Writ Against Army Goodwill School, Kupwara Not Maintainable: J&K and Ladakh HC Dismisses Teachers' Petition
The High Court of J&K and Ladakh held that Army Goodwill School, Wayne, Kupwara, is a self-financed private institution, and a service dispute with its contractual teachers carries no public law element amenable to Article 226.
A group of PRT, TGT, and PGT teachers appointed between 2013 and 2017 at Army Goodwill School, Wayne, Kupwara — a self-financed institution run under the Army's “Operation Sadbhavana” — filed a writ petition before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh seeking continuation in service and payment of salary in accordance with CBSE scales. Justice Shahzad Azeem, sitting singly at Srinagar, dismissed the petition at the threshold on 5 August 2026, holding it not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court found that the school is neither a Government department nor a Government-aided institution, and the dispute between the teachers and the school management is one of a purely private contractual character, carrying no public law element that could attract writ jurisdiction.
The Dispute Before the Court
The petitioners — Showkat Yousuf Shah and others — claimed they held substantive posts at Army Goodwill School, which is affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE). On that basis they sought pay fixation at the CBSE scale of ₹9,300–34,800 with Grade Pay of ₹4,200. After they made representations to the school management for pay revision, they alleged the management turned hostile and initiated a fresh recruitment process, creating a real and imminent threat of illegal termination or substitution.
Apprehending such action, the petitioners invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 seeking a direction for their continuation in service, contending that dispensing with their services without reasonable cause would violate Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. They also invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation and prayed for a writ of mandamus directing salary payment in accordance with CBSE scales.
The respondents — Union of India and others, represented by Deputy Solicitor General Tahir Majid Shamsi with Advocate Yasmeen Jan — raised a preliminary objection to maintainability, contending the school is a self-financed institution established under Operation Sadbhavana, that the petitioners were engaged on yearly contractual terms by the School Management Committee, and that no writ lay against it under Article 226.
What the School Is and How It Operates
The court recorded several foundational facts before turning to the legal question. Army Goodwill School, Wayne, was established under Operation Sadbhavana with the object of providing quality education to children in Jammu & Kashmir. An apex body — the Army Goodwill Education Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 — administers and manages the school. The Society constitutes a School Management Committee for day-to-day management in accordance with rules approved by the apex governing body.
A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) framed for the school deals in detail with classification, recruitment, qualifications, terms and conditions of service, pay scales, revision of pay scales, and termination. Specifically, paragraphs 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87 and 102 of the SOP govern these matters. The court noted that the school does not receive annual financial assistance from the Government or any statutory authority. It is run through self-generated funds, support from NGOs and corporate foundations, and limited amounts received under Operation Sadbhavana.
How the Bench Reasoned on the Legal Issue
Justice Azeem evaluated the three Supreme Court judgments placed before him — two relied upon by the petitioners and one by the respondents — to assess whether the precedents applied to the facts at hand.
On Bhola Nath v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 129, the court noted that the Supreme Court there directed regularisation of appellants appointed as Junior Engineers (Agriculture) against sanctioned posts in the Land Conservation Directorate of the State government. The direction rested on the principle that the State, as a model employer, cannot keep employees on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the label of contractual engagement and then abruptly discontinue their services. Justice Azeem distinguished that case directly: the appointments there were against regular sanctioned State government posts, whereas the petitioners here are governed exclusively by the contractual framework of the SOP. The ratio of Bhola Nath was therefore held inapplicable.
On Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (2024) 14 SCC 697, the court observed that maintainability of the writ in that case rested on deep and pervasive State control over the Bank, established through State shareholding and the State's predominant role. The Supreme Court there had restored the Letters Patent Appeal for decision on merits after the Division Bench had set aside the Single Judge's finding of maintainability. Justice Azeem held that without establishing a comparable factual foundation of deep and pervasive State control over the Army Goodwill School, the petitioners could not derive benefit from that judgment.
The respondents' reliance on Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., (2024) 16 SCC 598, proved determinative. There, the Supreme Court had considered whether the Army Welfare Education Society (AWES) was “State” under Article 12 and whether a pure service dispute against a private educational institution was amenable to Article 226. The Supreme Court held that AWES is a private unaided society engaged in imparting education — a public duty — but that the mere existence of a public duty does not automatically render every service dispute against such an institution amenable to writ jurisdiction. The employer-employee relationship remained that of a private contract, and breach of such a contract does not involve any public law element.
The Supreme Court in Army Welfare Education Society also held that CBSE affiliation bye-laws do not carry statutory force, that the school's CBSE affiliation is for recognition and syllabus purposes only, and that the school cannot be said to discharge any public duty in connection with employment of its teaching staff. The same court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is a public law doctrine that does not govern private contractual relationships.
Justice Azeem applied those conclusions directly. The Respondent-School is not a creation of statute, the service conditions of the petitioners are not governed by any service rules having statutory force, and the SOP cannot be enforced under Article 226. He also reiterated the settled position, traced through a line of Supreme Court authorities including Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V. R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691, Satimbla Sharma v. St. Paul's Senior Secondary School, (2011) 13 SCC 760, and St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 SCC 498: even where a body performing a public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, only those of its decisions that possess a public law element are subject to judicial review under Article 226. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued where the action challenged is essentially of a private character.
On the Respondents' Conduct Argument
The respondents also urged that the petitioners, who were continuing in service solely under interim orders of the court, had created an atmosphere of indiscipline adversely affecting academic performance, particularly of students of Classes 10 and 12, and had not responded to repeated counselling. The court did not engage with the merits of this allegation, given that it found the petition not maintainable at the threshold.
Outcome
Justice Shahzad Azeem upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and dismissed WP (C) No. 1911/2019 as non-maintainable. All interim directions subsisting as on the date of the judgment stood vacated. Pending applications were disposed of accordingly. The judgment was approved for reporting.