J&K HC Dismisses Amul Taza Milk Producers' Plea to Quash Food Safety Cognizance, Vacates Stay in Force Since 2022
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court refused to quash a 2021 cognizance order against Banaskantha District Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union, holding the Designated Officer lawfully referred the sample to a Referral Laboratory after recording written reasons under Rule 2.4.3 of the Food Safety and Standards Rules, 2011.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, in a judgment pronounced on 21 May 2026, dismissed a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by two authorised representatives of M/s Banaskantha District Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union Ltd., Palanpur, Gujarat, the entity behind the Amul Taza brand. The petitioners had sought to quash a complaint pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian, and the cognizance order dated 07.10.2021 by which summons were issued against them. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, sitting singly, found no illegality in the referral of the milk sample to a Referral Laboratory, rejected the claim that the Managing Director enjoyed immunity from prosecution, and vacated an interim stay that had been operative since 21 April 2022, directing the trial court to conclude proceedings preferably within six months.
The Complaint and the Cognizance Order
The Food Safety Officer, Block Shopian, collected a sample of Homogenised Toned Milk (Amul Taza) and sent it for analysis. The Food Analyst, Kashmir Division, issued report No. FSSA/K/FA/2020-21/P-500 dated 27.10.2020, declaring the sample to be of standard quality.
The Designated Officer, Shopian, reviewed that report and found that only eight parameters had been tested. Crucially, tests for antibiotic residues, pesticide residues, and heavy metals had not been conducted. Acting under Rule 2.4.3 of the Food Safety and Standards Rules, 2011, the Designated Officer recorded written reasons and dispatched the second part of the sample — bearing Code No. DO/FSSA/SPN/167, to the National Dairy Development Board, Anand, Gujarat, which is a designated Referral Food Laboratory for milk and milk products.
The Referral Laboratory declared the sample unsafe under Section 26(1) and Section 26(2)(i) read with Section 3(1)(zz)(xii) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, offences punishable under Section 59 of that Act. On the basis of that report, the Food Safety Officer filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian. The Magistrate took cognizance on 07.10.2021 and directed issuance of summons against the accused persons, including the two petitioners.
Petitioner No. 1, S.D. Mevada (age 62), is the Assistant Manager (Quality Assurance) of the Society. Petitioner No. 2, Kamraj Ramsang Bhai Chaudary (age 55), is the Incharge Managing Director. Both approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the complaint and the cognizance order.
Three Grounds Raised by the Petitioners
The petitioners advanced three distinct challenges before the High Court.
First, they argued that the Designated Officer referred the sample to the Referral Laboratory without recording reasons in writing as required by Rule 2.4.3 of the Food Safety and Standards Rules, 2011. Without that mandatory step, the entire referral, and consequently the complaint, was vitiated.
Second, they contended that the sample was referred without granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners’ company, which they said was a breach of natural justice.
Third, they pointed to what they described as an “unknown report” that had come before the respondents before the Referral Laboratory report arrived, which was neither appended to the complaint nor disclosed to the petitioners, casting doubt on the entire process. They also argued that the Magistrate was obliged to conduct an enquiry under Section 202 CrPC before issuing process, and that petitioner No. 2, as Managing Director, was shielded from prosecution by the proviso to Section 66 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, because a nominated officer was responsible for food safety at the relevant unit.
The Respondent’s Record and the Written Reasons
The Food Safety Officer, Block Shopian, filed a status report. The Deputy Advocate General, Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, produced before the Court the actual written reasons recorded by the Designated Officer, Shopian, before referring the sample. Those reasons, reproduced in the judgment, read in part:
“I have gone through the analytical report of Food Analyst Kashmir… and have been found that only 8 parameters have been conducted while as some important parameters like detection of antibiotic residue, pesticide residues and detection of heavy metals have not been conducted.”
The Designated Officer then directed that the second part of the sample be dispatched to the National Dairy Development Board, Anand, Gujarat. The respondents also denied that any contradictory or concealed report existed, stating that the only reports in the chain were the initial Food Analyst report and the subsequent Referral Laboratory report.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Nargal began by reaffirming that the power under Section 482 CrPC is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, only where continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of process.
On the first ground, the Court held that the written reasons produced by the respondents directly contradicted the petitioners’ claim. The Designated Officer had found the first report incomplete because it omitted examination of antibiotic residues, pesticide residues, and heavy metals, parameters directly relevant to human safety. Recording those findings in writing and then referring the sample to the Referral Laboratory was precisely what Rule 2.4.3 contemplated. The Court observed that the provision exists to ensure that unsafe food articles do not escape proper scientific scrutiny merely because an initial report was incomplete, and that authorities cannot be expected to mechanically accept an incomplete report when important safety parameters remain unexamined.
The Court applied the principle from Mackinon Mackenzie Ltd v. Mackinnon Employees Union, (2015) 4 SCC 544, that where a statute prescribes a particular act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone. It then found that the Designated Officer had done exactly that.
On the second ground, absence of prior hearing, the Court found no substance. Neither the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 nor the Rules framed thereunder contemplate a pre-decisional hearing before the Designated Officer exercises powers under Rule 2.4.3. The legislature had consciously not incorporated such a requirement.
On the “unknown report” allegation, the Court found it wholly speculative and unsupported by any material on record. The sequence of events borne out from the record showed only two reports: the initial Food Analyst report and the Referral Laboratory report.
On the significance of the two reports, the Court relied on the Madras High Court’s decision in A. Venkatrama v. The Food Safety Officer, Crl.O.P. Nos. 14595 and 22925 of 2016, decided on 13.04.2023, which held that the report of the Referral Laboratory shall be final and the complaint must be filed on the basis of that report. Applying that principle, the Court held that once the Referral Laboratory declared the sample unsafe, the earlier report, which admittedly covered only limited parameters, lost its significance. The two reports were not contradictory in the strict sense; the second was a conclusive and final determination under the statutory mechanism.
The Court also held that once a statutory expert laboratory renders a final opinion, a court exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot sit in appeal over that scientific determination. Judicial review cannot extend to substituting scientific opinion unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or contrary to law.
On the Section 202 CrPC argument, the Court noted that the complaint was filed by a public servant in discharge of official duties under a Central legislation. The Magistrate was only required to examine whether prima facie material existed for proceeding against the accused persons.
On the Section 66 immunity argument concerning petitioner No. 2, the Court read the provision carefully. Section 66(1) makes every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business liable for offences committed by the company. The proviso, which the petitioners relied upon, extends liability to the nominated head of a particular establishment or unit; it does not grant blanket immunity to the Managing Director. The second proviso provides a defence only where the accused proves the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence. Whether petitioner No. 2 exercised due diligence or had no knowledge is a matter of defence requiring evidence, and cannot be conclusively determined in Section 482 CrPC proceedings. The Court held that the question of his involvement must be examined at trial.
Public Health and the Interim Stay
Justice Nargal placed particular weight on the nature of the food article involved. Milk is consumed daily by children, infants, pregnant women, elderly persons, and patients. Contaminated milk has the potential to cause long-term and irreversible consequences, particularly for children whose physical growth and immunity depend on safe and nutritious food.
The Court invoked the Supreme Court’s observation in Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, 1987 SCC (Cri) 329, that maintenance and improvement of public health is a constitutional obligation of the highest importance. It held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the Court cannot adopt an approach that dilutes the statutory safeguards enacted under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 for protection of consumers.
The Court then turned to the interim stay. The stay had been granted on 21 April 2022 and had remained operative continuously. The Court expressed that it was not inclined to continue the interim order even for a single day more, observing that the petitioners had already enjoyed protection for a considerable period while proceedings involving serious allegations relating to unsafe food products remained pending. The interim stay was vacated forthwith.
Order
The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, along with all connected applications. The interim direction was vacated forthwith.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian, was directed to proceed with the complaint strictly in accordance with law and to make all possible endeavours to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date a copy of the order is made available before the court.
Both parties were directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shopian, on 10 July 2026.
The Court clarified that no observation made in the judgment shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the complaint, and the Magistrate shall proceed without being influenced by any such observation.