Justice G. Godse Bombay HC APPEALS ALLOWED Possession decree set aside
[ Bombay High Court ]

Bombay HC sets aside Pune bungalow eviction: old-grant land, so Union of India is no tenant

Justice Gauri Godse held that the Pune Cantonment plot was granted on old grant terms, that the Union was not a tenant, and that the 15-day notice of 5 June 1980 was invalid under a lease that required six months.

A suit filed in 1980 for a bungalow in Pune Cantonment lost its main relief in the Bombay High Court on 18 November. Justice Gauri Godse set aside the decree that had ordered the Union of India and the Military Estate Officer to hand over possession of the 0.85-acre property.

She held that the land was granted on old grant terms, so the Union could not be treated as the plaintiffs’ tenant. The plaintiffs’ 15-day notice to quit was also invalid under the lease, which required six months.

The court partly allowed two second appeals, Second Appeal 15 of 1987 and Second Appeal 16 of 1987, which it decided together. It left the rulings on rent and damages as they stood, and kept open whatever right the plaintiffs have under the lease terms.

A bungalow on cantonment land

The suit property is land at Survey No 742, measuring 0.85 acres, in the Pune Cantonment area, with all construction on it, including a bungalow. The plaintiffs were the Anklesaria family trust and its trustee, now represented by his legal heirs.

They said they owned the land and the structure outright. The defendants first took the property on hire under the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1923, they said, and later by lease.

The last lease was a Repairing Lease of 19 April 1940, for five years from 21 February 1938, at Rs 167.11 a month. They said it expired on 21 February 1943, after which the defendants held over as monthly tenants.

The 1972 resumption notice

On 29 January 1972 the Union issued a notice saying the land had been granted to the plaintiffs’ predecessor on old grant terms and was liable to be resumed. It paid Rs 29,596 for the structure, which the plaintiffs accepted under protest, and stopped paying monthly rent.

The plaintiffs challenged the notice in Special Civil Application 1286 of 1972. A Division Bench held that the defendants could not act on it and declared it without authority of law.

On 5 June 1980 the plaintiffs sent a notice forfeiting the tenancy and asking for possession. They sued in Special Civil Suit 477 of 1980 for possession, arrears of rent and damages, and the suit was filed on 1 December 1980.

The defendants answered that the land belonged to the Government and the plaintiffs held only occupancy rights. They also argued that, because the structure was held on monthly tenancy, the civil court had no jurisdiction.

Two courts ruled for the plaintiffs

The trial court decreed the suit on 27 April 1984. It ordered the defendants to hand over vacant possession and pay Rs 8,000 as damages, but refused arrears of rent.

It held that the civil court had jurisdiction, that the defendants had not proved an old grant, and that by setting up a superior title they had denied the plaintiffs’ title.

Both sides appealed. By a common judgment of 30 April 1986 the District Court dismissed the defendants’ appeal and partly allowed the plaintiffs’, granting arrears of rent but setting them off against the compensation already paid.

The first appellate court held that the suit lay under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that the tenancy had been terminated by the plaintiffs’ notice. The High Court admitted the second appeals on 20 February 1987.

The Supreme Court’s 1988 direction

The second appeals went to the Supreme Court and were sent back on 20 July 1988. The Supreme Court directed that they be decided in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the Division Bench’s findings on the resumption notice.

It also gave liberty to lead additional evidence, and a Division Bench order of 19 April 1991 allowed the defendants to do so. In connected appeals, on 4 August 1998, the Supreme Court recorded the Solicitor General’s statement that the Union would seek dispossession of the occupants in accordance with law.

Justice Godse said she had examined the whole documentary and oral evidence, including the additional evidence, because of that order. The plaintiffs had argued that a second appeal does not allow the evidence to be reappraised.

What the court had to decide

The second appeals were admitted on three points framed by the first appellate court. The court set them out as its questions of law:

“3. Whether the suit should be brought under Bombay Rent Act or under T.P. Act ? 4. Whether the Plaintiffs have served valid notice on the defendant ? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession?” (para 2)

Mr Atul Damle, Senior Advocate for the Union, argued that the land belonged to the Government under a General Order of 6 January 1827. The plaintiffs held only occupancy rights, he said.

Mr R D Soni, for the plaintiffs, argued that the 1918 sale deed showed absolute ownership. A tenant in possession, he said, cannot dispute the landlord’s title.

The Rent Act did not apply

The court first took the Rent Act question. The first lease, of 19 October 1929, followed notice under Sections 6 and 7 of the Cantonments Act, it found, so the plaintiffs’ case on that lease had substance.

Nothing showed that the agreement of 10 August 1935 or the Repairing Lease of 19 April 1940 followed that procedure. They appeared to be private agreements, the court said.

The Rent Act was extended to Pune Cantonment by a notification of 27 December 1969, but with a substituted exemption clause in Section 4(1). Clause (ii) excludes any tenancy in respect of cantonment premises taken on lease by the Government.

The Rent Act therefore did not apply, the court held. The defendants’ plea that the civil court had no jurisdiction under the Rent Act failed.

Old grant, not absolute ownership

The court then turned to title, on which both sides claimed ownership. The plaintiffs relied on a registered sale deed of 6 September 1918. It named no source of title for the seller, so it could pass on only the seller’s valid title and no more, the court said.

The General Land Register extract recorded the land as Class B-3, with the plaintiffs as holders of occupancy rights under old grant conditions of the General Order of 6 January 1827. That order says permission to build on cantonment ground gives no right of property in the ground, which stays with the State and can be resumed.

The plaintiffs had never challenged the entry. The court quoted Rule 8(ii) of the Military Lands Manual. Class B-3 alone does not prove that land is Crown property, but land over which the Government is known to have no proprietary rights must be classed as private, and this land was not.

The plaintiffs argued that no register entry from before the 1918 sale was produced. The court found no substance in this, since the sale deed itself showed no valid source of title.

A permission for an extra room, sought in 1885, referred only to occupancy rights and the Government’s power of resumption. The additional documents, a letter of 15 August 1918, a Cantonment Magistrate’s reply and a release deed, all said only occupancy rights had passed.

All of them showed the land was not privately owned and had been given on an old grant, the court held. The leases themselves protected the Government’s right of resumption.

Two Supreme Court rulings on cantonment land

The court relied on Chief Executive Officer v Surendra Kumar Vakil, a Sagar Cantonment case in which the Supreme Court held that title to cantonment land cannot be transferred, only occupancy rights that the Government can resume.

It then relied on Union of India v Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari ((2014) 14 SCC 204), which concerned another bungalow in Pune Cantonment and the same Division Bench order. The Supreme Court there held that the land belonged to the Union and that the plaintiffs had rights only in the structure.

That ruling also held that the Transfer of Property Act yields to the Government Grants Act, so a grant takes effect according to its terms. The facts here were similar, Justice Godse said, and those principles applied squarely.

On the basis of those principles she concluded:

“the Union of India cannot be held as a tenant” (para 72)

So there was nothing to terminate by notice under Sections 106 and 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. She answered the second part of the first question in the defendants’ favour.

Fifteen days given, six months owed

The plaintiffs’ notice of 5 June 1980 invoked the Transfer of Property Act. The court found that the lease governed termination separately: at the end of the term, or of any later completed year, on at least six months’ written notice.

The plaintiffs gave no such notice. They issued a 15-day notice and sued on 1 December 1980, before six months had passed.

Non-payment of rent after accepting the compensation was not a breach of the agreement, the court held, and efflux of time was not available since the defendants stayed on. The notice was not valid for seeking possession, and the second question went to the defendants.

Plaintiffs’ authorities rejected

The plaintiffs had relied on Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v Union of India, where the Supreme Court barred the Union from using a summary eviction procedure after the Solicitor General’s statement. The court held that the case did not apply, because here the Supreme Court had directed a fresh decision on title.

It also set aside the plaintiffs’ reliance on State of Andhra Pradesh v D Raghukul Pershad, on a tenant’s estoppel against the landlord. Estoppel did not apply, it said, because the suit rested on absolute ownership and on termination under the Transfer of Property Act, and the right of resumption was protected by the agreement.

No possession without title

On the third question, the court found no satisfactory evidence of the plaintiffs’ absolute ownership of the land. Building a bungalow on granted land gives a right in the structure, it said, and does not turn occupancy rights into ownership.

The register entries, the court added:

“create a strong presumption in favour of the appellants” (para 79)

The Division Bench had declared the resumption notice unlawful because the Union showed no right governing resumption, but it had not decided title. The plaintiffs had also not prayed for a declaration of title, so they were not entitled to possession as prayed.

Order

The second appeals are partly allowed. The plaintiffs’ right, if any, under the lease agreements to seek possession of the bungalow is kept open.

No question of law was framed on rent, set-off and damages. The first appellate court rightly set aside the refusal of arrears and granted set-off against the compensation the plaintiffs had received, and the claim for additional damages was correctly dismissed.

The first appellate court’s judgment of 30 April 1986 in the plaintiffs’ Civil Appeal 90 of 1985 is confirmed. Its judgment of that date in the defendants’ appeal is set aside.

The trial court’s decree of 27 April 1984 in Special Civil Suit 477 of 1980 is quashed to the extent of the decree for the plaintiffs to recover possession, and stands modified accordingly.

The operative clause also refers to an inquiry on mesne profits and costs, without elaborating. There is no order as to costs.