Justice S.M. Modak Bombay HC APPLICATION DISMISSED A film refund, a trade body, anda decision that stands
[ Bombay High Court ]

Bombay HC finds arbitration agreement behind film distributors body ruling on Rs 23 lakh refund

Justice S.M. Modak dismissed an application by the heirs of producer Kiran Ramsay to throw out execution of a 2009 decision of the Indian Motion Picture Distributors Association, holding that letters signed by both sides and the complaints the producer himself made to the association showed they had agreed to its adjudication.

A film distributor has been trying since 2016 to recover Rs 23,00,000 under a decision a film trade body gave in 2009. On 5 November 2026 the Bombay High Court refused to end that execution, holding that the producer and the distributor had agreed in writing to take their dispute to the body.

Justice S.M. Modak dismissed Interim Application No. 2543 of 2025 in Execution Application No. 1261 of 2016. The application was filed by the producer’s widow and daughter, who argued that no arbitral award existed to be executed.

A film, a refund and a missing producer

Royal Screening, a proprietorship of Mrs Heena D. Dhanwani, acting through her attorney holder Dilip Dhanwani, distributes films. Om Film Company, a proprietorship of Kiran Ramsay, produced the film Good Luck. Mr Ramsay has since died, and his wife Reshma and daughter Anita were brought on record as legal heirs.

Om Film Company assigned theatrical rights for five years on a minimum guarantee basis for Rs 28,70,000. The terms were recorded in a letter of 15 May 2008 signed by both sides. A later letter of 17 August 2008 cut the guarantee to Rs 5,70,000, with Rs 23,00,000 treated as refundable.

A dispute followed. A three-member Adjudication Sub-Committee of the Indian Motion Picture Distributors Association, or IMPDA, called the debtor. The debtor stayed away, and on 14 October 2009 the committee directed Om Film Company and Keshu Ramsay to refund Rs 23,00,000.

The case for ending the execution

Mr Ashish Gatagat appeared for the heirs. He argued that the letter of 15 May 2008 was a complaint, not a reference to arbitration. The sub-committee was not an arbitral tribunal, so its decision could not be an award.

He pointed out that the joint letter of 17 July 2008, which postponed the film’s release, has no arbitration clause. His client was a producer, not a member of IMPDA, and no notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had been given.

He also cited the association’s rules, under which lawyers cannot appear before its adjudication committee. The Executive Committee can declare a defaulting party a defaulter, he said, which is a separate mechanism that made execution in court unsustainable. He relied on Shakeel Noorani v. Sanjay Dutt, decided on 7 April 2014.

What the distributor answered

Mr Jaineel Vashi appeared for the decree holder. He said the 17 July 2008 letter needed no clause because the 15 May 2008 letter, signed by both sides and sent to IMPDA the same day, already contained one.

The debtor had also used the association’s mechanism itself, he said, through letters of 5 July, 16 July and 7 August 2008. A party that took the benefit of the process, he argued, cannot later say it was not arbitration.

He distinguished Shakeel Noorani on its facts. He cited the Supreme Court decisions in Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala on the Section 21 notice, Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur on the form of an agreement, Prasun Roy v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia.

The question the judge framed

Justice Modak put the single issue this way:

“Whether the decision by the Adjudication Sub–Committee of Indian Motion Picture Distributors’ Association, Mumbai dated 14th October 2009 can be said to be an Arbitration Award, within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996” (para 1)

He began with Section 7 of the Act. An arbitration agreement needs the parties to have agreed to refer a dispute, in writing, signed by them. It can be a clause in a contract, a separate agreement or an exchange of letters.

On Section 21, he said the notice matters only for working out limitation under Section 43. Following Bhagheeratha Engineering, it is not mandatory, so the lack of one did not help the heirs.

Why Shakeel Noorani did not apply

Justice Modak agreed that the facts of Shakeel Noorani were different. The difference, he said, lay not in the status of the parties but in the documents they signed.

The body in that case was an association of producers, while this one is of distributors. The claimant there was a producer and the respondent an actor, and nothing showed any agreement to refer the dispute to the association.

That judgment had also referred to Pride of Asia Films v. Essel Vision. There an undertaking to accept the Chairman’s decision was held not to be an arbitration agreement, because it imposed no duty on the committee to decide judicially and impartially.

Two reasons the debtor lost

The judge accepted that the joint letter of 17 July 2008 has no clause referring disputes to IMPDA. He nonetheless rejected the debtor’s contention, for two reasons.

First, both sides signed the letter of 15 May 2008, which provides that a dispute over interpretation, operation or enforcement of the terms is to go to IMPDA for adjudication. The same clause appears in their letter of the same date to IMPDA, which also says they will not take any dispute to another body, Film Makers Combine.

Second, the debtor itself invoked the process. By letters of 3 July, 16 July and 7 August 2008 it asked IMPDA to declare the distributor a defaulter or to act against it. The complaint was that the film was not being released until a censor certificate was issued.

Reading the association’s rules

The judge then went through the bye-laws. Rule 9 provides for adjudication, including disputes with non-members. A complaint is registered under Rule 11, notice goes to the defendant under Rule 12, and parties are invited to appear under Rule 13 if no settlement is reached.

Under Rule 14 the committee must hear both sides, including evidence, and follow natural justice. Rule 18 sets a time limit, with a final decision written on stamp paper and declared within one month of the final hearing.

He concluded there are trappings of judicial proceeding. The bar on lawyers in Rule 15, he added, cannot be a ground to challenge an award.

Defaulter list and court are separate remedies

The heirs had argued that the Executive Committee’s power to declare a defaulter replaced court execution. The judge distinguished the two. The Adjudication Committee decides the dispute, while the Executive Committee can declare a person a defaulter for non-compliance.

The rules give the Executive Committee no way to compel compliance, he said. If a party does not act on the decision, approaching the court is always open. Execution in court and relief as to defaulter are separate remedies.

Order

The judge concluded that

“there is an Arbitration Agreement in between the parties” (para 15)

to refer the dispute to IMPDA, whose Adjudication Committee must follow a set procedure before deciding. Both parties had consented to refer the dispute to it, he said, so Shakeel Noorani did not apply.

He found no merit in the application and dismissed it. The order does not deal with costs.