J&K High Court Upholds Execution of Interim Salary Order Against School, Warns Judicial Officers on AI-Generated Citations
Dismissing a school's repeated challenge to a 2022 salary direction, the J&K High Court held interim orders executable under Section 36 CPC and cautioned judges against unverified AI-sourced precedents.
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has dismissed a petition filed by Woodland House School challenging the execution of a 2022 interim order directing payment of 50% salary to a terminated employee. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, sitting singly, upheld the order dated 15 October 2025 passed by the 4th Additional Munsiff, Srinagar, and imposed costs of Rs 25,000 on the petitioners, finding their conduct to be a calculated strategy to obstruct compliance with binding judicial directions. The judgment also carries a significant postscript: the court found that the Trial Court's impugned order had relied on judicial precedents with incorrect citations — one of which could not be traced at all — and issued detailed directions to all judicial officers in the Union Territory on the verification of AI-generated legal research.
The Dispute Before the High Court
Shakeel Ahmad Malik, a teacher, filed a civil suit before the Trial Court seeking a declaration that he was entitled to be designated as Supervisor and that the designation of two other employees as Supervisors was illegal. He also sought release of salary. Alongside the suit, he filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for interim relief.
During the pendency of the suit, the school terminated Malik's services by order dated 11 May 2022, with effect from 1 July 2021. The Trial Court, by order dated 14 June 2022, directed the school to pay 50% of Malik's monthly salary for the period from April 2021 till 11 May 2022, subject to an undertaking by Malik to refund the amount if he failed in the suit.
The school challenged this order before the 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, which dismissed the appeal on 5 September 2023 and affirmed the Trial Court's direction. The school then invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in CM(M) No. 299/2023. That petition was also dismissed, the court finding no glaring error warranting interference.
Despite three concurrent findings against it, the school did not comply with the order dated 14 June 2022. Malik was compelled to move an execution application before the Trial Court. The Trial Court initially passed an order dated 15 May 2024 directing suspension of the school's registration. The High Court stayed that specific direction in CM(M) No. 166/2024 vide order dated 22 May 2024, but expressly left it open to the Trial Court to adopt any other mode available in law for executing the interim order.
Thereafter, the Executing Court passed the impugned order dated 15 October 2025, allowing the execution application and directing compliance with the order dated 14 June 2022. It further warned that, in the event of non-compliance, it would attach the school's salary account maintained with J&K Bank, Gupkar Branch, proceed for the detention of the Managing Director, and initiate contempt proceedings. The school challenged this order in the present petition, CM(M) 191/2026.
The Legal Issues
The school raised four principal contentions. First, that the order dated 14 June 2022, being an interlocutory order under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, was not a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC and could not be executed under Section 36 CPC. Second, that the only remedy available to Malik for alleged non-compliance was to invoke Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC, which specifically provides for consequences of disobedience of an injunction. Third, that the Trial Court had misconstrued the liberty granted by the High Court in its order dated 22 May 2024, which, according to the school, permitted only modes available in law and not coercive methods. Fourth, that since a review petition against the High Court's order dated 3 November 2023 was pending, the Trial Court ought to have refrained from proceeding with enforcement.
The school also argued that enforcing the interim order would amount to granting final relief in the suit, given that Malik's termination remained a disputed issue.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Nargal rejected each contention in turn.
On the core question of executability, the court turned to Section 36 CPC, which provides that the provisions of the Code relating to execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders. The court read this provision as extending the execution machinery under Order XXI CPC to orders of a civil court, not merely to decrees. The legislature's use of the broader expression “orders” rather than “final orders” was treated as deliberate.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Sheela Jerald & Ors. v. Pushpadasan, Civil Appeal No. 7650 of 2018, where the Supreme Court had held that an interim injunction does not become inexecutable merely because it is interlocutory in nature and that Section 36 CPC makes the execution machinery available for such orders. The court also cited the Bombay High Court's decision in Venkat Niloba Kabade v. Kishan Dadarao Dhuma, 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 158, which had reached the same conclusion after the 1976 amendment to Section 36 CPC.
On the argument that Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC was the exclusive remedy, the court held that the availability of that provision is supplemental and not destructive of the independent remedy of execution. The two remedies operate in parallel.
On the argument that the High Court's order dated 22 May 2024 had restricted the Trial Court, the court found that the earlier order had stayed only one specific coercive direction — suspension of the school's registration — and had expressly permitted the Trial Court to adopt any other mode available in law. It had not placed a blanket bar on all enforcement proceedings.
On the pendency of the review petition, the court held that the mere filing of a review petition does not operate as a stay of the order under challenge. No stay had been granted in the review proceedings. The court also noted that in a separate application, CM No. 3457/2025, the High Court had already observed that the Trial Court was at liberty to proceed with the matter notwithstanding the pending review.
On the argument that enforcement would amount to granting final relief, the court pointed out that the order dated 14 June 2022 was expressly conditional: Malik had been required to furnish an undertaking to refund the amount if he failed in the suit. The incorporation of that safeguard demonstrated that the relief was provisional and subject to restitution. A direction to pay a specified sum for a defined period could not be treated as a final adjudication of rights.
The court was direct about the school's conduct. It found that the petitioners had consistently resisted compliance at every stage, had exhausted all available remedies against the interim order, and had then proceeded to challenge every step taken towards its execution. The court observed that the present petition was a continuation of the same endeavour to defeat and delay the execution of lawful judicial orders. Applying the principles from the Supreme Court's decisions in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470, Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114, and Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, 2024 INSC 1051, the court found the petition to be a clear abuse of the process of law.
The Postscript: Incorrect Citations and AI Research Tools
Before concluding, Justice Nargal addressed a submission by the school's counsel that the impugned order of the Trial Court had relied on judicial precedents without furnishing complete and accurate citations, without identifying the ratio decidendi, and without examining their applicability to the facts.
The court undertook an independent verification of the judgments cited in the impugned order. It found that the citations attributed to the two principal judgments forming the basis of the order were incorrect. In respect of one judgment, not only was the citation erroneous, but the title of the decision as recorded in the impugned order could not be traced despite diligent search. The judgment, the court found, did not appear to exist in the form in which it had been referred to. In respect of the second judgment, while a decision bearing a similar title could be located, the citation assigned to it in the impugned order did not correspond with that decision.
The court clarified that this finding did not, by itself, warrant interference with the impugned order on merits, since the order was otherwise sustainable. However, the court expressed concern about the quality and reliability of judicial reasoning when precedents are cited inaccurately.
The court also noted a tendency in some orders to paraphrase the perceived principle of a judgment in the author's own words rather than reproducing the relevant extracts. It observed that the ratio decidendi of a judgment is to be gathered from what the court actually held, not from an individual's understanding of it, and that reproduction of relevant extracts ensures fidelity to the precedent and minimises the risk of distortion.
Turning to artificial intelligence tools, the court acknowledged that such platforms may serve as useful aids for legal research but held that they cannot substitute judicial scrutiny and verification. It stated that any proposition of law, citation, extract, or precedent generated or suggested by an AI tool must be independently verified from authentic and authoritative sources before being relied upon in a judicial order. The ultimate responsibility for the correctness and authenticity of a judicial order rests solely upon the authoring judge.
Directions to Judicial Officers Across the Union Territory
The court issued four specific directions for the guidance of all judicial officers in the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh:
Any citation, precedent, extract, factual assertion, or proposition of law obtained through AI platforms or similar tools must be independently verified from authentic and authoritative sources before being relied upon or incorporated in any judicial order.
Every precedent relied upon in a judicial order must be accompanied by a complete and accurate citation.
Where a precedent constitutes the foundation of a finding or conclusion, the relevant extract of the judgment should, as far as practicable, be reproduced verbatim rather than paraphrased.
Citations obtained from unofficial compilations, secondary sources, or electronic databases should be cross-verified with authentic sources before being incorporated into judicial orders.
The court directed that a copy of the order be forwarded to the Registrar Judicial of both wings of the court for circulation amongst all judicial officers in the Union Territory for information and compliance.
Order
The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit. The impugned order dated 15 October 2025 passed by the 4th Additional Munsiff, Srinagar, in File No. 1977/2022 was upheld. Costs of Rs 25,000 were imposed on the petitioners, to be deposited with the Registry within two weeks. The court directed that if costs were not deposited within the stipulated period, the Registry would place a note before the court for appropriate orders. The petitioners were further directed to comply with the order dated 14 June 2022, and it was left open to the Executing Court to proceed in accordance with law and adopt all permissible measures for securing enforcement in the event of continued non-compliance. The judgment was marked as reportable and speaking.