HP High Court Quashes Defamation Complaint: Filing a Police Complaint and Publishing FIR Contents Are Both Protected

The Himachal Pradesh High Court quashed a Section 500 IPC complaint against a news reporter and a complainant, holding that FIR contents and police complaints are protected from defamation liability.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh has quashed a criminal defamation complaint that had been pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Amb, District Una. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, sitting singly, allowed two connected quashing petitions filed by Surinder Sharma, a news reporter, and Rajesh Kalia, who had originally lodged a police complaint. The court held that a complaint made to the police falls within the exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC, and that publishing the contents of an FIR in a newspaper does not constitute defamation. The summoning order dated 5 January 2024, directing the petitioners to face trial for offences under Section 500 read with Section 120-B of the IPC, was set aside along with the underlying complaint.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The complainants, Parveen Kalia and another, are priests at the Mata Chintpurni Shrine. Their shops are situated in front of the shop of Rajesh Kalia, accused No. 1, with whom they alleged a business rivalry. According to the complaint, Rajesh Kalia filed a false complaint with the police on 20 November 2021 to harm the complainants' reputation, and again made a false complaint on 4 December 2021 regarding wrongful restraint and filthy abuses.

Surinder Sharma, accused No. 2, published a news item in Una Kesari reporting that Parveen and Sumant had beaten Rajesh Kalia when he was returning home, and that the police had initiated an investigation. The complainants alleged that the news item was published without verifying the facts, that it lowered their estimation in public, and that relatives and friends telephoned them after reading it. On this basis, complaint No. 8-I-2022 dated 8 February 2022 was filed before the trial court, leading to the summoning of both accused for offences under Section 500 and Section 120-B of the IPC.

Both petitioners approached the High Court under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, seeking quashing of the complaint and the consequential summoning order.

Arguments Raised by the Petitioners

Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Piyush Dhanotia, raised four distinct grounds. First, that a joint complaint filed by two persons is not maintainable. Second, that the editor of the newspaper was not arrayed as a party, making the complaint defective. Third, that Rajesh Kalia had only made a complaint to the police, which cannot be characterised as defamatory. Fourth, that the publication of FIR contents does not constitute defamation. Counsel also argued that since the petitioner Surinder Sharma was a resident of Una and the court at Amb was proceeding against him, an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was mandatorily required before summoning, which had not been conducted.

Counsel for the respondents, Mr Surinder Saklani, countered that the news item was published at the instance of Surinder Sharma, that repetition of a libel is itself a crime, and that the editor was not a necessary party. He urged dismissal of both petitions.

The Court's Reasoning

Justice Kainthla began by setting out the governing framework for quashing under Section 482 of the CrPC, drawing on the Supreme Court's restatement in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, which itself restated the categories from State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The court identified the relevant categories as: where the allegations, taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence; where there is an express legal bar to the proceedings; and where the complaint is manifestly attended with mala fides. The position was also noted from Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, which emphasised that the inherent power must be exercised sparingly but is available where no prima facie offence is made out.

On the maintainability of a joint complaint, the court rejected the petitioners' submission. Relying on Abdul Karim v. Nangoo, 1942 Cri LJ 731, decisions of the Patna and Madras High Courts, and its own earlier ruling in Dharam Dass v. State of H.P., 2016:HHC:5244, the court held that a joint complaint is maintainable where the cause of action is the same. Since both complainants were aggrieved by the same news publication, the joint complaint was valid.

On the absence of the editor as a party, the court noted that the news item was written by Surinder Sharma himself. Since he was the author, he was the necessary party and the editor was not required to be impleaded. The judgments cited by the petitioners on vicarious liability of editors were distinguished on this basis.

On the Section 202 CrPC inquiry, the court rejected the argument that the Magistrate at Amb lacked jurisdiction over a resident of Una. Both towns are in District Una. The court applied its earlier ruling in Sanjay Kumar v. State, Latest HLJ 2007(2) 1270 (HPHC), which held that a Magistrate is appointed for the whole district and that notifications under Section 15 of the CrPC relate to distribution of work, not to the definition of territorial jurisdiction under Section 14. No mandatory inquiry under Section 202 was therefore required.

The court then turned to the substantive question of whether the two acts, filing a police complaint and publishing FIR contents, could constitute defamation.

On the police complaint made by Rajesh Kalia, the court applied Exception 2 to Section 499 of the IPC, which protects communications made to authorities in good faith. Relying on its own ruling in Dinesh Chander Sharma v. Surinder Kumar Sharma, (2020) 1 Shim.LC. 418, the court held that a complaint made to the police and the investigation conducted pursuant to it are protected under that exception. The Bombay High Court's view in Yadav Motiram Patil v. Rajiv G. Ghodankar, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1969, was also noted, where Exceptions 8 and 9 to Section 499 were applied to a complaint made to the police in good faith. The Delhi High Court's observation in Rajan Sareen v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 9139, was cited to the effect that mere filing of complaints, even if later found to be false, does not automatically constitute defamation when made to authorities in due course of law.

On the publication of FIR contents by Surinder Sharma, the court drew on three decisions. In Ashutosh Choubey v. State of Jharkhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 2484, the Jharkhand High Court held that publishing the sum and substance of an FIR in a newspaper does not constitute an offence under Section 500 of the IPC, particularly when the facts reported are true and no false allegation is made. The Bombay High Court in Vijay v. Ravindra Ghisulal Gupta, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1315, observed that reporting the registration of a crime is news that the public has a right to know, and that freedom of the press to make true reports flows from Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Delhi High Court in Nilanjana Bhowmick v. Ravi Nair, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8819, held that factually correct reporting of an investigation, even if uncomfortable for the subject, cannot be termed defamatory when no part of the reporting is incorrect.

Applying these principles, the court concluded that the contents of the FIR made to the police are protected, and their publication by the newspaper is equally protected. Continuation of the proceedings before the trial court could not be permitted.

Outcome

Both petitions were allowed. Complaint No. 08-01 of 2022 dated 8 February 2022, pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Amb, District Una, for offences under Section 500 and Section 120-B of the IPC, was quashed. The consequential order of issue of process and summons dated 5 January 2024 was also quashed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were disposed of in the same terms.