J&K High Court Upholds PSA Detention of Alleged LeT Over Ground Worker, Rejects All Constitutional Challenges

The Srinagar bench dismissed a habeas corpus petition challenging a Public Safety Act detention order, rejecting arguments on mechanical application of mind, non-supply of material, and the constitutional validity of PSA adaptations post-reorganisation.

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed a habeas corpus petition filed by the wife of Tanveer Ahmad Mir, a 32-year-old resident of Brath Kalan, Tehsil Bomai Zaingeer, District Baramulla, who was placed under preventive detention by the District Magistrate, Baramulla on 29 April 2025 under Section 8(a) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 14 May 2026 after reserving it on 7 May 2026. The petition raised a wide range of challenges, from the constitutional validity of the PSA's adaptation after the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 to alleged non-supply of documents and mechanical reproduction of the police dossier. The court rejected each ground and found the detention order legally sound.

The Detention and the Allegations Against the Detenue

Detention Order No. 09/DMB/PSA/2025 dated 29 April 2025 was passed by the District Magistrate, Baramulla. According to the detention record, Tanveer Ahmad Mir was alleged to be an active Over Ground Worker affiliated with the banned terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba. The allegations included providing logistical support, shelter, transportation and assistance to terrorists operating in the Sopore area and adjoining localities.

The record further alleged that the detenue maintained contact with active terrorists and Pakistan-based handlers through encrypted communication applications and proxy networks. He was also facing criminal prosecution in FIR No. 203/2018 under Section 7/25 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and had been subjected to preventive proceedings under Sections 107/151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The detention order additionally reflected the prevailing security situation in the Valley, particularly in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack involving the killing of tourists, and the apprehension that the detenue could be reactivated for furthering terrorist objectives.

The Government approved the detention order on 5 May 2025 under Section 8(4) of the PSA within the statutory period.

The Petitioner's Case

Senior Advocate S.T. Hussain, appearing with Ms. Nida Nazir for the petitioner, advanced several distinct grounds for quashing the detention order.

The primary contention was that the grounds of detention were a verbatim reproduction of the police dossier with only cosmetic changes in language, demonstrating non-application of mind by the detaining authority. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's judgment in Jai Singh and Ors. v. State of J&K, AIR 1985 SC 764.

It was further argued that the detenue was not supplied all relevant material relied upon by the detaining authority, including statements recorded during investigation and copies of proceedings under Sections 107/151 CrPC and corresponding BNSS provisions, thereby violating Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The grounds of detention were also attacked as vague and bereft of specific particulars regarding transportation, sheltering of terrorists, or use of encrypted applications.

The petitioner contended that since the detenue was already facing criminal prosecution, ordinary criminal law remedies were sufficient and preventive detention could not be used as a substitute for prosecution. It was also argued that there was no live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the detention order.

Two additional constitutional challenges were raised during oral arguments. First, that after the Reorganisation Act, 2019, the expression “Security of the State” in the PSA could not have been substituted with “Security of the Union Territory” except by Parliamentary legislation, and that the Lieutenant Governor lacked competence to amend the PSA. Second, that the approval granted by the Government under Section 8(4) was not issued in conformity with Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government Business Rules and was not expressed in the name of the President.

The Respondents' Position

Deputy Advocate General Hakim Aman Ali, appearing for the UT of J&K, submitted that the detention order was passed after due application of mind and careful examination of the dossier. He described the detenue as a radicalised and hardened Over Ground Worker who continued anti-national activities despite earlier criminal prosecution and preventive measures.

On the constitutional validity of the PSA adaptation, the respondents relied on Sections 95 and 96 of the Reorganisation Act, 2019, which expressly preserved the applicability of laws in the Fifth Schedule and authorised the Central Government to make adaptations and modifications. They pointed to S.O. 1229(E) dated 31 March 2020 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs under Section 96, whereby references to “State” in the PSA were substituted with “Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.”

On the approval challenge, the respondents submitted that the approval order dated 5 May 2025 was issued “By order of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir” by a duly authorised officer of the Home Department, and that governmental business is conducted institutionally through authorised officers. They further submitted that the detenue was supplied material comprising twenty-five leaves, had the grounds read over and explained to him in Urdu and Kashmiri, was informed of his right to make a representation, and in fact submitted a representation which was duly considered and rejected.

On the co-existence of criminal prosecution and preventive detention, the respondents relied on Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2154, and Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad, (2019) 20 SCC 609.

The Court's Reasoning on PSA Adaptation After Reorganisation

Justice Nargal addressed the constitutional challenge to the PSA adaptation at the outset. He held that Parliament itself, through the Reorganisation Act, 2019, provided a complete statutory mechanism for the continuation and adaptation of existing laws applicable to the erstwhile State of J&K. Section 95 of the Reorganisation Act preserved the operation of laws enumerated in the Fifth Schedule, including the PSA, and declared that such laws shall continue to apply to the Union Territory of J&K. The court held that the continuance of the PSA after reorganisation was not the result of any executive action but flowed directly from Parliamentary mandate.

Section 96 expressly authorised the Central Government to make adaptations and modifications, including by way of repeal or amendment, to facilitate the application of pre-existing laws to the successor Union Territories. The court held that S.O. 1229(E) dated 31 March 2020 was issued in exercise of this statutory authority and that the argument that only Parliament could carry out such substitution overlooked the fact that Parliament itself had delegated this limited power of adaptation to the Central Government under Section 96.

The court found that the adaptation did not change the basic nature, object or policy of the PSA. The replacement of “State” with “Union Territory” was a consequential change necessitated by the reorganisation of 2019. Accepting the petitioner's argument, the court observed, would render every adaptation carried out pursuant to the Reorganisation Act vulnerable despite Parliament having expressly sanctioned such exercise.

On the Approval Order and Rule 33 of the Transaction of Business Rules

The court rejected the challenge to the approval accorded under Section 8(4) of the PSA. It held that the statutory requirement under the Act is approval by the Government within the stipulated period, and the approval order dated 5 May 2025 was issued “By order of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir,” indicating that approval was granted in the name and authority of the Government through a duly authorised mode of transaction of business.

On Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government Business Rules, the court held that the rule essentially regulates the transaction and disposal of governmental business and allocation of functions amongst officers and departments. The petitioner had failed to place any material on record to establish that the officer authenticating the approval order lacked competence or that the approval was not accorded by the Government. The court further held that no prejudice whatsoever had been shown to have been caused to the detenue on account of the alleged violation of Rule 33, particularly since the detenue had been informed of his right to make a representation and had in fact exercised it.

On Mechanical Reproduction of the Police Dossier

The court accepted the legal proposition in Jai Singh v. State of J&K that mechanical reproduction of a police dossier without independent examination would vitiate the subjective satisfaction required under preventive detention law. However, it held that every similarity between the dossier and the grounds of detention cannot automatically lead to an inference of non-application of mind, since the sponsoring agency necessarily supplies factual material to the detaining authority and reference to such material in the grounds is both natural and expected.

Examining the detention record, the court found that the material considered by the detaining authority went beyond FIR No. 203/2018. It included the detenue's antecedents, earlier criminal proceedings under Sections 107/151 CrPC and Sections 126/170 BNSS, intelligence inputs regarding his continuing association with Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives, his alleged use of encrypted communication applications and Virtual Proxy Networks, and his contacts with Pakistan-based handlers. The court also noted that the detention order reflected awareness that the detenue had been enlarged on bail in the substantive criminal case and yet, according to intelligence inputs, continued to remain involved in activities prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory.

The court relied on its earlier decision in Waseem Ahmad Dar v. UT of J&K and Others, 2025 SCC Online J&K 1213, which held that narrating background facts from a police dossier and thereafter framing an independent opinion does not amount to mechanical copying. Applying that principle, the court was satisfied that the detaining authority had not acted mechanically.

The court also noted a procedural deficiency in the petition: the Senior Superintendent of Police, who authored the dossier, and the Home Department, which accorded approval, had not been impleaded. The court held that their presence was necessary for complete and effective adjudication and that the petition suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties.

On Supply of Material and Article 22(5)

The court examined the execution report on record, which revealed that the detenue was furnished the detention order, grounds of detention, copy of the dossier, FIR and other connected material comprising twenty-five leaves in total. The contents were read over and explained to him in Urdu and Kashmiri. He was informed of his right to make a representation before the Government and the detaining authority, and he in fact submitted a representation which was considered and rejected by the competent authority.

Relying on the Supreme Court's observation in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22, that procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenue and must be strictly complied with, the court held that once the detenue had knowledge of the grounds, was supplied the material, was informed of his right to representation and actually exercised it, the plea regarding denial of effective representation lost much of its force. The court found Article 22(5) safeguards duly complied with.

On Preventive Detention Alongside Criminal Prosecution

The court reiterated the settled distinction between punitive and preventive detention, drawing on the Supreme Court's analysis in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 618, that preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation and does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may have been launched. The pendency of prosecution or even the grant of bail does not debar the competent authority from invoking preventive detention laws if the authority is satisfied that detention is necessary to prevent possible future prejudicial acts.

The court found that the detention order was founded not merely on vague allegations but on a combination of factors: FIR No. 203/2018, alleged recovery of arms and ammunition, criminal proceedings under CrPC/BNSS, intelligence reports regarding continued association with Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives, alleged use of encrypted communication applications, contacts with Pakistan-based handlers, and the prevailing security situation in the Valley.

On Arguments Travelling Beyond Pleadings

The court observed that the constitutional and technical challenges relating to the validity of the PSA adaptation and the applicability of Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government Business Rules were not specifically pleaded in the writ petition and were sought to be projected only during oral arguments. Relying on the Supreme Court's observation in Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor, (1998) 7 SCC 469, the court held that a party cannot be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and set up an altogether new case during the course of arguments. Pleadings constitute the foundation of litigation and the opposite party must know the case against it.

The court held that permitting the petitioner to raise fresh grounds during oral arguments without foundational pleadings would prejudice the responding party and run contrary to the settled principles governing judicial review, which require certainty, fairness and procedural discipline.

Outcome

Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal dismissed HCP No. 167/2025 along with all connected applications, finding it devoid of merit. The court held that the impugned detention order was passed upon due application of mind and on the basis of relevant material having rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the preventive detention law. None of the grounds raised, the validity of the PSA adaptation, the alleged violation of Rule 33, non-application of mind, non-supply of material, or lack of relevant material, were found sufficient to invalidate the detention order. The Registry was directed to return the detention record to the respondents' counsel, Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, against proper receipt. The judgment was marked as speaking and reportable.