J&K High Court Denies Bail in Section 376 Case, Holds Post-Charge Compromise Cannot Dilute Rape Allegations

Justice M. A. Chowdhary dismissed bail and a revision petition filed by a Kupwara man facing repeated sexual assault charges, holding that a post-charge compromise carries no weight in Section 376 IPC matters.

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed both the bail application and a connected criminal revision petition filed by Farooq Ahmad Dar, a 59-year-old Government employee from Sogam, Lolab, Kupwara, who has been in custody since 13 June 2022 in connection with FIR No. 17/2022 registered at Police Station Women Wing, Kupwara, under Sections 376 and 506 IPC. Justice M. A. Chowdhary, sitting singly, pronounced the full judgment on 2 June 2026 after reserving it on 19 May 2026. The court held that an apparent compromise reached between the parties after charges were framed cannot be accorded weight sufficient to dilute the gravity of rape allegations, and that the Trial Court was justified in refusing to summon additional defence witnesses at an advanced stage of trial.

The FIR and the Prosecution Case

FIR No. 17/2022 was registered on 13 June 2022 at Police Station Women Wing, Kupwara, alleging that Farooq Ahmad Dar subjected the prosecutrix to repeated acts of sexual assault and criminal intimidation over a prolonged period. The prosecution case is that the applicant is the stepfather of the prosecutrix, the offences arising in the context of his marriage with the prosecutrix's mother.

Upon completion of investigation, a challan was presented before the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Kupwara. Charges under Sections 376 and 506 IPC were framed against the applicant on 25 August 2022. The prosecution evidence was thereafter recorded, the accused's statement was taken under Section 313 Cr PC, and the petitioner examined three defence witnesses before the proceedings reached the stage at which the present applications arose.

The Bail Application: Competing Arguments

Farooq Ahmad Dar, through his son Naveed Farooq Dar, filed Bail App. No. 230/2025 before the High Court. His counsel, Mr. Zahir Ahmad Wani, advanced several grounds. The applicant had been in continuous custody since 13 June 2022 with no criminal antecedents. As a Government employee with deep roots in society, he was said to pose no flight risk and no threat to evidence.

Counsel pointed to what he described as material contradictions and improvements in the prosecutrix's statements during trial, arguing that her varying versions undermined the prosecution case. He also contended that the medical evidence did not support allegations of forcible sexual assault. A significant plank of the defence was that the prosecutrix herself had approached the applicant's son to file a petition under Section 482 Cr PC before the High Court seeking quashment of the very FIR — a step that, according to counsel, materially affected the credibility of the prosecution.

The respondents, represented by Mr. Faheem Nisar Shah as Government Advocate, opposed bail on the ground that the allegations were grave and heinous. The prosecutrix had fully supported the prosecution case, her statement under Section 164 Cr PC corroborated the FIR, and medical evidence collected during investigation established a strong prima facie case. The prosecution also expressed apprehension that if enlarged on bail, the applicant was likely to influence and intimidate the prosecutrix and other material witnesses.

How the Court Reasoned on Bail

Justice Chowdhary set out the governing principles by reference to the Supreme Court's judgment in State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, which authoritatively laid down the parameters for bail in serious offences: nature and gravity of accusation, severity of punishment upon conviction, possibility of tampering with evidence, likelihood of influencing witnesses, and the larger interests of society.

The court acknowledged the general rule that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, but drew on Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi and Anr., (2001) 4 SCC 280, and Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, to hold that in cases involving serious offences against women under Section 376 IPC, greater caution is required while balancing the liberty of the accused against societal interest and the rights of the victim.

On the contradictions and improvements in the prosecutrix's statements, the court was clear: their evidentiary value and appreciation are matters for the Trial Court at the stage of final adjudication and cannot be conclusively examined at the bail stage. The prosecutrix had supported the prosecution case both in the FIR and in her Section 164 Cr PC statement, and that prima facie support was sufficient for the present purpose.

The court addressed the Section 482 Cr PC petition directly. It held that the circumstances under which that petition came to be filed and subsequently withdrawn were issues requiring proper appreciation during trial, and that the petition's existence could not, at the bail stage, dilute the seriousness of the allegations.

The most pointed reasoning concerned the alleged compromise. The court found that the apparent settlement between the parties appeared to have been arrived at after framing of charges. Relying on Shimbhu and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318, where the Supreme Court held that rape is a non-compoundable offence and compromise cannot be a ground for leniency, and on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, which deprecated the practice of showing indulgence in sexual offences on the basis of settlement, the court held that such compromise could not be accorded undue weight. The offence alleged, the court observed, is not merely against an individual but carries serious societal ramifications.

The pendency of the criminal revision petition challenging the rejection of the Section 233(3) Cr PC application was also addressed. The court held that this pendency did not, by itself, entitle the applicant to bail, particularly when the prosecution had disclosed a prima facie case.

Taking the nature and gravity of allegations, the stage of trial, and the material on record together, the court declined to grant bail.

The Criminal Revision: Refusal to Summon Additional Defence Witnesses

Crl. R. No. 1/2025 challenged the order dated 17 December 2024 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge as Presiding Officer of the Fast Track Court, Kupwara, which had rejected the petitioner's application under Section 233(3) Cr PC. That application sought summoning of additional witnesses primarily to prove the conduct of the prosecutrix in filing and subsequently withdrawing the Section 482 Cr PC petition before the High Court.

The petitioner's counsel argued that Section 233(3) Cr PC confers a valuable statutory right on the accused to summon witnesses in defence, and that such right can be curtailed only where the court records satisfaction that the application is vexatious, intended for delay, or meant to defeat the ends of justice. The proposed witnesses were said to be material for proving the prosecutrix's subsequent conduct, which was relevant to the defence.

The respondents countered that the petitioner had already examined three defence witnesses and had been given sufficient opportunity to lead defence evidence. The proposed evidence was neither essential for adjudication nor relevant to the charges framed. The application, they submitted, was filed at a belated stage after conclusion of prosecution evidence and recording of the Section 313 Cr PC statement, with a view to prolong proceedings.

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction and the Court's Findings

Justice Chowdhary noted that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against interlocutory or procedural orders passed during trial is limited in scope. Interference is ordinarily unwarranted unless the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest miscarriage of justice.

The court found that the Trial Court had duly considered the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced and had recorded reasons while declining the prayer. The principal ground — the Section 482 Cr PC petition filed by the prosecutrix — already formed part of the record, and documents relating to it had admittedly been placed before the Trial Court. The petitioner had also examined defence witnesses in support of his version.

The court held that the Trial Court was justified in concluding that summoning additional witnesses at the advanced stage of trial was not necessary for just adjudication. The relevancy, admissibility, and evidentiary value of documents already produced could be appreciated by the Trial Court at the stage of final adjudication.

The contention that refusal to summon additional witnesses amounted to denial of fair trial was rejected. The court observed that while fair opportunity must be afforded to an accused to defend himself, the court is equally duty-bound to ensure that criminal proceedings are not unnecessarily prolonged under the guise of additional evidence. No illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error was found in the impugned order of 17 December 2024.

The court directed the Trial Court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law and to make endeavour to expeditiously conclude the trial.

Order

Bail App. No. 230/2025 was dismissed. The court clarified that observations made in the bail order shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case and shall remain confined to disposal of the bail application.

Crl. R. No. 1/2025 along with connected application CrlM No. 38/2025 was also dismissed. Interim directions, if any, were vacated. The Trial Court was directed to proceed expeditiously. The court further clarified that observations in the revision order shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the main case pending before the Trial Court.