Calcutta High Court Affirms Rape Conviction, Directs State Legal Services Authority to Ensure Victim Receives Compensation

Dismissing a 2004 criminal appeal, Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das upheld the conviction under Section 376 IPC and directed the State Legal Services Authority to facilitate compensation for the victim.

The High Court at Calcutta has dismissed a criminal appeal filed by Anil Kumar Gupta against his conviction under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for rape. Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das, sitting singly, affirmed the order of conviction passed on 12 December 2003 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, 1st Court, Asansol, Burdwan. The court found the victim's testimony credible and consistent throughout cross-examination, and held that the several lapses in investigation did not justify setting aside the conviction. Separately, the court directed the Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority to take appropriate steps to ensure the victim could avail herself of the compensation scheme under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a provision that had not been in force at the time of the original trial.

The Complaint and Trial History

The complaint was lodged on 23 October 1998 at Asansol Police Station by the victim, who alleged that the appellant — a friend of her elder brother who regularly visited their home — came to the house one afternoon in March 1998 when her parents were absent, forcibly took her inside, and committed rape. He then assured her he would marry her, which led her to stay silent. Subsequent physical relations followed on the basis of that promise. She became pregnant, and the appellant continued to delay the marriage with various excuses. After eight months, she delivered a male child. When the appellant finally refused to marry her, she filed the complaint.

Asansol Police Station Case No. 224/98 was registered under Sections 376 and 493 IPC. After investigation and commitment, the matter was placed before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Asansol, where the charge was framed under Section 376 IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial court, after assessing the evidence of six prosecution witnesses, convicted the appellant. He filed CRA 305 of 2004 before the High Court, represented by an advocate engaged by the Calcutta High Court Legal Services Committee.

Challenges Raised by the Appellant

The appellant's counsel raised several challenges to the prosecution case. The victim was described as a Hindi-speaking girl who stated her age as 19 years when she deposed in 2003, yet claimed she was 14 at the time of the incident in 1998 — a discrepancy the defence argued was unresolved because no ossification report was placed before the court and no birth certificate was produced. The brother named in the complaint as someone the victim had informed was never examined. PW 1, a local resident, was not examined by the police. The scribe of the complaint was not examined, and no statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The defence also pointed to the absence of any seizure of wearing apparel, no documentary proof of the child's birth, and the fact that the investigating officer who submitted the chargesheet was never examined. The appellant denied all allegations during his examination under Section 313 CrPC and stated that the victim's father was responsible for her pregnancy — a claim that local people had also allegedly made when they surrounded the police station to protest the filing of the complaint. On these grounds, the defence argued the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The Prosecution's Position

The prosecution argued that the complaint itself clearly described how the offence was committed and how the promise of marriage was used to silence the victim. The delay in lodging the complaint was explained by the victim's illiteracy, her inability to communicate effectively, and her continued hope that the appellant would honour his promise. The prosecution emphasised that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident and that the appellant had exploited her vulnerability with full knowledge of her age.

Evidence Assessed by the Court

Justice Chatterjee Das examined the evidence of all six prosecution witnesses in detail. PW 1, Narayan Yadav, denied knowing the victim by name. PW 2, Bina Sharma, the victim's maternal aunt, deposed that the accused used to visit the house and was on friendly terms with the victim, that he committed rape and assured marriage, and that the family came to know of the pregnancy only when the victim complained of stomach pain and was taken to a doctor. The aunt also described the agitation at the police station when the complaint was lodged, the victim being slapped, and the family ultimately having to approach the DSP before the police accepted the complaint. In cross-examination, the aunt acknowledged that the local people who assembled at the police station alleged the complaint was false.

PW 3, the Superintendent at Raiganj District Hospital, confirmed from the hospital logbook that the victim was admitted on 7 October 1998 and delivered a male child on 9 October 1998. PW 4, the victim herself, deposed that the appellant came to her shop, took her inside the house, and forcibly committed rape while putting his hand over her mouth. She stated the incident occurred around 3 PM when no one was in the field. She confirmed that subsequent physical relations took place on the basis of his promise to marry, that she informed her mother about a marriage at a Kali temple, and that she gave birth in hospital. She could not recall the specific date of the incident but identified the month as March 1998. She withstood cross-examination and maintained her account throughout.

PW 5, the victim's mother, corroborated that the accused frequently visited the house in her absence despite being rebuked, that she learned of the pregnancy from a doctor, and that after the delivery the accused and others created trouble when the victim returned home with the child. She confirmed that her daughter had told her about a marriage at the Kali temple.

The court noted several investigative failures: the second investigating officer who submitted the chargesheet was not examined; no ossification report was filed despite a prayer having been made; no bed-head ticket from the hospital was collected; the discharge certificates seized by the first IO were not placed before the court; and the logbook did not disclose the name of the father of the child. The court observed that this reflected a “lackadaisical attitude on the part of the investigating authority” but held that it would be a travesty of justice to ignore an offence like rape solely on the ground of faulty investigation.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Chatterjee Das applied the settled proposition that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix can sustain a conviction if it inspires confidence, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh, which held that corroboration is not a requirement of law but a matter of prudence, and that minor contradictions are not a ground for discarding the prosecutrix's evidence.

The court also drew on the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gurmeet Singh (AIR 1996 SC 1393), which cautioned against testing a victim's evidence with suspicion as though she were an accomplice, and directed courts to draw inferences from facts with realistic diversity rather than rigid uniformity.

On the question of consent vitiated by a false promise to marry, the court referred to Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608, which held that for consent to be vitiated under Section 90 IPC, the promise of marriage must have been false at the time it was given and must bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. The court found both conditions met: the appellant had never intended to marry the victim, had continued to make false promises even after she became pregnant and delivered the child, and had ultimately denied paternity without ever seeking a DNA test.

The court rejected the defence narrative that the victim's father was responsible for her pregnancy, finding it unsupported by any cogent evidence and characterising it as an afterthought raised to discredit the prosecution case. No neighbour adduced evidence supporting that allegation. The court also noted that the appellant appeared to be an influential person, given that the police initially refused to accept the complaint and the police station was surrounded by a mob of fifty or more people, forcing the victim to be shifted to her aunt's house.

On the victim's age, the court found it disputed but observed that the hospital paper at the time of delivery recorded her age as 19 years in 1998, which would mean she was under 18 at the time of the incident. The court held that the overall circumstances showed the victim was very young, that the appellant had gained access to her home through her brother's friendship, and that she had been an easy target given her age and the assurances made to her.

The court gave weight to the trial court's observation of witness demeanour, noting that the trial court was in the best position to assess credibility and that its findings should not be disturbed unless grossly improbable. The court found no illegality or improbable reasoning in the trial court's order of conviction.

Direction on Victim Compensation

The court separately addressed the question of victim compensation. Since the incident predated the insertion of Section 357A into the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2017, the original trial order had only directed payment of fine under Section 357 CrPC and did not reflect any entitlement under the compensation scheme. The court held that the victim, as a survivor of sexual assault, must not be deprived of the benefit of the scheme merely because the provision was not in force at the time of the trial. It directed the Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority to take appropriate steps to ensure the victim could avail herself of the scheme.

Order

CRA 305 of 2004 was dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, 1st Court, Asansol, was affirmed. The bail bond executed by the appellant was cancelled. The Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority was directed to take appropriate steps to ensure the victim receives the benefit of the compensation scheme. A copy of the judgment along with the trial court record was directed to be sent to the concerned court for information and appropriate action.