Justice S.V. Kotwal Justice R.R. Bhonsale Bombay HC PROBATE GRANTED A will upheld after 36 years
[ Bombay High Court ]

Gifts and a pilgrimage are not undue influence, Bombay HC says in granting a daughter probate

A Division Bench reversed a 2010 single judge ruling that treated gifts, a pilgrimage and passport help from a London-based daughter as bait, holding that Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act and Supreme Court precedent point the other way.

A daughter living in London came to Mumbai in April 1989 with gifts for her mother, took her on a pilgrimage and helped her get a passport. A month later her mother signed a Will leaving her the estate.

A single judge called all this bait. On 4 November 2026, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court called it ordinary.

Justice Sarang Vijaykumar Kotwal delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, with Justice Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale, allowing Appeal No. 112 of 2011. He set aside the judgment of 21 September 2010 and granted probate of the Will dated 24 May 1989.

Two wills, one estate

Shantaben Ambalal Patel died in Mumbai on 14 July 1990. Her daughter, Meena Vasant Patel, sought probate of a Will dated 24 May 1989 and named herself sole executrix. Her brother, Prithviraj Ambalal Patel, filed a caveat and denied that his mother had signed it.

The Will gave Meena Shantaben's 50 per cent share in the partnership firm A.P. Patel and Company, and the residue of her estate. Paragraph 6 explained why the son got nothing: he had received enough under his father's Will, had mismanaged the firm and had sold properties without giving her share.

Prithviraj propounded his own Will, dated 9 March 1990, which he said revoked the earlier one. A single judge heard both suits together and dismissed both. Prithviraj did not appeal, so the refusal of probate for his Will had become final.

In his affidavit Prithviraj called the 1989 Will forged and bogus. He said the signature differed from his mother’s usual one and that the Will was unnatural, since she had lived with his family while Meena lived in London.

He said his mother’s last Will, dated 9 March 1990, divided property among almost all the family, Meena and her daughters included. The court recorded that he never examined either attesting witness to that second Will.

Evidence from both siblings

Meena gave evidence as PW-1. She said her mother had diabetes and high blood pressure but was of sound mental health, and that her brother was not looking after her. She said the family solicitors prepared the Will after her mother asked to be taken to them.

Under cross-examination she described her mother’s relations with her brother’s household as painful and unhealthy. She did not remember whether her brother could have heard her mother ask to see the solicitors.

Prithviraj said the Will was bogus and procured by undue influence, and that his mother had loved his children. He accepted that she was educated in Gujarati and did not know English.

Why the single judge refused probate

The single judge found that Meena had arrived about a month before the Will, bringing jewellery put at Rs 5 lakh or about 5,000 pounds sterling, besides other gifts. She had taken her mother to Ambaji and helped with a passport for a possible visit to London.

Sitting in the testatrix’s armchair, the judge said, it was impossible to conceive that she would disinherit her only son and his children. He said Meena had won her mother over, and called the passport the possible ultimate bait. He rejected her evidence as unworthy of acceptance.

The judge listed eight circumstances brought out in Meena’s cross-examination, among them the pilgrimage, the gifts, the plan to take her mother to London, the passport and the mother’s unproduced written complaints. He noted that there were no physical threats, and that the son had paid for a cook, a driver and a servant in 1989.

What each side argued

Mr Gaurav Joshi, Senior Advocate for Meena, said a daughter bringing gifts for her mother proved no undue influence. He relied on illustrations (vii) and (viii) to Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which protect a Will made in free exercise of judgment even after persuasion, attention or flattery.

He said the attesting witness had proved execution under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Leaving out a son, he argued, is not itself suspicious, citing the Supreme Court in Parvathi Nairthi, K.S. Dinachandran and Naresh Charan Das Gupta.

Mr Bhupesh Dhumatkar, for the son’s legal heirs, called the exclusion of the son and his children a glaring suspicious circumstance. He pointed to contradictions between Meena and the attesting witness about who was in the room, and said the Will was in technical language.

He added that Meena had not proved the son mismanaged the business or ill-treated their mother. He relied on Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta to say that suspicious factors must be weighed together.

The solicitor who drew the Will

The Bench began with the attesting witness, Mr Mrunal Shah, a solicitor and the testatrix’s neighbour since 1960. He said Shantaben called him herself, gave instructions on 24 May 1989 and was asked to return after lunch while he prepared the draft.

He read the Will to her and explained it in Gujarati. The other attesting witness, Rekha Brahmbhat, also explained it in Gujarati. Shantaben then signed it, and both witnesses signed in her presence and in each other’s presence. He said she was of sound and disposing mind.

The Bench found no reason to disbelieve him. Nothing showed he had been won over by Meena or had any interest in giving false evidence. It held that execution of the Will was proved and that every requirement of valid execution was met.

Who was in the room

The son’s side made much of whether Meena and her daughters were inside the solicitor’s chamber. The witness said he took care that only the testatrix was inside when she signed. The Bench said it was understandable that they accompanied her to the office without being present at the signing.

It saw nothing unusual in a mother taking her daughter to the solicitor if she meant to leave everything to her. There was no evidence of pressure in the office, or that Meena interfered while the Will was drafted.

Gifts, a pilgrimage and a passport

The gifts and the pilgrimage were the main reason that weighed with the single judge. The Bench found nothing unnatural in them. Meena lived in the United Kingdom and was financially well off, so it was natural for her to bring gifts.

It called it too much to hold that a mother would hand over her entire property because of them.

Illustrations (vii) and (viii) to Section 61, it said, apply directly. A Will is not invalid because of affection, flattery or expensive gifts, or even persuasion, and here there was no direct evidence that Meena had persuaded her mother.

The Bench added two practical points. Meena went back to the United Kingdom after the Will and was still there when her mother died. Shantaben knew her solicitor well, yet nothing showed she tried to cancel the Will, or told her son of it, though he said relations were cordial.

It accepted the Supreme Court statement in Naresh Charan Das Gupta that not every influence is undue. A person may plead a case before a testator and persuade the testator, and the Will stands if mental capacity is retained and there is no fraud or coercion.

A son left out of the Will

The Bench relied on Parvathi Nairthi and Uma Devi Nambiar v. T.C. Sidhan for the rule that exclusion of natural heirs, by itself, is not a suspicious circumstance. A Will exists to alter the ordinary line of succession.

On the reasons in paragraph 6, it said they were the testatrix’s own. It was not for Meena to prove that the son mismanaged the business. Once the Will was held validly executed by Shantaben’s own volition, those reasons could not be proved or disproved by outside evidence.

Excluding the grandchildren, who lived in the same Mumbai flat, was not suspicious either, since the Will gave the same reason that the family had received enough under her husband’s Will.

Weighing every factor together

The court framed six points for determination, the first of which was:

"Whether the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will are suspicious circumstances ?" (para 44)

Kavita Kanwar lists factors that cannot decide a case alone: a beneficiary’s active role in execution, an attesting witness who is an acquaintance, unequal distribution, or some discrepancy in oral evidence. The court must weigh their quality and combined effect on the testatrix’s free agency.

Applying that test, the Bench concluded:

"we do not find anything suspicious about the said Will" (para 62)

It answered the questions against the son on all counts: the circumstances were not suspicious, the Will was validly executed, there was no undue influence, coercion or fraud, and the exclusion of the son and his family did not make it unnatural.

Order

The appeal is allowed. The single judge judgment and decree of 21 September 2010 in Testamentary Suit No. 48 of 1990 is set aside. Probate of the Will of Shantaben Ambalal Patel dated 24 May 1989 is granted, and a decree is to be drawn up accordingly.

Prithviraj Patel died during the appeal and was represented by his legal heirs, who were the respondents. The judgment was reserved on 26 October 2026 and pronounced on 4 November 2026.