J&K High Court Dismisses Neighbour's Writ Against Revised Building Permission, Directs Petitioner to Statutory Tribunal
Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal held that disputed questions of deviation extent and compoundability cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 when an efficacious statutory remedy exists before the J&K Special Tribunal.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed a writ petition filed by a resident of Chinar Avenue Colony, Naseembagh, challenging a revised building permission granted by the Srinagar Municipal Corporation to his neighbour. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 2 June 2026, after reserving it on 13 May 2026. The Court found that the petitioner had bypassed an efficacious statutory remedy available before the J&K Special Tribunal under Section 403 of the J&K Municipal Corporation Act, 2000, and that the core dispute — whether the deviations were compoundable — involved disputed factual and technical questions unsuitable for adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution. A connected contempt petition was also disposed of.
The Dispute Before the Court
The petitioner, Mohammad Ameen War, aged 62 years, resides at House No. 43, Chinar Avenue Colony, Naseembagh, Srinagar. Private respondent No. 8, Arsheed Ansar Mufti, was initially granted Building Permission Order No. 2900/2018 dated 1 January 2018 for construction over land at Chinar Avenue, Naseembagh.
According to the petitioner, respondent No. 8 raised construction in substantial deviation from the sanctioned plan. Repeated complaints to the Municipal authorities eventually led the Srinagar Municipal Corporation to issue demolition notice No. SMC/Enf/4104-10 dated 1 February 2019 through the Chief Enforcement Officer, alleging deviations from the sanctioned plan under the J&K Municipal Corporation Act, 2000.
Respondent No. 8 challenged the demolition notice before the J&K Special Tribunal, Srinagar, by way of statutory appeal. The petitioner filed a caveat and an impleadment application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide order dated 28 February 2019, did not finally uphold or set aside the demolition notice. Instead, it directed both parties to approach the Srinagar Municipal Corporation by way of representation and directed the Corporation to re-examine the matter strictly in accordance with law and regulations.
Pursuant to those directions, the petitioner submitted a representation contending that the deviations were major and non-compoundable. The Srinagar Municipal Corporation, after reconsidering the matter, issued revised Building Permission Order No. 27 of 2019 dated 20 May 2019 in favour of respondent No. 8, invoking Clause 5.8.2(ii)(c) of the Srinagar Building Bye-laws, 2011, and holding the deviations to be compoundable. The petitioner then filed WP(C) No. 2106/2019 before the High Court seeking quashment of that revised permission, along with CCP(S) 329/2019 seeking initiation of contempt proceedings.
Petitioner's Case and Respondents' Objections
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.H. Thakur, argued that once the demolition notice was issued and the matter was before the Tribunal, the Municipal authorities became functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to subsequently regularise the same construction. He contended that the revised permission effectively regularised nearly ninety percent unauthorised construction, which is impermissible under the Municipal Corporation Act and the Srinagar Building Bye-laws. He also argued that no review or revision proceedings were initiated against the demolition notice, and that no meaningful opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner before the revised permission was issued. Allegations of mala fides, collusion and corruption against the official respondents and respondent No. 8 were also levelled.
The petitioner further argued that the writ petition was maintainable despite the existence of an alternate remedy because the case involved illegal exercise of statutory powers by public authorities.
Mr. Bikramdeep Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the official respondents, raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the efficacious alternate statutory remedy available under Section 403 of the J&K Municipal Corporation Act, 2000. He submitted that the Srinagar Municipal Corporation had reconsidered the matter pursuant to the Tribunal's directions, examined the petitioner's objections, and found the deviations compoundable under Clause 5.8.2(ii)(c) of the Srinagar Building Bye-laws, 2011. Counsel for respondent No. 8 submitted that the writ petition was misconceived and that construction had proceeded strictly in accordance with the revised permission.
The Legal Framework: Section 403 and the Statutory Revision Route
Section 403 of the J&K Municipal Corporation Act, 2000 confers power of revision on the Government to examine the correctness, legality, propriety or regularity of any proceeding or order passed by any officer of the Government or the Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him. The Court reproduced the provision and noted that a Division Bench of the High Court in Abdul Qayoom Dar v. Union Territory of J&K & Ors., LPA No. 76/2020 decided on 1 December 2021, had already held that any challenge to a building permission granted by the Srinagar Municipal Corporation is revisable before the J&K Special Tribunal. That Division Bench had further explained that Section 3 of the J&K Special Tribunal Act, 1988 provides that where a revision lies to the Government, it shall be presented to the Tribunal, and any reference to the Government shall be construed as a reference to the Tribunal. The revision remedy under Section 403 was held to be neither illusory nor ineffective.
Section 255 of the J&K Municipal Corporation Act, which the Court also reproduced, empowers the Government to issue directions for compounding of deviations from a sanctioned plan. The Court observed that the statute itself contemplates compounding of deviations in accordance with policy directions issued by the Government, and that whether the deviations in the present case were correctly compounded under Section 255 was a matter for the competent statutory authority.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Nargal applied the well-settled principle that where a statute provides a complete mechanism for redressal of grievances, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, 1964 SCR (6) 654, that the High Court does not permit the statutory machinery to be bypassed by entertaining a writ petition where an equally efficacious alternate remedy exists.
The Court also drew on the Supreme Court's ruling in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85, which held that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in well-defined exceptions such as where the statutory authority has acted in defiance of fundamental principles of judicial procedure or in total violation of principles of natural justice.
The Court found no such exceptional circumstance. The petitioner had participated before the Tribunal by filing a caveat and an impleadment application. The Tribunal itself had directed the petitioner to submit a representation before the Municipal authorities. The respondents had specifically pleaded that the representation was considered before the revised permission was issued. The Court rejected the plea of denial of hearing as “fit of his own imagination and contrary to record.”
On the question of whether the deviations were major or non-compoundable, the Court held that adjudication would necessarily require examination of sanctioned building plans, nature and extent of deviations, measurements, technical reports and factual verification on site. Such disputed factual and technical questions cannot be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The Court relied on its own earlier judgment in Building Operation Controlling Authority (BOCA) v. Nageen Ara, OWP No. 90/2019 decided on 29 August 2023, where it had held that the Tribunal is the final arbiter on questions of whether a violation is minor or major, and that the writ court cannot re-appreciate evidence as an appellate authority. The Court also referred to its judgment in Noor Mohammad Dar v. Srinagar Municipal Corporation, WP(C) 1499/2024 decided on 12 August 2025, which reiterated that the High Court has no mechanism or yardstick to conduct a roving enquiry into whether a violation is minor or major.
The Supreme Court's ruling in M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, was also applied. That judgment had held that where resolution of disputed questions of fact is an indispensable prelude to the grant of relief, the writ court may relegate the party to the appropriate remedy.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the respondents had taken a contradictory stand by raising both locus standi and alternate remedy objections simultaneously. It held that the two objections are separate and independent legal objections, and raising them together does not render the respondents' position contradictory. Even assuming the petitioner had sufficient locus as a neighbouring resident, he was still required to avail the statutory remedy before invoking writ jurisdiction.
On mala fides, the Court held that allegations of collusion and corruption must be pleaded with full particulars and supported by cogent material. The petitioner had made only general and sweeping allegations without placing any substantive material on record. Mere bald assertion of bias cannot found extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's attempt to frame the dispute as one affecting the public at large. It found that the controversy arose from an individual dispute between neighbouring parties regarding construction adjoining the petitioner's property. Merely referring to the Master Plan, Municipal laws and alleged public rights does not convert an individual private dispute into a matter of public interest. The Court observed that no other resident of the locality had approached the authorities seeking similar relief, and that the litigation appeared to have been pursued primarily in the backdrop of personal disputes relating to the construction activities of the private respondent.
Contempt Petition: CCP(S) 329/2019
The petitioner had also filed a contempt petition alleging that despite the demolition notice and the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal and the High Court, respondent No. 8 continued construction with the active connivance of the official respondents, thereby committing wilful disobedience of orders passed by the Tribunal and the Court.
The Court found no merit in this prayer. The Tribunal's order dated 28 February 2019 had not finally upheld the demolition notice; it had only directed the parties to approach the Municipal Corporation by way of representation. The competent authority thereafter reconsidered the matter and issued the revised permission dated 20 May 2019. The Court further noted that it had itself, vide order dated 25 June 2019, permitted respondent No. 8 to raise construction strictly in accordance with the building permission granted by the competent authority. The subsequent construction activities were undertaken pursuant to that revised permission.
The Court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs v. P. Ravikumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 971, which held that the contempt court cannot travel beyond the scope of the original order or adjudicate issues that were neither conclusively determined nor specifically directed in the judgment alleged to have been violated. The contempt court is only required to examine whether there exists deliberate and wilful disobedience of a clear and unequivocal direction.
The Court held that no material had been placed on record to establish any wilful or deliberate disobedience of any specific order passed either by the Tribunal or by the High Court. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked for determination of seriously disputed questions of fact or for adjudicating the legality of administrative or statutory actions that require independent examination on merits.
Order
Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal dismissed WP(C) No. 2106/2019 along with all connected applications, holding it devoid of merit and not maintainable. The contempt petition CCP(S) 329/2019 was disposed of, with the rule, if any, discharged.
The Court clarified that dismissal of the writ petition shall not preclude the petitioner from availing such statutory remedy as may be available to him under law before the competent forum. No order as to costs was made.