Militant Attack Claim Was Afterthought, Pending Criminal Case Justified CRPF Termination: J&K and Ladakh High Court

Justice Sanjay Dhar dismissed a writ petition challenging a CRPF constable's termination during probation, holding the one-month notice under Rule 16 and a pending criminal case each independently justified the action.

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed a writ petition challenging the termination of a Central Reserve Police Force constable who was on probation when his services were ended in September 2008. Justice Sanjay Dhar, sitting singly, held that the termination by one month's notice was fully lawful under Rule 16 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 read with Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The court found an additional, independent ground: a criminal case under Section 307 and 148 of the Ranbir Penal Code was pending against the constable at the very time he was appointed, in breach of a specific condition of appointment. The constable's plea that he could not return to duty because militants had attacked his home was rejected as a defence fabricated after the fact. The petition was filed by Nargis Begum, wife of the original petitioner Shabir Ahmad Deedad, who was substituted after his death during pendency of the proceedings.

How the Termination Came About

Shabir Ahmad Deedad was appointed as Constable (GD) in CRPF pursuant to an appointment order issued in February 2008. His appointment came with a probation period of two years and was explicitly conditioned on there being no civil or criminal case pending against him.

He was sanctioned casual leave from 3 July 2008 to 7 July 2008 and was required to report back for duty on 7 July 2008. He did not do so. A registered notice was sent to him on 10 July 2008 through postal authorities. Despite receiving it, he did not return.

On 13 August 2008, a formal one-month termination notice was issued bearing No. D.II.I/2008-EC-II. The court found that the petitioner's signatures appeared on the acknowledgement card for that notice. He still did not report for duty during the notice period. His services were accordingly terminated with effect from 11 September 2008 by order No. D-II-I/08/EC-II dated 15 September 2009.

An appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Union of India was rejected in October 2010. The writ petition before the High Court followed.

The Petitioner's Case

The petitioner contended that Deedad had not willfully absented himself. According to the writ petition, when he proceeded on sanctioned leave and reached his home, militants attacked his house on 1 July 2008, injuring his father and other family members, who were hospitalised. A police report was said to have been lodged in connection with the incident.

It was further argued that Deedad had been falsely implicated in FIR No. 157/2003 registered at Police Station Handwara for offences under Section 307 and 148 RPC. He had since been acquitted after a full-dressed trial, with the acquittal judgment dated 8 June 2010. The petitioner argued that his acquittal entitled him to reinstatement and that the respondents had failed to consider this material.

The Respondents' Position

The Union of India contested the petition through a reply on affidavit. The respondents maintained that the termination was strictly in accordance with Rule 5(1) of the Rules of 1965. They submitted that a registered notice was duly sent, received, and acknowledged, and that the constable's continued absence despite the notice left them no option but to act.

On the militant attack plea, the respondents noted that the appellate authority had specifically asked the petitioner to produce evidence. What was produced was a letter from an advocate of the District Court, Kupwara, stating that the constable's parents had not lodged an FIR because terrorists had warned them against doing so. The appellate authority rejected this and dismissed the appeal on 13 April 2010.

The respondents also disclosed that during character and antecedent verification, it came to their notice that a challan had already been filed against the constable in FIR No. 157/2003 before a competent court. By that time, the termination order had already been issued.

The Court's Reasoning on Probationary Termination

Justice Dhar examined Rule 16 of the CRPF Rules, which provides that all members of the Force are enrolled for a period of three years and are liable to be discharged at any time on one month's notice by the appointing authority. Rule 5(1) of the Rules of 1965 correspondingly provides that a temporary government servant's services are liable to be terminated at any time by written notice in either direction. The appointment order itself, in clause (a) of its conditions, also made this power explicit.

Reading Rule 16 of the CRPF Rules and Rule 5(1) of the Rules of 1965 together with the appointment conditions, the court concluded that there was “no manner of doubt” that services of a probationer could be terminated on one month's notice. The respondents had issued the notice on 13 August 2008, the petitioner had received and acknowledged it, had not rejoined during the notice period, and his services were terminated on 15 September 2008. The court held the respondents were “well within their rights and competence” to act as they did.

The Pending Criminal Case as an Independent Ground

Justice Dhar identified a second, independent ground that stood on its own. The appointment of Deedad as a CRPF Constable in February 2008 was subject to the condition that no civil or criminal case was pending against him. FIR No. 157/2003 under Section 307 and 148 RPC had been registered at Police Station Handwara, and a challan had been filed against him in that case well before his appointment. The acquittal judgment relied upon by the petitioner was dated 8 June 2010, which meant that at the time of appointment, the challan was still pending before the court.

The court held that once it came to the respondents' notice that a criminal case was pending against the constable at the time of his appointment, his services were liable to be terminated under the conditions of appointment, read with Rule 16 of the CRPF Rules and Rule 5(1) of the Rules of 1965. The subsequent acquittal did not cure the breach of the appointment condition that existed at the date of appointment.

Militant Attack Plea Rejected as Fabrication

The court addressed the core factual defence squarely. The petitioner claimed the militant attack on his home occurred on 1 July 2008. However, the documents produced by the petitioner to support this claim showed that the report regarding the attack was lodged only on 23 October 2009 — more than a year after the attack was alleged to have taken place and after his services had already been terminated.

Justice Dhar held that from this sequence of events it could “safely be inferred” that the case set up by the petitioner was “nothing but an afterthought which deserves to be rejected.” The appellate authority's rejection of this defence was upheld as correct. The court found the documents to have been manufactured to create a post-hoc defence rather than contemporaneous evidence of the alleged incident.

Outcome

Justice Sanjay Dhar found no ground to interfere with either the termination notice dated 13 August 2008 or the termination order dated 15 September 2009. The writ petition was dismissed as lacking merit. The order was reserved on 23 July 2026 and pronounced on 31 July 2026. The court directed that the record be returned to the counsel for the respondents.