Gujarat HC Sets Aside Family Court Divorce Decree Filed Within One Year of Marriage, Allows Fresh Suit

A Division Bench at the Gujarat High Court found the Family Court at Kadi, Mehsana, erred in ruling on the merits of cruelty and desertion when the suit itself was barred by Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On 2 July 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad — comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R. T. Vachhani — allowed a First Appeal filed by a husband whose divorce petition had been dismissed by the Family Court, Kadi, Mehsana. The Family Court had dismissed the suit as premature under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, yet proceeded to record findings on cruelty and desertion against the husband. The Division Bench held that once a court treats a petition as barred by Section 14, it has no jurisdiction to examine the merits. The impugned judgment and decree in Family Suit No. 27 of 2024 was set aside, and the husband was granted liberty to file a fresh suit.

The Divorce Suit Before the Family Court, Kadi

The appellant, Yogesh Amrutbhai Patel, filed a petition for divorce before the Family Court, Kadi, Mehsana, under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act — the grounds of cruelty and desertion respectively. The suit, Family Suit No. 27 of 2024, was presented within one year of the date of marriage.

Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act prohibits any court from entertaining a divorce petition unless, at the time of presentation, one year has elapsed from the date of marriage. The Family Court found the suit premature on that basis. However, instead of returning the plaint or dismissing it with a reservation of rights, the court proceeded to examine and decide the grounds of cruelty and desertion on their merits. In paragraph 9-2 of its judgment dated 21 August 2024, the Family Court recorded that it was the husband who was not interested in living with the wife.

The Issue: Can a Premature Suit Be Decided on Merits?

The husband challenged the judgment and decree in First Appeal No. 3246 of 2024. His counsel, Mr. Jay Jani, argued that the Family Court had committed a legal error. No issue of maintainability had been separately framed. If the court intended to dismiss the suit on grounds of limitation, it ought not to have then determined the substantive grounds for divorce. The findings on cruelty and desertion, Mr. Jani submitted, were also not based on evidence. He sought either a remand for fresh adjudication or liberty to file a fresh suit on the same grounds.

Counsel for the respondent wife, Mr. Nirad Buch, opposed the appeal. He contended that since the Family Court had already decided the issues on merits, there was no basis to remand the matter or grant a fresh opportunity to file a suit on the same grounds.

How the Division Bench Reasoned

The Division Bench examined the impugned judgment carefully. It accepted as admitted that the Family Suit was presented within one year of marriage, squarely attracting the bar under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The bench observed that the Family Court's own paragraph 9-2 records that the suit was “prematured and is not maintainable as it was filed within one year from the date of marriage.” Despite this finding, the same paragraph also discusses cruelty and desertion and arrives at a conclusion adverse to the husband. The bench found this approach legally untenable.

Justice Vora, writing for the bench, held that when a suit is premature or filed in violation of Section 14, the proper course available to the Family Court is either to return the plaint or to dismiss the suit while expressly reserving the parties' right to file a fresh suit. The court has no authority, at that stage, to traverse the merits of the other grounds. In the present case, the Family Court not only entered the merits but also failed to assign proper and sound reasons even on those other grounds.

The bench rejected the respondent's argument that a decision on merits forecloses any fresh opportunity. Because the very foundation of the Family Court's exercise — taking up the merits — was legally impermissible when the suit was barred at the threshold, the merits findings could not stand.

Directions on Fresh Evidence and Prior Proceedings

The Division Bench permitted both parties to lead fresh evidence in the new suit. It directed expressly that the parties shall not rely on the evidence led in the present suit (Family Suit No. 27 of 2024). When the fresh suit is filed, the Family Court at Kadi, Mehsana, will decide it afresh, uninfluenced by the findings recorded in the set-aside judgment.

The Civil Application for Stay filed along with the First Appeal was disposed of in view of the order passed in the main appeal. No order as to costs was made.

Outcome

The First Appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree dated 21 August 2024 in Family Suit No. 27 of 2024, passed by the Family Court, Kadi, Mehsana, was set aside in its entirety. The appellant husband is permitted to file a fresh divorce suit on the available grounds under the Hindu Marriage Act. The Family Court will decide the fresh suit on its own merits, with both parties free to lead evidence afresh.