J&K High Court Upholds Acquittal in Bandipora Kidnapping and Rape Case, Finds Prosecutrix Accompanied Accused Voluntarily
Justice Sanjay Dhar dismissed two appeals against a 2012 acquittal, holding that the prosecutrix’s own conduct showed she had accompanied the accused of her own free will, and that the age of consent applicable at the time of the 2007 incident was 16 years.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed two criminal appeals filed by the State of J&K and the complainant challenging the acquittal of the accused in a kidnapping and rape case from Bandipora district. Justice Sanjay Dhar, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 31 July 2026, after reserving it on 23 July 2026. The appeals had challenged the judgment dated 31 December 2012 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Bandipora, which had acquitted the respondent-accused of charges under Section 363 and Section 376 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The court found that the trial court had properly appreciated the evidence and that the conclusion of voluntary accompaniment was irresistible on the record.
The Incident and Trial Court Proceedings
On 26 July 2007, the complainant Abdul Majeed Beigh lodged a report at Police Station, Bandipora, stating that his daughter had left home on 22 June 2007 and had not returned. A search revealed she had been allegedly kidnapped by the accused, Mohammad Ramzan Mir, with a view to committing sexual intercourse upon her. FIR No. 120/2007 for an offence under Section 363 RPC was registered.
During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered from the possession of the accused. Her medical examination indicated she had been sexually assaulted, and the offence under Section 376 RPC was added. The investigating agency filed a chargesheet, and on 1 August 2008 the trial court framed charges under both Sections 363 and 376 RPC.
The prosecution examined eight witnesses. In his statement recorded under Section 342 of the J&K Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused stated that the prosecutrix had accompanied him of her own free will, that the two had contracted marriage, and that a marriage agreement had been executed. He denied kidnapping and alleged that the prosecutrix had deposed against him due to pressure from her family.
The accused also led a defence, examining two witnesses. The trial court, after analysing the evidence, concluded that the prosecutrix had voluntarily joined the accused and had entered into wedlock with him, and that the charges had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The accused was accordingly acquitted.
Scope of Appellate Interference in Acquittal Appeals
Before examining the facts, Justice Dhar set out the legal framework governing State appeals against acquittals. The court drew on three Supreme Court decisions in sequence.
In Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, the Supreme Court had restated the principles from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415. Those principles confirm that an appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence in an acquittal appeal, and that phrases such as “substantial and compelling reasons” are more in the nature of flourishes of language than restrictions on power. They also confirm the double presumption: the accused is presumed innocent, and that presumption is further reinforced once a trial court records acquittal. Critically, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the evidence, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.
In H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Supreme Court added that an appellate court can interfere only if it concludes that the only possible conclusion on the evidence was guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt, and no other conclusion was open.
The court then cited Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoundar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, which distilled the test to three conditions: the acquittal must suffer from patent perversity; or be based on misreading or omission of material evidence; and no two reasonable views must be possible — only the view consistent with guilt must emerge from the record. The appellate court must record pertinent findings on these factors before reversing an acquittal.
Age of Consent: Law Applicable in June 2007
The appellants had contended that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence and that her consent was therefore immaterial. Justice Dhar examined this contention against the statutory position in force in June 2007.
The court recorded that the age of consent under Section 376 RPC, as it stood at the relevant time, was 16 years. It was only by virtue of the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013, which came into effect on 22 March 2014, that the age of consent in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir was raised to 18 years.
The court then turned to the evidence of the prosecutrix’s age. The registration card issued by the Jammu and Kashmir State Board of School Education placed her date of birth at 7 September 1989. Her mother, PW-2 Mst. Sharaf Majeed, confirmed this date in cross-examination. PW-7, Dr. Anjum Nazir, deposed that the prosecutrix’s approximate age was 18 years or more at the time of examination. On this body of evidence, the court concluded that the prosecutrix had crossed 16 years of age by the date of the alleged occurrence and had, in terms of the law then in force, attained the age of consent. The minority argument was therefore unavailable to the appellants.
Analysing the Prosecutrix’s Testimony and Conduct
The central question for the court was whether the prosecutrix had accompanied the accused voluntarily or had been forcibly taken away and subjected to sexual intercourse under threat or coercion.
In her examination-in-chief, the prosecutrix stated that the accused had forcibly kidnapped her, taken her inside a shop, and raped her there. She said she stayed with the accused for one month and seven days before being recovered by the police, and that the accused kept changing hideouts.
The cross-examination, however, revealed a materially different picture. The prosecutrix admitted that during the daytime the accused would leave the shop and return in the evening, and that she would not raise any alarm even when he went out. She conceded she was taking food and changing clothes in the shop, and that there was no lock keeping her inside. She admitted travelling in a passenger vehicle in which three other persons were also present, and that the vehicle was checked by the police at a naka, but she neither raised an alarm nor narrated anything about her alleged kidnapping or rape to anyone present, including the police.
She denied her signatures on the marriage agreement and denied having executed it before a Judge. She also stated she asked the accused to set her free, but he refused.
Justice Dhar drew the inference that this conduct — remaining with the accused for over a month, not raising an alarm when the accused was absent, and staying silent before the police at a check-post — was inconsistent with a claim of forcible detention. The statement that she had been forcibly kidnapped and subjected to sexual assault was found to be doubtful and unreliable.
The Marriage Agreement and Defence Evidence
The accused placed on record a photocopy of a marriage agreement stated to have been registered by the Sub-Registrar, Kargil. The prosecutrix denied her signatures on the document. However, defence witness DW Bashir Ahmad Mir, who was also a witness to the agreement, clearly stated in his evidence that the prosecutrix had executed the marriage agreement before the Sub-Registrar, Kargil.
The court found that DW Bashir Ahmad Mir’s testimony, read with the copy of the agreement, probabilised the accused’s defence that the parties had entered into a wedlock. This further supported the conclusion of voluntary accompaniment.
Outcome
Justice Dhar concluded that the prosecutrix had accompanied the accused out of her own free will and that the case was not one of kidnapping and rape. The trial court had, in the court’s assessment, properly analysed and appreciated the evidence and arrived at a conclusion that was irresistible on the nature of evidence on record.
Both CRAA No. 23/2013 filed by the State and CRAA No. 27/2014 filed by the complainant were dismissed as devoid of merit. The trial court record, along with a copy of the judgment, was directed to be sent back forthwith. The judgment has been marked as reportable.