had previously existed between two three-Judge Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P., (1999) 7 SCC 695, and Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562. That conflict was settled by the Constitution Bench in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, which held that there is no particular form of medical certificate to be insisted upon. What matters is whether, on the basis of questions put to the injured person, the Magistrate was satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind, and whether the declaration was truthful and voluntary.

PW-7 testified in cross-examination that Satyavati was calm when she gave her statement, was not under any distress or confusion, and spoke directly. He also stated that the deceased's family — husband or brothers-in-law — were not present when the declaration was recorded. PW-9, Dr. S.N. Gupta, the doctor who attended on Satyavati when she was admitted on 2 July 2015 at about 9:30 a.m., found her fully conscious and recorded approximately 80% burn injuries. His evidence confirmed that the police were informed about the victim to record the dying declaration as she had freshly received burn injuries. The Bench found that the combined testimony of PW-7 and PW-9, together with the doctor's endorsement on the declaration, placed it beyond doubt that Satyavati gave her statement in full possession of her senses.

On the discrepancy about the type of oil — vegetable oil in the dying declaration versus kerosene as indicated by the post-mortem smell — the Bench held that any person suffering 80% burn injuries could mistake the kind of oil used in an assault. This discrepancy did not discount the worth of the dying declaration.

Applying the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Panneerselvam v. State of T.N., (2008) 17 SCC 190, the Bench reiterated that a dying declaration that inspires full confidence can form the sole basis of conviction. Corroboration is merely a rule of prudence, not an absolute requirement of law. The Bench held the declaration free from tutoring, prompting, or imagination, and entitled to great weight.

Delay in the FIR: Why It Did Not Undermine the Prosecution

The Bench accepted that PW-1 was not present at the scene and is not an eyewitness. He was at his workplace and reached Ishwari Devi Hospital only at around 10:00 a.m. on 2 July 2015. He stated in cross-examination that he panicked, went to the police station the following day but his report was not registered, and he eventually obtained the assistance of Advocate S.C. Saxena to draft and lodge the written report.

The Bench observed that an FIR is the earliest information police receive about a cognizable offence, and all subsequent statements may not really qualify as the first information. In this case, the police could not have been unaware of the occurrence — the District Magistrate had issued a memo to the ACM to record the dying declaration on the very day of the incident. If the DM's office had that information, it was impossible that the police did not. The dying declaration itself carried the substance of what appears in the FIR. Given PW-1's explanation, the police's own resistance to registering the report, and the fact that Satyavati was still alive and fighting for her life when the delay began, the Bench held the delay of thirteen days was well explained in the totality of circumstances and not fatal to the prosecution.

Witnesses of Res Gestae and the Procedure for Contradicting Witnesses

The Bench addressed the evidence of Avaran Singh (PW-2) and Devi Singh (PW-3), who arrived at the scene shortly after the assault and saw Satyavati in flames. Neither was an eyewitness to the actual act of setting her afire. Both testified, however, that Satyavati, while suffering in the flames, was crying out and naming Tilluka as the person who had set her afire. PW-3, additionally, saw Tilluka at the place of occurrence, and saw Tilluka's brother and father fleeing their homes.

In cross-examination, each witness was confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., where the fact that Satyavati had named her assailant had apparently not been recorded. The defence sought to use this omission to discredit the witnesses. The Bench found that the Trial Court had not followed the correct procedure. Proper contradiction of a witness using a prior Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement requires that the relevant portion of that statement be marked — by brackets and identification marks such as AA, BB, and so on — and then specifically put to the witness. If the witness admits the omission, the portion stands proved. If denied, the Investigating Officer must separately prove the marked portion. Only then can it be used to contradict the witness.

The Bench referred to the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench decision in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17, which explained the interplay between the proviso to Section 162 Cr.P.C. and Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. It also drew on the recent Supreme Court decision in Vinod Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 3 SCC 680, which reiterated that portions of a prior statement used to contradict must be duly proved through the Investigating Officer before they can be reproduced in a deposition. The casual confrontation done by the Trial Court, without marking the relevant portions or proving them through the IO, was legally insufficient to discredit PW-2 or PW-3.

The Bench therefore held the testimony of both PW-2 and PW-3 in the dock to be admissible and reliable as witnesses of res gestae. Their evidence, corroborating the dying declaration, lent additional weight to the prosecution case, though the dying declaration alone was found sufficient.

The Argument That Tilluka Helped Convey Satyavati to Hospital

PW-10 (Bantoo), who provided the car that took Satyavati to hospital, testified that it was Tilluka and his mother who got her admitted and paid his fare. The Bench acknowledged this evidence but noted a significant inconsistency: PW-9, the attending doctor, stated from the hospital records that it was Mohan Singh son of Charan Singh who brought Satyavati for medical examination. There was no mention of Tilluka or his mother in the doctor's evidence. This inconsistency somewhat reduced PW-10's reliability on this specific point. In any event, the Bench held that even accepting that Tilluka helped convey Satyavati, this could not neutralise the overbearing weight of the dying declaration in which Satyavati clearly and unequivocally named Tilluka as her assailant.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no error in the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 25 October 2019 in S.T. No. 543 of 2015. The appeal was dismissed. The Registrar (Compliance) was directed to communicate the order to the appellant in jail through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra. The Trial Court record, along with a copy of the judgment, was directed to be transmitted to the court concerned.