Justice T. Chakraborty Justice A. Roy Calcutta HC APPEAL DISMISSED Relief for bank employee upheld
[ Calcutta High Court ]

Calcutta HC upholds relief for UCO Bank employee dismissed a month before retirement

Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Partha Pratim Roy dismissed the bank appeal, agreeing that an unintentional error with no ill motive was not misconduct under the bipartite settlement.

Indranath Mukherjee had served UCO Bank for 32 years, since 1981, with no antecedents. A month before he was due to retire, the bank charged him with misconduct. He was punished within a month of the charge-sheet.

On 16 November the Calcutta High Court dismissed the bank’s appeal against the single-judge order that wiped out the entire disciplinary proceeding. Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty wrote for a Division Bench with Justice Partha Pratim Roy.

Charged a month before retirement

Mr Mukherjee joined the bank’s clerical cadre in 1981 and was promoted over the years. The charge-sheet is dated 29 August 2013. He replied on 6 September, and an enquiry officer was appointed the next day.

The enquiry officer submitted an undated report, to which Mr Mukherjee replied on 24 September. The disciplinary authority issued a second show-cause notice on 27 September and passed the punishment order on 28 September 2013.

The appellate authority disposed of his statutory appeal on 31 December 2014. The charge, as the Division Bench described it, was that he verified a change to the introducer’s name in a bank account, entered by another staff member, Tapas Kumar Banerjee, using his own ID in the system.

Years of other remedies

Mr Mukherjee sought documents on the enquiry against Mr Banerjee, who was named in the charge-sheet. When that was not allowed he used the Right to Information Act, which kept him in appeals from January 2015 to July 2016. The second appeal was dismissed on 4 July 2016.

He also went to the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. On 29 September 2017 the appellate authority passed an order, and the bank paid the gratuity.

He filed his writ petition in May 2018. The single judge decided it on 22 July 2025. The judge set aside the charge-sheet, the enquiry report, the punishment and the appellate order, and directed the bank to pay all admissible terminal benefits as if no disciplinary proceeding had been started.

What the bank argued

Mr S. Pal, for the bank, said the proceeding was governed by a bipartite settlement, so Mr Mukherjee should have gone to the Industrial Tribunal. He said the single judge wrongly held that Mr Mukherjee was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, because his main duty was clerical.

Mr Pal also pointed to delay. The appeal was decided on 31 December 2014, and the petition came about four years later. The single judge, he said, accepted an excuse as an explanation.

On the merits, he argued that a writ court reviews only procedure, natural justice, statutory rules and mala fides, not the correctness of the decision. He said Mr Mukherjee had himself admitted approving the change of the introducer’s name and sought to explain it as an unintentional mistake made in good faith.

A bank officer, Mr Pal said, must keep a high standard of honesty and integrity because he handles depositors’ money. It was no defence that no loss or profit resulted, and the act was misconduct under Clause 5(j) of the bipartite settlement.

He added that even where a penalty seems disproportionate, the matter should go back to the disciplinary authority rather than the court fixing the punishment. He relied on Union of India v P Gunasekaran ((2015) 2 SCC 610) and CISF v Abrar Ali (Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 2015).

What the employee argued

Mr Kallol Basu, for Mr Mukherjee, said the entire proceeding showed a closed mind. The enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had all assumed that he acted in connivance with Mr Banerjee to cause the bank a loss.

That allegation, he said, was not in the charge-sheet, and the enquiry report showed no evidence of it. Suspicion, however high, cannot replace legal proof.

He said the time spent on the Right to Information route explained the delay, and that the gratuity order was passed after the bank’s case on wilful omission failed. He relied on Union of India v R Reddappa ((1993) 4 SCC 269) and Tukaram Kana Joshi v Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation ((2013) 1 SCC 353).

Alternative remedy and delay rejected

The Division Bench noted that the single judge had framed five questions. They covered alternative remedy, delay, whether an act without mala fide intent can be misconduct, whether the findings were perverse or non-speaking, and whether the punishment shocked the conscience.

On the first two, the bench said the single judge had rightly discounted the objections. The bipartite settlement did not bar a writ petition, and the bank itself said Mr Mukherjee had been promoted to Special Assistant and was drawing more than Rs 40,000 a month.

The court said its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be fettered by a mechanical tendency to retreat from the plenary power.

The enquiry officer’s own finding

The bench then turned to the enquiry report. The enquiry officer found that the evidence and depositions:

“do not suggest any malafide intention on the part of CSE” (para 12)

The same finding called the mistake, in all likelihood, unintentional, and said the transaction was verified in a routine manner. The bench held that Mr Mukherjee could not have been dismissed for verifying in a routine manner.

It added that the bank could not establish in the gratuity proceedings that the dismissal was for a wilful omission causing financial loss.

No charge of connivance, no loss

The charge was that Mr Mukherjee verified the modification of the introducer’s name. The bench said there was no specific charge of connivance or of financial loss to the bank.

It also held that he was not responsible for Mr Banerjee’s acts. The proceedings against Mr Banerjee contained no allegation against him.

The police had investigated the alleged fraud devised by Mr Banerjee and four other officials and found nothing against Mr Mukherjee. In its own affidavit-in-opposition, the bank admitted that the proceeding against him had no connection with the one against Mr Banerjee.

On the bank’s argument that he admitted guilt, the bench agreed with the single judge. An unintentional mistake with no ill motive, the single judge had found, cannot be misconduct under Clause 5(j) of the bipartite settlement.

Authorities held distinguishable

The bench observed that a judgment is an authority for what it decides, and that a minor difference in facts can change the outcome. It said there was no dispute on the law in the bank’s authorities, but they were distinguishable on facts.

An appellate court interferes, it said, only when the judgment appealed is clearly wrong, and not merely when it is not right. That usually means the lower court acted without or beyond jurisdiction, gave no reasons for its discretion, or reached a perverse decision.

The single judge, it said, had dealt with the factual issues and reached specific findings supported by detailed reasons.

Order

The appeal and the connected application, CAN 1 of 2025, are dismissed. The single judge’s order of 22 July 2025 stands, including the direction to disburse all admissible terminal benefits as if no disciplinary proceeding had been initiated.

There is no order as to costs. Urgent certified copies are to be given to the parties on completion of formalities.