Suit filed despite Supreme Court bar: Bombay HC recalls Rs 3.48 crore Aamby Valley decree
Justice Abhay Ahuja set aside an ex parte decree of 29 July 2021 against Aamby Valley Ltd and its subsidiary, finding special circumstances in a Supreme Court order that barred other courts from entertaining litigation over Aamby Valley City, but made the recall conditional on a deposit of Rs 3,48,39,298 within four weeks.
On 7 February 2018 the Supreme Court told every other court in the country not to entertain litigation about Aamby Valley City. A Bombay High Court summary suit against the company followed in 2019 and was decreed ex parte for Rs 3,48,39,298 in 2021. On 5 November 2026 the Court recalled the decree, on condition that the sum is deposited.
Justice Abhay Ahuja allowed Interim Application No. 5256 of 2025 by Aamby Valley Ltd and its wholly owned subsidiary, Qing Ambay City Developers Corporation Ltd. AYG Realty Pvt Ltd, the plaintiff, opposed it.
A decree challenged after three years
The suit was Commercial Summary Suit No. 414 of 2019. The decree of 29 July 2021 was for Rs 3,48,39,298 with interest at 9 percent a year until realisation. The applicants belong to the Sahara Group, which faces proceedings before the Supreme Court.
The application, filed on 28 November 2024 under Order IX Rule 13 and Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sought to recall the decree and stay its execution. On 18 December 2024 the Court had stayed the decree until the application was decided.
An embargo and a company in disarray
Ms Ambrin Khan appeared for the applicants. She pointed to contempt proceedings against the Sahara promoters that began in 2013. On 7 February 2018 the Supreme Court recorded in paragraph (viii) that no other court should hear litigation about Aamby Valley City.
“no other court in the country shall entertain any litigation” (para 4)
The order sat within a long chain, which she took the Court through. It included a 2017 attachment of the Aamby Valley property, a valuation and auction by the Official Liquidator, and an Official Receiver’s appointment in November 2017.
She said the plaintiff knew of those proceedings. In an application it filed with 17 others before the Supreme Court, it had withdrawn on 28 November 2016 once it learned of the restraints on selling Sahara property. Yet it sued here without disclosing the order, she argued, so the decree was obtained by fraud and was a nullity.
On service, she said no writ of summons or notice of hearing reached the applicants. A series of adverse Supreme Court orders had disrupted the company and left its management in disarray. The applicants learned of the decree only when notice came in proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai.
They told the NCLT of the 2018 order, and that tribunal adjourned its case without a date. The applicants then moved this Court in Interim Application (L) No. 7153 of 2024 and won a stay on 1 April 2024. That application was disposed of on 9 October 2024 with liberty to file the present one.
The plaintiff’s answers
Mr Shadab Jan appeared for AYG Realty. He said the application was barred by limitation, filed more than three and a half years after the decree, without an application to condone the delay or any reason for it.
He relied on a Bailiff’s Report of 5 July 2019, which showed the plaint and writ of summons were served on 13 April 2019. The suit was set down ex parte on 8 July 2019. A letter of 13 September 2021 had also sent the applicants a copy of the decree.
On the 2018 order, he said the applicants had taken it out of context to avoid paying. The Supreme Court never granted blanket immunity from debts, he argued, and the order lost force once the auction process ended.
He added that on 4 September 2024 the Supreme Court, on the plaintiff’s own application, gave liberty to proceed before any other forum, leaving all pleas open. The application, he said, was also barred by res judicata, being near-identical to the 2024 application, and set out no defence on the merits.
If the Court were inclined to allow it, he asked that the applicants first deposit the amount claimed, as the Supreme Court directed in Mahesh Kumar Joshi v. Madan Singh Negi.
The missing condonation application
Justice Ahuja began by saying the decree could be set aside on one ground alone: despite the order of 7 February 2018, the plaintiff filed the suit. He nonetheless dealt with the plaintiff’s other points.
He accepted that the Bailiff’s report showed registered post service on 13 April 2019, and that the application was delayed. But given the Supreme Court’s embargo, he found it believable that the company was not actively operating and that postal service may not have reached the right people.
On the missing application for condonation, he followed the Supreme Court in Dwarika Prasad v. Prithvi Raj Singh, which relied on Bhagmal v. Kunwar Lal. A technicality should not defeat a request where the application itself explains the delay. Here it contained a complete chronology and a detailed explanation, which he found sufficient cause.
What Order XXXVII Rule 4 requires
Rule 4 lets the Court that passed a summary decree set it aside in special circumstances. It may also stay or set aside execution, and give the defendant leave to appear and defend, on such terms as it thinks fit.
Justice Ahuja drew on Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra. There the Supreme Court said special circumstances are not defined and connote something exceptional or uncommon. A defendant must show circumstances unusual enough to justify putting the clock back, and facts that would entitle it to leave to defend.
Why the Court found special circumstances
The judge accepted that the applicants could not appear because of the disruption the Supreme Court orders caused. He noted orders in other cases in this Court, where the applicants were served, appeared and placed the Supreme Court order on record, and the Court declined to proceed.
He held the circumstances to be
“uncommon and exceptional in character” (para 42)
and enough to justify setting the decree aside. The applicants, he found, had shown the special circumstances that kept them from appearing or applying for leave to defend in 2021.
On the embargo itself he rejected the plaintiff’s reading. The order plainly barred any court from entertaining litigation about Aamby Valley City, he said, and the applicants form part of the group. Liberty to proceed came only with the order of 4 September 2024.
The Court said it could not have entertained the suit had the plaintiff told it of the restriction, which still operated when the suit was filed and when the decree was passed. It found the plaintiff’s reading to be erroneous and misplaced.
Res judicata and the balance of convenience
On res judicata, the judge pointed to the earlier application, Interim Application (Lodging) No. 7153 of 2024. It had been disposed of on 9 October 2024 in view of the Supreme Court order of 4 September 2024, with liberty to seek relief under Order IX Rule 13. Res judicata, he held, could not apply.
On balance of convenience, he said the filing of the suit did not observe the Supreme Court order, and it would be unfair not to let the applicants defend. The judgment does not separately take up the plaintiff’s point that no merits defence had been set out.
To balance the equities, he allowed the application only on a deposit of the decretal sum. He relied on Mahesh Kumar Joshi, which the plaintiff had cited. The decree had held the applicants owed money, he noted.
Order
The application is allowed on one condition. The applicants must deposit Rs 3,48,39,298 in the High Court within four weeks of the order being uploaded, in terms of Order XXXVII Rule 4.
On deposit, the ex parte decree of 29 July 2021 stands recalled and set aside, and the applicants have leave to defend the suit. They must file their written statement within 30 days of the deposit, and the suit will then be heard on merits.