Justice R. Chattopadhyay Calcutta HC MATTER REMANDED Two penalties welded into oneorder, sent back to the bank
[ Calcutta High Court ]

Pay cut and frozen increments cannot be stacked: Calcutta HC remits SBI demonetisation penalty

Justice Rai Chattopadhyay left untouched the findings that an SBI assistant deposited Rs 4.20 lakh in cash and swapped Rs 2.92 lakh of old notes in 2016, but held that Rules 6(e) and 6(f) of the 2002 settlement are alternatives, and sent the penalty back to the bank.

A State Bank of India assistant lost his challenge to findings of misconduct over demonetisation-era transactions, and won on the punishment. On 12 November 2026 the Calcutta High Court held that the bank could not combine a pay reduction and a stoppage of increments in one order.

Justice Rai Chattopadhyay read the word “or” between Rules 6(e) and 6(f) of the 2002 Memorandum of Settlement as separating two distinct penalties. The court sent the penalty back to the disciplinary authority and ordered the withheld benefits released.

Explain the cash in your accounts

The petitioner, Suman Saha, joined SBI as an Assistant on or about 17 December 2012. He was working as a Customer Assistant at the Madhyamgram Chowrasta Branch when the bank asked him to explain cash deposits of Rs 2,00,000 in each of two savings accounts.

His reply cited his mother’s pension and illness, his mother-in-law’s recent heart attack, construction and repairs at his house, cash gifts, household savings and a relative’s marriage. He said notes held for those needs were deposited because demonetisation made them unusable.

The bank suspended him on 4 February 2017. A show-cause notice of 31 May 2017 listed three allegations, and after his reply of 27 June 2017 the bank revoked the suspension on 31 August 2017, without prejudice to proceeding under the service rules.

Three charges and two corrigenda

The charge-sheet of 21 September 2017 alleged gross misconduct under Clause 5(j) of the Memorandum of Settlement of 10 April 2002. Charge 1 was cash deposits of Rs 4,20,000 disproportionate to his known income. Charge 2 was swapping old notes during demonetisation against the bank’s instructions.

Charge 3 was misuse of other persons’ accounts to exchange old notes. A corrigendum of 3 January 2018 recast it to add withdrawals beyond the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) ceiling and use of his salary account as an intermediary.

One listed transaction involved Rs 98,000 deposited through a cash machine on 17 November 2016. A vendor’s employee passed it on to a third person, who by his own statement gave Mr Saha that sum in old notes.

A second corrigendum, of 10 January 2018, cut the swapping charge from Rs 4,92,500 to Rs 2,92,500 by removing two entries of Rs 1,00,000 each. The remaining entries ran from 12 November 2016 to 26 December 2016.

From enquiry to a two-stage pay cut

The enquiry began on 11 January 2018 and the report followed on 23 February 2018. Mr Saha objected on 16 March. On 27 March the bank proposed a reduction in his pay scale by two stages for two years, and he objected again on 28 March.

On 29 March 2018 the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty under Rule 6(e): reduction by two stages for two years, with no increments during that period and no postponement of later increments on its expiry. The appellate authority dismissed his appeal on 27 December 2018, finding the penalty commensurate with the gravity of the charges.

The petitioner: no evidence, and a double penalty

The petitioner’s counsel said the penalty order was mechanical and the findings rested on no evidence. On Charge 1, the explanations for the Rs 2.20 lakh and Rs 2 lakh deposits were neither believed nor considered, and the enquiry officer looked only at his 2016 salary.

On Charge 2, no RBI circular or bank order barring the swapping was produced, and PW-1 himself said there was none. The exchanges were made during extraordinary circumstances, with no gain to Mr Saha and no loss to the bank. On Charge 3, he said, routing funds through an account proves nothing without more.

He cited United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee on when findings can be disturbed. His main point was the penalty.

Rule 6 lists punishments separated by the word “or”, so only one could be imposed, and the order combined Rules 6(e) and 6(f). He cited Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax, Patna v. Union of India to say “or” cannot be read as “and”.

The bank: findings sound, penalty lawful

Ms Deblina Lahiri appeared for the bank. On Charge 1 she said the cash deposited within days of demonetisation was disproportionate to his income and length of service, and he had not filed assets and liabilities statements. On Charge 2 she said separate written instructions were unnecessary, and the evidence of PW-1, read whole, referred to the RBI circulars.

A departmental enquiry, she said, needs proof on a preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. The disciplinary authority concurred with the enquiry officer that Charge 3 was partly proved.

She said nothing in Rule 6 bars more than one form of punishment for separate proved acts. Rule 9 only bars more than one punishment for any one charge, and here two charges were proved and a third partly, so Rules 6(e) and 6(f) could both be used. The word “or”, she added, is not always mutually exclusive.

She relied on Union of India v. M. Duraisamy, Deputy General Manager v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, Income Tax Officer v. Biju Patnaik, Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank and Union of India v. Dalbir Singh on the limits of judicial review, reasons and the standard of proof.

Two questions, two different standards

The court framed two questions. The first was whether the disciplinary findings can be interfered with under Article 226. The second was whether the penalty actually imposed is legally permissible, given that Rules 6(e) and 6(f) are mutually exclusive.

The two operate in different spheres, the court said. A finding of misconduct, even if sustainable, cannot dispense with the need for a punishment that conforms to the governing rules.

On the first, the court restated the settled limits. The High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over a departmental enquiry and cannot reassess evidence because another view is possible. It can interfere where findings rest on no evidence, ignore relevant material, rely on irrelevant material, are mala fide or are perverse, as Biswanath Bhattacharjee recognises.

Why the findings stood

The court set out the sequence from the first query to the penalty order. It held that Mr Saha was told the allegations, was allowed to explain, and could object both to the enquiry report and to the proposed punishment. No specific denial of a material opportunity was shown.

On Charge 1, his explanation was material to consider, but the enquiry officer was not bound to accept it. Whether it accounted for the deposits was for the fact-finder, so long as relevant material supported the view. The court could not substitute its own calculation of his finances.

On Charge 2, the court said a fresh evidentiary enquiry into the transactions was not possible in judicial review. The test was whether the finding was wholly unsupported by evidence or so unreasonable that no authority could reach it, and no such flaw was shown on the materials.

On Charge 3, the lack of financial loss to the bank does not prove that no misconduct occurred, and routing money through an account does not by itself prove misconduct. But Mr Saha had shown no patent perversity, and the court declined to reappraise the evidence.

One “or”, two penalties

On the penalty, the court began with the text. Rule 6(e) allows an employee found guilty of gross misconduct to be brought down to a lower stage in the pay scale, up to a maximum of two stages. Rule 6(f) allows increments to be stopped, with or without cumulative effect.

The word “or” between them, the court held, is not incidental. It separates two distinct forms of punishment. Applying the Patna customs ruling, it said a disjunctive expression cannot be read as conjunctive to widen the authority’s power.

The bank’s argument that “or” is not always exclusive did not change the result, the court said. The clauses list distinct penalties, and the bank showed no textual basis for treating them as parts of one composite penalty. The court did not decide whether distinct punishments could ever be imposed where the rules expressly allow it.

Rule 9 did not help the bank either. It regulates more than one punishment for a single charge. It does not turn the alternatives in Rules 6(e) and 6(f) into a single cumulative penalty, and proving more than one charge does not validate a composite one.

A penalty named as 6(e) but carrying 6(f)

The order of 29 March 2018 cited Rule 6(e). But its further direction that no increments be earned during the reduction was, in substance, a Rule 6(f) penalty. A penalty’s legal character, the judge held, is set by its operative terms and effect, not by the clause the order names.

The court accepted that the authority may have meant to impose a proportionate punishment. That did not allow a form of punishment the rule does not permit. The court put it in one line:

“The proportionality of a punishment and its legal permissibility are separate requirements” (para 44)

The appellate authority’s finding that the penalty fit the charges did not cure the defect either. An appellate authority cannot validate a form of penalty that the governing provision does not allow merely by calling it appropriate.

Remand, not exoneration

The court declined to exonerate Mr Saha or to pick a punishment itself, since the defect lay only in the legal form of the penalty. The disciplinary authority must reconsider and decide whether the proper penalty is under Rule 6(e) or under Rule 6(f), given the gravity of the misconduct found proved.

Because the penalty cannot stand in its present form, the court held that the financial consequences cannot continue. The amounts withheld, including those held back through stoppage of increments, are to be released forthwith. The release is not a final ruling that he is immune from any lawful financial consequence.

Any later withholding, adjustment or recovery can follow only from a fresh and lawful order under the rules.

Order

The writ petition succeeded in part. The orders of the disciplinary authority of 29 March 2018 and the appellate authority of 27 December 2018 were set aside to the extent they sustained the composite penalty combining Rules 6(e) and 6(f). The findings of misconduct were not disturbed.

The matter goes back to the disciplinary authority for a fresh, reasoned order selecting one permissible form of punishment, preferably within eight weeks of communication of the order. Until then the penalty set aside cannot be enforced, and the bank must release the withheld benefits at once. There was no order as to costs.