Justice R. Sinha Justice R.K. Agrawal Chhattisgarh HC FIR QUASHED Bigamy and cheating charges fallshort without foundational proof
[ High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur ]

Chhattisgarh HC Quashes Bigamy and Cheating FIR Against Woman, Finds Essential Ingredients of Sections 420 and 494 IPC Absent

The High Court of Chhattisgarh quashed an FIR, charge-sheet, and criminal case against a woman accused of bigamy and cheating, holding that the foundational ingredients of both offences were absent from the prosecution material.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, on 12 August 2026 quashed an order of a Judicial Magistrate First Class directing registration of an FIR, the consequential FIR bearing Crime No.316/2024, and Criminal Case No.800/2025, all arising from allegations of cheating and bigamy against Smt. Rashi Sharma. The bench, after examining the prosecution material in its entirety, concluded that the basic ingredients of Section 420 and Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code were not disclosed, and that permitting the proceedings to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. The petition was filed under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court invoking Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Smt. Rashi Sharma, the petitioner, had been previously married. Divorce proceedings were pending before the Family Court, Bilaspur, and a decree of divorce was passed on 28 January 2023. She subsequently married respondent No.2, Ankit Sharma, on 29 January 2023. The petitioner's case was that respondent No.2 and his family members were fully aware of her earlier matrimonial status and the pending divorce proceedings, including that respondent No.2 had accompanied her to Satna to collect her belongings and had knowledge of the Family Court proceedings at Bilaspur.

Matrimonial discord later developed between the parties. The petitioner approached the Mahila Thana and also lodged a complaint against her father-in-law. Respondent No.2 thereafter filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the JMFC, Raipur. An earlier application on similar allegations had been withdrawn without obtaining any liberty from a competent court. A subsequent application on substantially similar allegations was then filed. On 24 July 2024, the JMFC, Raipur, directed registration of an FIR under Sections 420 and 494 IPC. Crime No.316/2024 was registered at Police Station New Rajendra Nagar, District Raipur, and after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, giving rise to Criminal Case No.800/2025 before the Trial Court.

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the JMFC's order dated 24 July 2024, the FIR, and the charge-sheet, contending that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were absent and that the proceedings were initiated with an ulterior motive.

The Legal Issues

Two distinct questions arose before the bench. First, whether the prosecution material disclosed the essential ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC, specifically deception and dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property or alteration of a valuable security. Second, whether the ingredients of bigamy under Section 494 IPC were made out, given that the prosecution's own material recorded that the petitioner's earlier marriage had been dissolved by a decree dated 28 January 2023, and given the disputed date of the subsequent marriage.

A further procedural question was whether the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS was appropriate at this stage, when the charge-sheet had been filed and the matter was pending before the Trial Court.

How the Bench Reasoned

On the Section 420 IPC charge, the bench held that mere non-disclosure of a material fact relating to matrimonial status, without the necessary elements of deception and dishonest inducement, does not by itself constitute cheating. The bench referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2000) 4 SCC 168, which held that “the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating is deception and dishonest inducement.” The bench found that the material collected during investigation did not disclose any specific instance of respondent No.2 having parted with property or money on account of any deception practised by the petitioner. The prosecution's reference to a payment of Rs.10,00,000/- made by the petitioner's former husband towards settlement of the earlier matrimonial dispute was considered wholly insufficient to constitute cheating of respondent No.2.

On the Section 494 IPC charge, the bench observed that the prosecution's own record noted that the petitioner's earlier marriage was dissolved on 28 January 2023. The date of the subsequent marriage was stated differently by the parties. Even accepting the prosecution's version for the purposes of consideration, the bench found that the material did not satisfactorily disclose the foundational facts required to establish bigamy — in particular, the factum and validity of the alleged second marriage in accordance with the essential ceremonies prescribed by law. The bench drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Kanwal Ram & Ors. v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration, AIR 1966 SC 614, which held that the fact of a second marriage must be proved by cogent evidence and that mere admission of marriage by the accused is not sufficient. It also referred to Sarla Mudgal (Smt.) & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 635, which recognised that the ingredients of Section 494 IPC necessarily depend on the subsistence of a valid first marriage and the valid solemnisation of a second marriage in accordance with law.

The bench addressed the broader context directly. The criminal proceedings were initiated after the petitioner had herself lodged complaints, including against her father-in-law. The subsequent matrimonial discord, the bench held, could not in the absence of foundational ingredients be converted into a criminal prosecution for cheating. The re-filing of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC on substantially similar allegations, after withdrawing an earlier application without obtaining liberty from a competent court, was also noted as indicative of the manner in which the proceedings had been instituted.

On the scope of inherent jurisdiction, the bench acknowledged that proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS ordinarily do not involve appreciation of evidence or a mini-trial. At the same time, it held that where allegations, even if taken in their entirety, fail to constitute the offences alleged, continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. The bench referred to State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which recognised that proceedings can be quashed where the FIR's allegations, accepted wholly, do not disclose an offence or where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide. It also cited Vineet Kumar & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2017) 13 SCC 369, which affirmed that inherent jurisdiction exists to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The bench rejected the respondents' argument that the availability of remedies before the Trial Court — such as seeking discharge — was an absolute bar to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Where the basic ingredients of alleged offences are absent, such alternative remedies do not foreclose the High Court's power to intervene.

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed the petition. The order dated 24 July 2024 passed by the JMFC, Raipur, directing registration of the offence against the petitioner was quashed. The FIR bearing Crime No.316/2024 registered at Police Station New Rajendra Nagar, District Raipur, for offences under Sections 420 and 494 IPC was quashed. The consequential charge-sheet and all criminal proceedings arising therefrom, including Criminal Case No.800/2025 pending before the Trial Court, were quashed qua the petitioner. All pending applications, if any, were disposed of. No order as to costs was made.