J&K High Court Sets Aside Decree Passed on Deemed Admission Where College Denied Superannuation Policy

Justice Sanjay Dhar held that an evasive denial cannot substitute a clear admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC when the defendant has taken a categorical stand on the disputed fact.

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has set aside a decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, which had been pronounced under Order XII Rule 6 read with Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Justice Sanjay Dhar, sitting singly, found that the trial court had committed a grave error by treating the college management’s reply to two paragraphs of the plaint as an evasive — and therefore deemed — admission, while ignoring the defendant’s categorical written stand that the applicable superannuation age for teaching staff was 60 years and not 65. The matter has been remanded for a full trial on the contested facts.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Amina Naseem and other respondents were engaged as Lecturers on a contractual basis by Vishwa Bharati Women’s Welfare Institution, Rainawari, Srinagar, in 1993. Their services were regularised in 2001. In July 2021, the college issued two communications — bearing Nos. VB/CJ/AC/327-31/MC dated 06.07.2021 and VB/CJ/AC/333-35/MC dated 14.07.2021 — terminating their services upon their attaining the age of 60 years and directing that their salaries be withheld from June 2021 onwards.

The respondents filed a civil suit before the trial court seeking a declaration that these communications were illegal. Their case rested on three planks: Clause 8 of the college’s Bye-laws, Rule 11 of the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005, and information obtained from the college under the Right to Information Act. The RTI response, dated 02.08.2021, stated that employees who had retired since 1990 had superannuated upon attaining the age of 65 years.

The college contested the suit. It pleaded that the Bye-laws relied upon by the respondents had since been amended, and that under the amended Bye-laws the age of superannuation for teaching staff stood at 60 years. It also relied on SRO 339 dated 20.12.2005, which it said fixed the retirement age for teaching staff of affiliated colleges at 60 years. The college further explained that its management had migrated from the Kashmir Valley in 1990 owing to militancy and had been unaware that certain employees had been allowed to continue beyond 60 years; once it learnt of this, it issued the impugned communications.

How the Trial Court Passed the Decree

After the written statement was filed, the respondents moved an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC read with Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 CPC, arguing that the college’s replies to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the plaint amounted to admissions. Those paragraphs related to the alleged institutional policy of retiring employees at 65 years.

The trial court, after inviting objections and considering the college’s response, concluded that the replies to paragraphs 23 and 24 were evasive and therefore constituted deemed admissions. On that basis, it passed a judgment and decree dated 29.01.2025 in favour of the respondents without proceeding to trial.

The college appealed. Its primary contention was that there had been a clear and specific denial of the averments in those paragraphs, and that the trial court had ignored the broader written statement which categorically asserted a superannuation age of 60 years.

The Legal Framework: Discretion, Not Obligation

Justice Dhar set out the governing provisions at length. Order XII Rule 6(1) CPC permits a court, either on application or suo motu, to pronounce judgment on the basis of admissions made in pleadings or otherwise, without waiting for determination of other questions. However, the provision uses the word “may”, making the power discretionary and not mandatory.

Order VIII Rule 5(1) CPC provides that an allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, shall be taken to be admitted. But the proviso to that sub-rule preserves the court’s discretion to require even admitted facts to be proved by other evidence.

The court drew on two Supreme Court decisions. In Balraj Taneja and another v. Sunil Madan and another, (1999) 8 SCC 396, the Supreme Court had held that a court must not act blindly upon an admission in a written statement and that, where disputed questions of fact are involved, it would not be safe to pass a judgment without requiring proof. The court had also noted the interplay between Order XII Rule 6, Order VIII Rule 5, and Section 58 of the Evidence Act, all of which vest discretion in the court to insist on proof even of admitted facts.

In S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287, the Supreme Court had reiterated that judgment on admission is not a matter of right but of discretion, and that where defendants have raised objections going to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

Justice Dhar distilled the position: unless admissions are clear and unequivocal, a court should not pass a decree on that basis alone. Even where some admissions exist, the court may, in an appropriate case, call upon the plaintiff to prove the facts by leading evidence.

Applying the Law to the Facts

Turning to the substantive provisions relied upon by the respondents, Justice Dhar examined Clause 8 of the college Bye-laws, which provides that the age of superannuation “shall not be less than 60 years and not more than 65 years” except where the management waives the restriction by special order. He read this as fixing a range of 60 to 65 years, not as guaranteeing retirement at 65 in every case. The clause, on its own terms, did not entitle any employee to claim that 65 years was the fixed superannuation age.

Rule 11(4) of the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005, which provides that no teacher or non-teaching staff member shall continue beyond the age of 65 years, was read as a ceiling, not as a floor. It meant that no employee could be retained beyond 65, but it did not mean that every employee was entitled to serve until 65.

On the RTI information, the court noted that the college had specifically pleaded in its written statement that employees had been allowed to continue beyond 60 years without the management’s knowledge, owing to its displacement from the Valley in 1990. Whether that explanation could be accepted was a matter for trial, not for summary disposal under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

The court then addressed the amended Bye-laws and SRO 339 dated 20.12.2005. The college had pleaded that the amended Bye-laws fixed the teaching staff’s superannuation age at 60 years, and that SRO 339 did the same for affiliated colleges. Whether these instruments applied to the respondents, who had been employed before the amendments came into force, was itself a contested question that required determination at trial.

Why the Trial Court Erred

Justice Dhar found that the trial court had made two errors. First, it had seized upon the replies to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the plaint in isolation, characterising them as evasive, while ignoring the college’s categorical stand elsewhere in the written statement that the applicable superannuation age was 60 years. The replies to those two paragraphs, which denied the existence of any consistent policy of retiring employees at 65, did not amount to evasive denial by any stretch of imagination.

Second, the trial court had failed to appreciate that the entire dispute — whether the superannuation age was 60 or 65, whether the amended Bye-laws applied to pre-amendment employees, and whether the management’s explanation for the earlier continuations was credible — involved genuinely contested questions of fact. These could not be resolved summarily on the basis of a purported admission. The trial court had, in effect, clinched the issue on a narrow reading of two paragraphs while ignoring the broader written statement.

The court held that the impugned judgment and decree could not be sustained in law.

Outcome

Justice Sanjay Dhar allowed RFA No. 18/2025 and set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.01.2025 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, in the case titled Amina Naseem and Others v. Vishwa Bharati Women’s Welfare Institution through its Managing Committee, Rainawari, Srinagar and Others. The matter has been remanded to the trial court with a direction to proceed further and decide the suit in accordance with law. The parties were directed to appear before the trial court on 13.07.2026.