Mutation Entry, Not Title: J&K HC Dismisses Heirs' Bid to Block Highway Compensation to Khananeshin Daughter

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held that a Collector conducting land acquisition proceedings cannot adjudicate disputed title and was right to treat the revenue-recorded owner as the sole interested person for compensation purposes.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, comprising Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Sanjay Parihar, on 5 June 2026 dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal filed by Atiqa Begum and others against a writ court judgment that had upheld the Collector's refusal to withhold highway acquisition compensation. The appellants, legal heirs of one Mst. Mala Begum, had challenged Mutation No. 1066 — attested in 1954 in favour of respondent No. 5 as the Khananeshin (resident) daughter of the original estate holder — and sought to stall disbursement of compensation for approximately six kanals of land acquired for a National Highway Bypass at Mouza Delina, Baramulla. The bench held that the Collector's jurisdiction in acquisition proceedings is confined to apportionment among recognised interested persons and does not extend to adjudicating disputed questions of title. Any compensation released to respondent No. 5, however, must be secured by a bank guarantee equivalent to one-half of the amount, pending the civil suit.

The Estate, the Mutation, and the Dispute

The original estate holder, Abdul Ahad Ganie, owned land measuring 40 Kanals and 17 Marlas under several survey numbers at Mouza Delina, Baramullah, Kashmir. Upon his death, the estate devolved upon three legal heirs: his widow Mst. Fazi Begum (since deceased), his daughter respondent No. 5, and Mst. Mala Begum — the mother of the present appellants.

Respondent No. 5 was unmarried at the time of the estate holder's death and was recorded as the Khananeshin daughter. Mutation No. 1066, dated 21 November 2011 BK, was attested in her favour on that basis and also purportedly on the strength of an unregistered Will said to have been executed by Abdul Ahad Ganie. The mutation had remained operative since 1954.

The mother of the appellants never challenged the mutation during her lifetime. On 25 November 2024, the appellants filed an appeal before the Collector/Additional Deputy Commissioner, Baramulla, alleging that the mutation was contrary to statutory succession provisions and that fraud had been perpetrated. Their case was that, since the deceased left no male issue, only one-half share could devolve upon respondent No. 5, with the remainder reverting to collateral heirs. The appeal was dismissed on 20 May 2025. A revision petition was also filed.

Separately, the appellants instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that the property was joint and undivided, and a prohibitory injunction restraining the revenue authorities from disbursing compensation for the acquired land.

The Highway Acquisition and the Compensation Dispute

Land measuring approximately 3.222 kanals under Survey No. 92 and 2.688 kanals under Survey No. 233 — together about six kanals — fell under the National Highway Bypass and was acquired by the official respondents. The appellants approached the Collector, Land Acquisition, seeking that compensation be withheld pending resolution of the title dispute.

The Collector conducted an enquiry and obtained a field report. The report recorded that neither the appellants nor their mother appeared as owners or tenants in the revenue records; respondent No. 5 alone was recorded as the Khananeshin daughter. The Collector rejected the appellants' application.

The appellants then filed an application under Section 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956, seeking a reference of the compensation dispute to the District Judge, Baramulla. The Collector, by order dated 11 March 2025, dismissed that application as well, holding that the appellants were neither recorded as owners nor as tenants and that no devolution of ancestral property had taken place in their favour.

Aggrieved, the appellants filed two writ petitions — WP(C) No. 601/2025 and WP(C) No. 56/2025 — corresponding to the two separately acquired parcels. The Writ Court dismissed both on 30 March 2026. The present Letters Patent Appeal followed.

The Legal Questions Before the Division Bench

The bench framed two issues. First, whether the Collector was under a statutory obligation under Sections 3G and 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956 to withhold compensation and refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court upon the existence of rival claims. Second, whether the rejection of the reference application solely on the ground that the appellants were not reflected in revenue records as owners or tenants was legally sustainable.

The appellants argued that the Writ Court had committed a fundamental error by treating mutation entries as conclusive proof of title. They contended that mutation entries are fiscal in nature and do not create or extinguish title — a settled legal position — and that the Writ Court had effectively elevated a revenue entry to the status of substantive title. They further argued that the statutory scheme under Sections 3G and 3H obligated the Collector to refrain from disbursing compensation where rival claims existed and to refer the dispute for adjudication.

Respondent No. 5, opposing the appeals, argued that the appellants had raised no bona fide succession or title dispute, that they had withdrawn their civil claim over the acquired land, and that they did not fall within the definition of “persons interested” under the Act. The Collector's refusal to make a reference was, on this view, entirely correct.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench drew on the Supreme Court's judgment in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (1962 SCR (1) 676) for the proposition that the Land Acquisition Officer's enquiry is administrative in nature and is confined to ascertaining the market value of the property and the respective interests of persons claiming compensation for apportionment purposes. The Collector does not function as a judicial officer and cannot decide complicated questions of title.

From Shyamali Das v. Illa Chowdhry & Ors. (AIR 2007 SCC 215) and Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 2003 SC 942), the bench extracted the principle that the reference court's jurisdiction arises solely on the basis of a reference made by the Collector and cannot be widened to decide matters not referred to it. The Collector's award is final and conclusive as between the Collector and persons interested on the true area, the value of the land, and apportionment — but the scheme does not attach similar finality to the question of the person to whom compensation is payable, which remains open for adjudication before a competent forum.

Applying these principles, the bench found that the appellants were admittedly not parties to the acquisition proceedings. Respondent No. 5 alone was reflected as owner in possession in the revenue records on the strength of Mutation No. 1066, and she alone was heard during the acquisition proceedings. The bench acknowledged the settled position that revenue entries are fiscal and do not conclusively determine title, but held that the Collector conducting acquisition proceedings is bound to proceed on the basis of official records available at the relevant time.

The bench observed that had the appellants possessed any recognised interest in the property, there would have been no occasion for them to challenge the mutation or institute a civil suit seeking a declaration of co-sharership. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants — their mother, who was the real sister of respondent No. 5 — had never challenged the mutation during her lifetime, which lent further support to the prima facie entitlement of respondent No. 5.

On the Section 3H reference, the bench held that this provision is substantially analogous to Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the scope of reference is confined to disputes relating to apportionment amongst persons already recognised as interested persons. Since the appellants had not established any legally recognised interest in the acquired property at the relevant time, the Collector had no jurisdiction to make such a reference. Even if a reference had been made, it would have been beyond the Collector's competence.

The bench also noted that the appellants had attempted to withdraw their civil claim relating to the acquired land after learning of the compensation assessment, but no order permitting such withdrawal had been placed on record. The civil suit therefore continued to remain sub judice, covering the entire property including the acquired land.

The bench rejected the appellants' reliance on Mohan Devi's case as factually distinguishable, and held that the principles in Shyamali Das and Sharda Devi squarely applied.

The Bank Guarantee Direction

During arguments, counsel for respondent No. 5 fairly conceded that if the appellants succeed before the civil court in establishing their rights, they would at best be entitled to one-half share of the compensation amount for the acquired land. The bench took note of this concession.

While finding no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the Writ Court's judgment, the bench directed that respondent No. 5 shall be entitled to receive the compensation amount as assessed and determined by the Collector, subject to furnishing a bank guarantee equivalent to one-half of the compensation amount before the competent civil court as security, pending final disposal of the civil suit.

Order

The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. The bench found no ground to interfere with the Writ Court's judgment upholding the Collector's refusal to withhold compensation or make a reference under Section 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956. Respondent No. 5 may receive the assessed compensation upon furnishing a bank guarantee for one-half of that amount before the competent civil court, to remain in place until the pending civil suit is finally decided.