Police Constables Convicted Under NDPS Act Cannot Shield Dismissal Behind Suspended Sentence, Rules Himachal Pradesh High Court

The Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the dismissal of two police constables convicted under the NDPS Act, ruling the Director General of Police acted within jurisdiction under Article 311(2)(a) without conducting a departmental inquiry.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, has dismissed two writ petitions filed by police constables challenging their dismissal from service by the Director General of Police (DGP). Both constables had been convicted for offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) by competent criminal courts. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, sitting singly, decided the petitions by a common judgment on 29 July 2026, finding no infirmity in the dismissal orders. The Court held that the DGP was a competent authority under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, and that the invocation of Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India — which dispenses with a departmental inquiry where dismissal follows a criminal conviction — was proper in both cases. The pendency of criminal appeals and the suspension of sentence by the High Court did not bar the dismissal orders.

The Two Petitions and What Each Constable Sought

Constable Gaurav Verma, appointed in 2009, was posted at BSL Project Security, Sunder Nagar when FIR No. 59 of 2016 was registered against him on 25 February 2016 at Police Station Balh, District Mandi, under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. The allegation was recovery of 1,003 grams of charas from his possession. The learned Special Judge, Mandi, convicted him and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000. His criminal appeal remained pending before the High Court, with the sentence stayed.

A departmental inquiry had been initiated against Verma under Rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, and he had also obtained a stay of those departmental proceedings before the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. That original application was later transferred to the High Court and registered as CWPOA No. 7210 of 2019.

In CWP No. 6783 of 2026, Verma challenged the DGP's order dated 12 January 2026 dismissing him from service and a follow-up order dated 15 January 2026 issued by the Commandant, 4th IRBn, Jangalberi. He sought quashing of both orders and reinstatement with all consequential benefits.

Constable Lakshay Chauhan, appointed in 2015 under the sports persons quota, faced FIR No. 84 of 2019 registered at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, under Sections 21, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Special Judge-II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr, convicted him vide judgment dated 26 December 2023. His criminal appeal was pending and his sentence stood suspended by the High Court.

In CWP No. 2077 of 2026, Chauhan challenged the DGP's order dated 13 January 2026 dismissing him from service. He sought quashing of that order, directions to allow him to continue as Constable, or alternatively, a direction to decide his statutory appeal within a time-bound period.

Arguments Before the Court

Senior Advocate K.D. Shreedhar appeared for Gaurav Verma and Senior Advocate Onkar Jairath appeared for Lakshay Chauhan. Their principal contentions were threefold. First, the DGP was not the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority of the petitioners and therefore lacked jurisdiction to pass the dismissal orders. Second, the authority had not followed the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, which requires the disciplinary authority to peruse the conviction judgment and assess the conduct of the employee before imposing a penalty. Third, the DGP had also ignored the DOPT Office Memorandum dated 25 November 2022, which reiterates those parameters. Counsel also argued that both petitioners had continued to perform their duties satisfactorily after conviction, and that the suspension of their sentences by the High Court made their dismissal unsustainable.

Advocate General Anup Rattan, appearing for the State, countered that Article 311(2)(a) expressly authorises dismissal on the ground of conduct leading to criminal conviction without holding an inquiry. He argued that police employees must be held to a higher standard given that their conviction under the NDPS Act maligns the Police Department. The Advocate General emphasised that suspension of sentence does not mean suspension of conviction; as convicted persons, the petitioners could not rely on the pending appeals to resist dismissal. He also submitted that the DGP, being a superior authority to the officers specified in Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, was fully empowered to pass the impugned orders.

Whether the DGP Was a Competent Authority

The Court addressed the jurisdictional objection first. Rule 16.1(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, as applicable to Himachal Pradesh, sets out a table of punishments and the officers who may impose them. For the rank of Constable, the punishment of dismissal may be imposed by a Superintendent of Police “or by any officer of higher rank.” The DGP is indisputably of higher rank than a Superintendent of Police. The Court therefore found no merit in the argument that the DGP lacked authority.

The Court rejected the contention that only the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority could pass such orders. The Punjab Police Rules specifically provide that any officer of higher rank than the one named in the table may impose the listed punishments. The DGP fell within that category, and the jurisdictional challenge did not survive scrutiny.

Whether the Dismissal Orders Complied with Tulsiram Patel

The substantive question was whether the DGP had applied his mind to the relevant factors before invoking Article 311(2)(a). The Court reproduced the key passage from Tulsiram Patel, which requires the disciplinary authority, upon learning of a conviction, to peruse the criminal court's judgment, consider all facts and circumstances, and assess whether the employee's conduct warrants the penalty proposed. Critically, the Supreme Court had held that a conviction does not automatically entail dismissal — the authority must decide which of the three available penalties (dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) is appropriate, doing so by itself without hearing the employee.

The Court also referred to the DOPT Office Memorandum dated 25 November 2022, issued in continuation of the earlier OM of 11 November 1985, which translated Tulsiram Patel's requirements into administrative guidance. The OM directs the disciplinary authority to take into account “the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances.” It also cautions that the penalty should not be grossly excessive or disproportionate.

Applying these principles, the Court examined the text of the DGP's dismissal orders in both cases. The orders recorded the registration of the FIRs, the completion of the criminal trial, the conviction by the competent Special Court, the nature and gravity of the offences proved, the quantity and character of the contraband involved, and the fact that while the High Court had suspended the sentence, no stay had been granted on the conviction itself. The DGP then invoked Article 311(2)(a) and Section 63 of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007, and dismissed the constables from service.

The Court found that this exercise satisfied the Tulsiram Patel standard. The authority had taken into consideration the conduct of the petitioners — their involvement in NDPS offences — which led to their conviction. The gravity of that conduct, the Court reasoned, was self-evident: police constables, whose duties include enforcing the very law they violated, had been convicted of drug-related offences. In those circumstances, the Court held that the penalty of dismissal was not grossly excessive or disproportionate.

Effect of a Suspended Sentence on the Dismissal Power

The petitioners argued that since the High Court had suspended the sentence in their criminal appeals, dismissal was premature. The Court rejected this squarely, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mukesh Poonamchand Shah (Civil Appeal No. 1804 of 2020, decided 25 February 2020).

In that decision the Supreme Court had held that proceedings for dismissal under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) are not barred merely because the sentence has been suspended by an appellate court or the employee has been released on bail pending appeal. The relevant consideration is the conduct of the government servant which led to the conviction, not the status of the sentence. Until the conviction itself is set aside by an appellate or higher court, it may not be advisable to retain such a person in service.

The Court applied this directly to both petitioners: their convictions by the Special Courts remained intact. No court had stayed the conviction. The DGP was therefore entitled to act on those convictions under Article 311(2)(a).

The Constable-as-Violator Consideration

The Court made a pointed observation about the specific character of the misconduct. It noted that conviction for rash driving or a minor physical altercation might call for a different assessment of proportionality than conviction under the NDPS Act. The safeguards in Tulsiram Patel and the DOPT Office Memoranda exist precisely because not all convictions warrant the same response, and the disciplinary authority must calibrate its decision to the facts of each case.

In these two cases, however, the Court found the calculus straightforward. The petitioners were members of a police force whose responsibilities include checking drug offences and ensuring that those guilty under the NDPS Act are brought to justice. Having themselves been convicted of NDPS offences, they had, as the Court put it, become violators of the very law they were tasked to enforce. The protectors of law had themselves broken it. Against that backdrop, the Court found it impossible to characterise dismissal as grossly excessive.

Outcome

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel dismissed both CWP No. 6783 of 2026 (Gaurav Verma) and CWP No. 2077 of 2026 (Lakshay Chauhan) as devoid of merit on 29 July 2026. The Court found no infirmity or illegality in the dismissal orders passed by the Director General of Police under Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. All pending miscellaneous applications in both petitions were disposed of accordingly.