Protest March Participants Who Tried to Save Teachers Cannot Be Held Liable Under Section 149 IPC, Rules Himachal Pradesh HC

The Himachal Pradesh High Court quashed a 2017 FIR against three persons who joined a protest march but were specifically identified by the complainant as having stood beside the SDM and attempted to protect teachers from the mob.

Justice Sandeep Sharma, sitting singly at the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, quashed FIR No. 82 of 2017, registered on 29 July 2017 at Police Station Tissa, District Chamba, against three petitioners who had participated in a protest march that turned violent at a government school. The court found that the complainant's own statement and the medical evidence specifically exonerated the petitioners, placing two of them next to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate attempting to save teachers while the mob gave beatings. The third petitioner's name appeared nowhere in the complaint or victim statements. With the challan already filed in the trial court, Justice Sharma held that continuing proceedings against these three individuals would amount to an abuse of process, given the near-certain prospect of acquittal.

The Protest, the FIR, and the Route to the High Court

On 29 July 2017, residents of Churah in District Chamba organised a protest march following a complaint of sexual harassment of a female student against a teacher, Tek Chand, who was already in police custody. The march moved towards Government Senior Secondary School Khushinagar, where the protestors raised slogans and asked students to leave classes, causing panic. Some members of the march turned violent and assaulted several teachers, including Bhawani Sharma, Kesari Singh, Chatar Singh, and Asha Kumari.

The officiating Principal, Rajdeen (respondent No. 2), lodged a complaint at Police Station Tissa. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Churah, reached the spot but the mob did not disperse. On instructions from the SDM, teachers who were on leave — Bhawani Sharma, Kesari Singh, Surinder Singh, and Shyam Lal — were recalled to school, only to be assaulted on their return.

The FIR was registered under Sections 452, 353, 332, 143, 147, 149, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against several persons, including petitioners Dildar Ali Batt, Parvej Ali Batt, and Hasan Mohammad @ Harun. After investigation, police filed a challan before the competent court. Before the trial could proceed, the three petitioners filed Cr.MMO No. 1092 of 2024 before the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of the FIR and the consequent proceedings.

What the Complaint and Medical Evidence Actually Showed

Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Aman Parth Sharma assisted by Mr. Rishabh Negi, drew the court's attention to the text of the complaint itself. Rajdeen's complaint stated that petitioners Dildar Ali Batt and Parvej Ali Batt were standing next to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Churah, and that both had attempted to save teachers Bhawani Sharma and Kesari Singh from the mob.

The victim teachers' statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and the medico-legal certificates (MLCs) specifically named the persons who had allegedly beaten them. None of these documents named the three petitioners as perpetrators. As for petitioner No. 3, Hasan Mohammad @ Harun, counsel pointed out that his name did not appear in the complaint at all, nor did any of the injured teachers allege that he had given beatings to anyone.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Mr. Rajan Kahol with Mr. Vishal Panwar and Deputy Advocates General Mr. Ravi Chauhan and Mr. Anish Banshtu, argued that the petitioners were undisputedly part of the mob that created ruckus and administered beatings, and that the question of their individual role could only be determined by the trial court on the basis of the full evidence. Quashing the FIR at this stage, the State submitted, would amount to preempting the prosecution from proving its case.

The Court's Reasoning on Section 149 IPC and Constructive Liability

Justice Sharma surveyed the settled position on the scope of the court's quashing power under Section 482 CrPC, drawing on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1, and the recent decisions in Abhishek Singh v. Ajay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1313, B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, and Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185.

From these authorities, the court distilled the position that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide or is maliciously instituted, or where FIR allegations, taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence against the accused, the High Court may quash proceedings. Equally, a High Court cannot embark on appreciation of evidence at the Section 482 stage, but must assess whether a prima facie case disclosing ingredients of the alleged offence is made out.

Turning to Section 149 IPC, Justice Sharma held that the provision rests on constructive liability. Two essentials must be met: the accused must be a member of an unlawful assembly, and the offence must be committed in prosecution of the assembly's common object, or must be one which members knew was likely to be committed. The court was emphatic that “mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person member of the unlawful assembly.”

The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Zainul v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 1187 of 2014, decided 07.10.2025, which extensively analysed the distinction between an innocent bystander and a member of an unlawful assembly, and held that liability under Section 149 attaches only when the accused shared the common object. The court also drew on Charan Singh v. State of U.P., (2004) 4 SCC 205, and Amerika Rai v. State of Bihar, (2011) 4 SCC 677.

Applying these principles, Justice Sharma found that the protest march had been organised to express public anger over the sexual assault of a school girl. The petitioners had joined a march that was, at its inception, a public demonstration. When some members of the march turned violent, the petitioners — far from sharing or advancing that common object — separated from the mob and attempted to protect the teachers being attacked. The court found nothing on record to show that the petitioners knew, in the positive sense required under the second part of Section 149, that beatings of teachers were likely to be committed as part of the march's common object.

The court rejected the Additional Advocate General's submission that presence in the march was sufficient, observing that the complainant's own account placed petitioners Dildar Ali Batt and Parvej Ali Batt beside the SDM in a protective role, not among the assailants. As for Hasan Mohammad @ Harun, neither the complaint nor any victim statement attributed any act or presence to him.

Why Continued Prosecution Would Have Been an Abuse of Process

Justice Sharma concluded that the chances of conviction of the petitioners were very bleak. The material on record showed that the complainant and the victims had specifically named the persons who had beaten them, and those names did not include the petitioners. Petitioners Dildar Ali Batt and Parvej Ali Batt had been affirmatively identified as having tried to save teachers, while petitioner Hasan Mohammad @ Harun had not been mentioned at all.

Permitting the FIR to continue would, in the court's view, unnecessarily subject the petitioners to the ordeal of a protracted trial that was bound to fail. This fell squarely within the recognised ground for quashing — where proceedings are an abuse of the court's process — confirmed across the line of Supreme Court decisions the court had surveyed.

Order

FIR No. 82 of 2017, dated 29 July 2017, registered at Police Station Tissa, District Chamba, under Sections 452, 353, 332, 143, 147, 149, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, along with all consequential proceedings, were quashed and set aside qua the three petitioners only. The petitioners were acquitted of the charges framed against them. Cr.MMO No. 1092 of 2024 was allowed and disposed of. All pending applications were also disposed of.