Jharkhand HC Dismisses CBI Panel Counsel's Challenge to One-Month Notice Termination in Animal Husbandry Scam Cases
Justice Deepak Roshan held that CBI's termination of a panel advocate under a 1997 notification satisfied Article 14; mala fide allegations without documentary proof carried no weight.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dismissed a writ petition filed by Shiva Kant Srivastava, a 78-year-old advocate who had been working on the Additional Panel of Advocates for animal husbandry scam cases conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The CBI terminated his engagement by letter dated 8 July 2026, giving one month's notice with effect from 9 August 2026. Justice Deepak Roshan, sitting singly, found that the termination was squarely governed by clause IV of a Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions notification dated 30 January 1997, which expressly made such appointments terminable on one month's notice in writing to either side. The petition, being W.P.(S) No. 5780 of 2026, was pronounced on 24 August 2026.
The Dispute Before the Court
Srivastava had been engaged as counsel in the Additional Panel of Advocates for animal husbandry cases by the CBI through a letter dated 8 April 2003. He handled several cases arising from the animal husbandry scam. When the CBI issued its disengagement letter on 8 July 2026, he moved the High Court seeking to quash the order and also sought a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from giving effect to the termination.
The respondents were the Union of India through the CBI, the Director of Prosecution, CBI, New Delhi, the Joint Director, CBI, ACB, Ranchi, and the Head of Branch, CBI, ACB, Ranchi.
Arguments Raised by the Petitioner
Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Senior Advocate, appearing with Mr. Gopal K. Sinha, advanced four distinct grounds on behalf of Srivastava.
First, he argued that no opportunity had been given to the petitioner before his services were terminated, making the action contrary to principles of natural justice. Second, he contended that the action was discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution, because other counsel engaged alongside the petitioner were continuing in their positions. Third, he alleged mala fide: the petitioner, acting as public prosecutor, had been summoning CBI officers to appear in court and give evidence, and the termination was a direct response to that pressure. Fourth, he relied on a letter dated 18 September 2013, attached as Annexure-8 to the writ petition, which he said showed that any change of counsel or transfer of officers in animal husbandry scam cases could be done only with the permission of the High Court.
On the legal side, Mr. Sharma placed heavy reliance on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 212, where the Supreme Court had held that public prosecutors could not be removed in violation of Article 14.
CBI's Defence: The 1997 Notification and Rakesh Kumar Kesari
Mr. Prashant Pallav, Additional Solicitor General of India, assisted by Ms. Shivani Jaluka, appeared for the respondents. He produced the notification dated 30 January 1997 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, which was taken on record by the Court.
The ASGI's position was straightforward. Clause IV of the notification expressly provided that the appointment of a counsel would be terminable on one month's notice in writing to either side. The impugned letter gave precisely that notice, with disengagement effective from 9 August 2026. The ASGI further submitted that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 in such matters is minimal, and that the State or a statutory body cannot be compelled to utilise the services of any particular advocate. He relied on State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Rakesh Kumar Kesari and Anr., AIR 2011 SC 1705, in support of this position.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Roshan framed a single issue: whether the notice dated 8 July 2026 suffered from any illegality warranting judicial review.
On the 1997 notification: The Court found that it was not in dispute that the letter dated 8 July 2026 gave a clear one-month notice and that disengagement was effective from 9 August 2026. This was in complete conformity with clause IV of the 1997 notification. Once the act had been done in the prescribed manner, the Court held, there was no arbitrariness on the respondent's part.
On the 2013 letter: The Court held that the letter dated 18 September 2013, which purportedly required the High Court's permission before any change of counsel, would not assist the petitioner because trials pertaining to animal husbandry cases were already over.
On the Shrilekha Vidyarthi precedent: Justice Roshan distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling directly. That case involved an en bloc termination of the entire body of government advocates and pleaders across the State of Uttar Pradesh. The ratio was that even in contractual matters, the State is not divested of ensuring compliance with Article 14 and must avoid arbitrariness. The present case involved a single engagement, terminated after one month's notice in strict accordance with the governing notification. The reliance on Shrilekha Vidyarthi was held to be misplaced.
On mala fide: The Court was unsparing. It held that “mere pleading without proof cannot be treated as evidence” and is not sufficient to establish mala fide. Relying on its own earlier decision in Shashi Bhushan Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. (WP(S) No. 1517 of 2024), the Court reiterated that allegations of mala fide must rest on concrete material capable of inspiring judicial confidence. In this case, no documentary or other proof had been placed on record. The Court further noted an independent procedural defect: where mala fide is alleged against an officer, that officer must be impleaded by name as a respondent. The petitioner had not done so, and the case failed on that ground as well.
On Article 226 and the choice of counsel: The Court applied Rakesh Kumar Kesari to hold that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked to compel the State to utilise the service of a person as an advocate. The State, or in this case a statutory investigative body, is free to select its own counsel.
The Court's Closing Reference
Before dismissing the petition, Justice Roshan referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (1979 INSC 192). In that case, the Supreme Court observed that when the government ends the public office held by a government pleader, what becomes the incumbent “in the land of Gandhi is a dignified renunciation of office, not a chase for lost briefs through the writ route.” The Court invoked the observation to reinforce that advocacy is a noble profession and advocates, as officers of the court, are expected to conduct themselves with dignity.
Order
W.P.(S) No. 5780 of 2026 was dismissed. All interlocutory applications, if any, were closed. No order as to costs was made. The judgment was pronounced on 24 August 2026.