Delhi HC Upholds Rape Acquittal: DNA Proof of Intercourse Does Not Establish Absence of Consent

Justice Madhu Jain declined to interfere with an ASJ's acquittal, holding that DNA evidence confirming paternity cannot, by itself, prove non-consent under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

The Delhi High Court has dismissed a prosecutrix's appeal against the acquittal of the man she accused of repeated rape, unnatural intercourse, administering an intoxicant and criminal intimidation over several years. Justice Madhu Jain, sitting singly, pronounced judgment on 3 September 2026 in CRL.A. 320/2026, after reserving the matter on 25 August 2026. The court found that the Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, had arrived at a conclusion that was reasonably possible on the evidence before it. Critically, the court held that the FSL DNA report — which confirmed the accused was the biological father of the child born to the prosecutrix — established the fact of sexual intercourse but did not, standing alone, determine whether that intercourse was consensual or coerced. The inconsistencies running through the prosecutrix's testimony across her complaint, her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and her deposition in court were found to be material, not peripheral.

The Allegations and the Trial

The prosecutrix lived with her husband, who had sustained a fall from a roof in 2007 leaving him with 75 per cent disability and unable to father a biological child. The couple had adopted a child in 2014. The accused, Anoop, was known to the family and allegedly visited the house regularly.

The prosecution's case was that from 2017 onwards, Anoop established physical relations with the prosecutrix against her wishes through threats and inducements. On one occasion, she alleged, an intoxicating substance was administered to her before he assaulted her. The alleged acts, including repeated vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse and threats using nude photographs and videos, continued thereafter.

The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth on 20 June 2019. DNA samples of the prosecutrix, Anoop and the child were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Rohini, which returned a report confirming Anoop as the biological father. FIR No. 138/2021 was registered at Police Station Dwarka North on 17 March 2021 — nearly four years after the first alleged incident — under Sections 376, 377 and 506 IPC. Her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement was recorded the following day.

The police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 376/377/506/509 IPC, supplemented later by the DNA report. Cognizance was taken on 7 September 2021, after which the case was committed to sessions and registered as SC No. 151/2022. On 23 February 2024, the ASJ framed charges under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

The prosecution examined four witnesses: the prosecutrix as PW-1, her husband as PW-2, and two investigating officers as PW-3 and PW-4. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 7 September 2024, Anoop admitted physical relations with the prosecutrix but said the relationship was consensual and was within the knowledge of her husband. He led no defence evidence.

On 7 October 2024, the ASJ acquitted Anoop of all charges. The trial court found material inconsistencies in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, considered the delay in reporting, and concluded that the possibility of a consensual relationship could not be ruled out. It held that the accused had successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Prosecutrix's Appeal Before the High Court

The prosecutrix preferred the present appeal under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Her counsel argued that the trial court had failed to appreciate that PW-1's testimony was cogent, consistent and trustworthy, relying on State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny, (2017) 2 SCC 51, and Phool Singh v. State of M.P., (2022) 2 SCC 74, for the settled proposition that the sole testimony of a credible prosecutrix is sufficient for conviction.

It was urged that the trial court had gravely erred in disregarding the DNA report, described as the most clinching form of scientific evidence, with reliance placed on Raju v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2432, and Sunil v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4505. Counsel submitted that once sexual intercourse was proved by DNA and the prosecutrix stated she had not consented, the burden under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act shifted to the accused to prove consent — a burden he had not discharged through any defence witness or material.

The appellant also contended that the trial court had placed undue emphasis on the delay in lodging the complaint and on minor contradictions, and had ignored the cumulative corroboration available from PW-2's testimony and the DNA report. It was further submitted that no prudent husband would consent to such conduct, and that PW-2 had categorically refuted the suggestion. Additionally, the accused's partial admission of physical relations was said to have been given insufficient weight.

The State, through the Additional Public Prosecutor, supported the impugned judgment, submitting that the trial court had duly appreciated the evidence, that its conclusions were based on a proper reading of the material, and that the judgment did not suffer from any illegality, infirmity or perversity warranting interference.

The Standard for Reversing an Acquittal

Justice Madhu Jain identified the principal question as whether the judgment of acquittal dated 7 October 2024 suffered from such perversity, patent illegality or misappreciation of material evidence as would warrant appellate interference.

The court restated the settled position: where the view taken by the trial court is a reasonably possible view on the evidence, the appellate court will not interfere merely because another view is also possible. Reversal requires that the trial court's appreciation of evidence be perverse, manifestly illegal, based on a misreading of material evidence, or that conviction be the only conclusion reasonably possible on the evidence.

The court cited the Supreme Court's recent articulation in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, which set out the governing principles: the appellate court may interfere only where the judgment suffers from patent perversity, where material evidence has been misread or omitted, where there are compelling and substantial reasons including a clearly unreasonable order, or where the only possible conclusion on the evidence is guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt.

How the Bench Assessed the Evidence

The court accepted that the DNA report, Ex. P-7, established that Anoop was the biological father of the child, and described that evidence as undoubtedly significant. But it held that the DNA report established paternity and the fact of sexual intercourse — nothing more. It did not determine the circumstances in which intercourse occurred or whether the relationship was consensual. The question before the trial court had therefore been whether the prosecution established the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, not merely whether intercourse had taken place.

On the Section 114A presumption, the court held that the statutory presumption must be given its due effect but does not render the prosecutrix's testimony immune from judicial scrutiny. The court must still examine whether the foundational facts are established and whether the defence evidence or circumstances sufficiently rebut the presumption.

The court then examined the specific inconsistencies the trial court had identified. On the allegation of administration of an intoxicant: the prosecutrix's initial complaint (Ex. PW-1/A) stated the accused mixed an intoxicant in milk consumed by both her and her husband; in her deposition she introduced an additional detail about leaving the kitchen and returning to find the accused emerging from it; and her Section 164 statement described the accused administering the intoxicant before the initial incidents in general terms. These were materially different accounts of how the substance was allegedly introduced.

On her state of consciousness during the first alleged assault, the inconsistency was equally significant. In the complaint she said she became drowsy but could see what the accused was doing, though unable to move her limbs. In her deposition she initially said she remembered nothing after being taken to the other room until she woke the following day. It was only when confronted in cross-examination by the APP that she agreed she had been conscious but unable to move. The court noted that the prosecution itself attributed the absence of consent during the first incident to the administration of the intoxicant and the consequent condition of the prosecutrix, making this discrepancy particularly material.

The court also examined the contradictions around the pregnancy and the husband's alleged suspicion of paternity. The prosecutrix's Section 164 statement placed the disclosure to her husband in 2018; her deposition placed the same events in 2019 and described the husband taking her to hospital and seeking a DNA examination. PW-2, however, stated he had neither quarrelled with his wife nor questioned paternity before the child's birth — a direct contradiction of a circumstance the prosecution had treated as significant in its narrative of how the alleged relationship came to light.

The circumstances of the 100-number call were also inconsistently stated: PW-1 said her husband called the police after seeing her and the accused in a compromising position, while PW-2 gave a different account of how that call was made.

On the allegations under Sections 506 and 509 IPC involving nude photographs and videos: PW-1 stated at different points that the accused had taken such material and threatened to circulate it, but during cross-examination she could not confirm with certainty that the photographs existed or to whom they had been sent. No photographs or videos were produced. The mobile phone of the accused was forensically examined, but the alleged material was not recovered. The court held the trial court was entitled to treat the absence of electronic corroboration as relevant.

On the nature of the relationship more broadly, the court noted that PW-1 herself admitted to speaking with the accused several times a day, that the accused had sent her money for a mobile phone, that she was disturbed when he stopped calling, and that she disclosed the relationship after he refused to maintain contact with her. The court stated that the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are not wholly irrelevant when determining whether the prosecution has established charges beyond reasonable doubt — though it was careful to add that a prosecutrix's conduct cannot be judged on stereotypical notions, and that delay in reporting alone cannot discard a prosecution case.

On the Section 377 IPC charge, the court held that the trial court's finding was not perverse. The allegations of oral and anal sexual acts had not been stated with the same specificity in the earlier versions, and there was no medical or other corroboration of the alleged oral acts. The court was entitled to examine the improvements in the testimony when determining whether the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

On the Section 328 IPC charge, the court held the trial court correctly appreciated that the prosecution was required to establish not merely that the prosecutrix felt drowsy but that the accused administered a poison, stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome substance with the requisite intention or knowledge. The alleged incident occurred years before the FIR, no substance was recovered or subjected to scientific examination, and the testimony of PW-1 contained the inconsistencies already noted.

The court also addressed the submission that Anoop had led no defence evidence. It held that the prosecution is required to establish its case in accordance with law, and that the absence of defence evidence cannot relieve it of that burden or convert deficiencies in the prosecution evidence into proof of guilt.

The court placed reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 78, which held that while conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, “the testimony of such a witness must inspire confidence of the Court.” The court observed that the principle permitting conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix operates only where that testimony is found to be reliable, trustworthy and of such quality as to inspire confidence; it does not require the court to ignore material contradictions.

The court also rejected the submission that the prosecutrix had no reason to falsely implicate the accused and would not have exposed herself to social stigma unless the allegations were true. It held that such an argument cannot substitute proof; a criminal charge must be decided on the evidence led before the court.

The Acquittal Upheld

Justice Madhu Jain held that the inconsistencies identified — concerning the intoxicant, the prosecutrix's condition during the first alleged assault, the circumstances in which her husband allegedly came to know of the pregnancy, and the subsequent conduct attributed to him — were not peripheral matters disconnected from the prosecution case. They related to circumstances forming an integral part of its narrative and were properly considered cumulatively by the trial court.

The court stated that it may not necessarily endorse every observation of the trial court in precisely the same terms, but that on an independent consideration of the material it could not be said that the trial court had ignored material evidence or arrived at a conclusion wholly contrary to the record. The DNA evidence was correctly appreciated as establishing paternity and intercourse without establishing absence of consent. The strengthened presumption of innocence in an appeal against acquittal consequently operated in favour of the accused.

The court acknowledged the gravity of the allegations but held that “the gravity of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial.” Where the evidence permits a reasonable view consistent with innocence, the benefit must go to the accused.

The Supreme Court decisions relied upon by appellant's counsel — State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny, Phool Singh v. State of M.P. and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh — were distinguished as having been rendered in materially different factual and evidentiary circumstances.

Order

The appeal in CRL.A. 320/2026 was dismissed. The judgment of acquittal dated 7 October 2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 151/2022 arising out of FIR No. 138/2021, Police Station Dwarka North, was upheld. All pending applications stood disposed of. A copy of the order was directed to be sent to the trial court for necessary information and compliance.