J&K High Court Quashes PSA Detention of Juvenile, Holds Acts Committed During Minority Cannot Ground Preventive Detention
The High Court of J&K and Ladakh set aside a Public Safety Act detention order against a Pulwama youth who was a juvenile when the underlying FIR was registered, finding the detaining authority never considered his age or the Juvenile Justice Act.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, at Srinagar, has quashed a detention order issued under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 against Fariz Gulzar, a resident of Hunipora Wanpora, Pulwama, on the ground that the detaining authority failed entirely to consider that the detenue was a juvenile at the time of the activities cited against him. Justice M. A. Chowdhary, sitting singly, allowed the habeas corpus petition on 11 May 2026, directing Fariz Gulzar’s immediate release from custody. The judgment holds that acts committed during juvenility cannot form the basis for a subsequent preventive detention order, and that mechanical reproduction of a police dossier without applying mind to the detenue’s age vitiates the order.
The Detention Order and the Challenge Before the Court
Detention Order No. 11/DMP/PSA/25 was passed on 30 April 2025 by the District Magistrate, Pulwama, respondent No. 2, detaining Fariz Gulzar under the PSA to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of habeas corpus to quash that order.
The factual foundation of the detention order was FIR No. 293 of 2023, registered at Police Station Pulwama for offences under Section 302 IPC and Section 2/25 of the Arms Act, alleging involvement in antinational and subversive activities. The detenue was also alleged to have worked as an over-ground worker providing logistic support to two killed terrorists, and to have been motivating local youth to join terrorist ranks. He had been lodged in Juvenile Home Harvan, Srinagar for approximately one year and three months before being released on bail on 2 January 2025. After his release, the detaining authority concluded that his activities remained prejudicial to State security and ordered his detention under the PSA.
The central challenge raised by counsel for the petitioner, Advocate Shaheryar, was that Fariz Gulzar was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged activities as well as on the date of registration of FIR No. 293/2023, making him a juvenile governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The detaining authority, it was argued, had completely failed to consider this aspect. Additional grounds raised were the vagueness of the grounds of detention and the absence of any proximate fresh activity to justify preventive detention in 2025 on the basis of events from 2023.
The Government Advocate, Furqan Yaqub Sofi, appearing for the respondents, contended that the petitioner was a habitual offender whose activities were prejudicial to State security, that the detention was based on subjective satisfaction derived from relevant material, and that the PSA does not expressly bar detention of a juvenile.
Establishing Juvenility: The School Certificate and the Supreme Court’s Rule
The petitioner placed on record a Secondary School Examination Certificate issued by the Jammu & Kashmir Board of School Education, showing his date of birth as 11 April 2007. The respondents did not rebut this document. The court observed that the grounds of detention themselves recorded the detenue’s age as 18 years and 16 days as on the date of detention, 30 April 2025. Working backwards, this meant he was approximately 16 years old at the time of the alleged activities in 2023. The respondents’ own case acknowledged that the detenue as a juvenile was involved in the 2023 matter, and he had in fact been tried by a Juvenile Board and detained in a Juvenile Home.
On the evidentiary weight to be given to the school certificate, the court applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 3467, which interpreted Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. That ruling establishes a strict hierarchy: the matriculation or equivalent certificate is the highest-rated option, and “if the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon.” Only in its absence does the inquiry descend to school admission registers, then municipal birth certificates, and finally medical opinion. Since the school certificate was available and unrebutted, it conclusively established the petitioner’s date of birth.
Whether Juvenile Acts Can Sustain a Preventive Detention Order
The court then addressed the question of whether activities committed during juvenility can be relied upon to justify preventive detention at a later date. It drew on two authorities.
The Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Ramesh Bishnoi, (2019) 19 SCC 710, observed that the thrust of both the 2000 and 2015 Juvenile Justice Acts is that even a conviction of a juvenile must be obliterated so that no stigma attaches to any crime committed during minority, with the clear object of reintegrating the juvenile into society as a normal person.
A Division Bench of the same High Court in Tahir Riyaz Dar v. Union Territory of J&K, LPA No. 121/2025, decided on 6 November 2025, had held that preventive detention must be based on relevant, proximate and legally admissible material, and that acts committed as a juvenile lose their determinative value for future preventive action. The Division Bench had stated that “an illegal act committed by a juvenile does not stigmatize his future and likewise, any illegal act committed by the juvenile cannot form the basis for issuance of a detention order under the Act subsequently.”
Applying these principles, Justice Chowdhary found that the impugned detention order was substantially founded upon FIR No. 293/2023 and allegations pertaining to the period when the detenue was a juvenile. A perusal of the detention order revealed no reference to the petitioner’s age and no consideration of the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act. The order was, in the court’s assessment, a mechanical reproduction of the police dossier. The failure to consider the vital and relevant factor of the petitioner’s juvenility on the date of the alleged activities rendered the order vitiated on account of non-application of mind.
The court also addressed the broader constitutional position on preventive detention. Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2011) 5 SCC, it reiterated that preventive detention is repugnant to democratic ideas and must be confined within very narrow limits. If the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law is illegal. In the present case, the detaining authority showed no compelling necessity to bypass the Juvenile Justice framework, and the detention order therefore failed the tests of reasonableness, legality, and proportionality.
Vagueness in the Grounds of Detention
Beyond the juvenility issue, the court found an independent infirmity in the grounds of detention. The order alleged that the detenue had worked as an over-ground worker for killed terrorists, motivated youth to join terrorist ranks, and was closely associated with active terrorists. However, the grounds did not specify the particular acts, dates, places, or persons involved. The court characterised these as vague and general statements.
The Supreme Court in Jahangir Khan Fazal Khan Pathan v. Police Commissioner & Anr., (1989) 3 SCC 590, had held that vague averments in grounds of detention are bad because the detenue cannot make an effective representation against the order. The court applied that principle here.
The court also cited the Supreme Court’s guidance in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana & Ors., (2023) 9 SCC 587, which requires that an order of detention precisely set forth the grounds without vagueness, in language that the detenue can comprehend, so that the right to make a representation is not defeated. The Supreme Court had cautioned in that case that detaining authorities must ensure no extraneous factors or vague formulations find their way into the order.
The stale nature of the underlying material was also noted. The allegations related entirely to the year 2023. The petitioner’s counsel had argued that without any fresh activity being attributed to the petitioner after his release on bail on 2 January 2025, the 2023 FIR lacked the proximity required to justify preventive detention in April 2025. The court found this argument well-founded in the overall context of the order’s infirmities.
Order
Justice M. A. Chowdhary allowed HCP No. 239/2025 and quashed Detention Order No. 11/DMP/PSA/25 dated 30 April 2025. Fariz Gulzar S/O Gulzar Ahmad Wani, R/O Hunipora Wanpora, Tehsil and District Pulwama, was directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not required in any other case. The scanned detention record produced by the respondents was directed to be returned.