Kerala HC Strikes Down 20-Page Cap on Free RTI Information for BPL Applicants

The Kerala High Court has declared the proviso to Rule 4(4) of the Kerala RTI Rules ultra vires, holding it directly conflicts with the absolute fee exemption under Section 7(5) of the RTI Act, 2005.

The High Court of Kerala, in a judgment delivered on 13 February 2026, has struck down the proviso to Rule 4(4) of the Kerala Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2006, which restricted free supply of information to persons below the poverty line to twenty pages. Justice Mohammed Nias C.P., sitting singly at Ernakulam, held that the proviso directly conflicts with Section 7(5) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which grants an unqualified fee exemption to BPL applicants, and that a rule-making authority cannot curtail a statutory right Parliament has conferred in absolute terms. The writ petition was allowed and the proviso declared void.

The Dispute Before the Court

Nishad Shobanan, an RTI activist from Ernakulam district and a member of Bodhi Vivaravakasa Samrakshana Sena, belongs to the below-the-poverty-line category. He filed an application under the RTI Act seeking information from the Co-operative Society Registrar about audit reports of the Puthenvelikkara Service Co-operative Bank and Elanthikkara Women Co-operative Sangham.

In response, a letter dated 25 October 2023 directed him to pay Rs. 30/- for the copies sought. The letter cited Rule 4(4) of the Kerala RTI Rules, 2006, which provides that no fee shall be charged from BPL persons but adds a proviso — inserted by a gazette notification dated 17 January 2015 — that the free supply of material shall be restricted to twenty pages only. He held a BPL certificate issued by the Puthenvelikkara Grama Panchayat dated 26 October 2023.

Shobanan filed WP(C) No. 3530 of 2024 before the Kerala High Court, challenging the proviso as ultra vires the RTI Act.

The Legal Issue

Section 7(5) of the RTI Act, 2005, states that no fee shall be charged from persons below the poverty line. The provision is unqualified. Section 27 of the Act confers rule-making power on the appropriate government, specifically including the power under Section 27(2)(c) to prescribe fees payable under Sections 7(1) and 7(5). Under this authority, the State of Kerala enacted the Kerala RTI Rules, 2006, and the substantive part of Rule 4(4) faithfully reflected the Section 7(5) exemption. The 2015 amendment then inserted a proviso capping free supply at twenty pages.

The central question was whether the proviso was a permissible exercise of delegated rule-making power or whether it exceeded the authority conferred by the parent Act and conflicted with a mandatory statutory command.

The State's Justification

The State of Kerala, in its counter-affidavit, defended the proviso on the ground of preventing misuse. The Kerala State Information Commission had observed that some applicants file RTI requests under Section 6(1) merely to determine the availability of information and the cost involved, and then engage BPL persons as proxies to evade paying fees. To address this, the State argued, the proviso was introduced.

The State also pointed to a judgment dated 24 September 2014 of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in LP Appeal No. 1102 of 2014, which noted similar misuse, and to a Central Information Commission order in Shama Praveen v. NHRC (Appeal No. CIC/OK/2006/00717) directing that BPL applicants be provided information free of cost only where the authority was a genuine seeker and not a proxy. The State further submitted that other state governments have imposed similar page caps.

The Union of India, through the Department of Personnel and Training, confined its counter-affidavit to noting that the challenge related solely to a rule framed by the State of Kerala and that no substantive relief was sought against it. It submitted that it was not a necessary party and was liable to be deleted from the array of parties.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Mohammed Nias C.P. began from the foundational principle that a rule-making authority derives its authority solely from the statute under which such power is conferred and must operate strictly within its confines. When examining subordinate legislation, the court must consider the nature, object, and scheme of the parent statute, the scope of the delegation, and whether the rule conforms to the legislative intent.

The court held that Section 7(5) of the RTI Act employs language that is “clear, categorical and imperative” — the provision is unqualified, admits of no exception, and leaves no discretion with either the rule-making authority or the information officer. Parliament having consciously granted a complete exemption, the delegate cannot, by inserting a proviso, dilute, restrict, or neutralise it.

The court drew a distinction between two categories of challenge to subordinate legislation. Where the alleged inconsistency is with the abstract object or scheme of the statute, the court proceeds with caution. But where the rule is in direct conflict with an express and mandatory provision, the analysis is straightforward. The proviso to Rule 4(4) fell squarely in the second category: it did not create an alleged inconsistency with a purpose or spirit but directly contradicted Section 7(5) in terms.

On the doctrine of the proviso itself, the court cited the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [AIR 1966 SC 12] and S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [(1985) 1 SCC 591] for the proposition that a proviso is ordinarily intended to except or qualify the main enactment, not to destroy, nullify, or enlarge it. A proviso cannot be construed so as to override or supplant the principal enactment.

Applying these principles, the court held that the proviso to Rule 4(4) does not merely qualify the rule; it substantially curtails the statutory exemption under Section 7(5) and imposes a financial burden on the precise category of persons Parliament has expressly and unconditionally exempted from payment of any fee. The rule-making authority had, under the guise of preventing alleged misuse, curtailed a statutory right. Administrative convenience or apprehension of abuse, the court held, cannot justify the dilution of a legislative mandate.

The court also referred to a similar outcome before the Telangana High Court in Busa Nikhil v. High Court for the State of Telangana & Ors. (WP No. 19960/2023), where Rules 3 and 4 of the Telangana High Court RTI Rules were found inconsistent with Section 7(5) of the RTI Act and with Rule 5 of the Right to Information Rules, 2012. The proceedings there were closed as infructuous after the government initiated steps to amend the offending rules.

The court further held that the power under Section 27 of the RTI Act is supplemental and not substitutive in nature: it is a power to give effect to the statute, not to dilute, restrict, or defeat the substantive right under Section 7(5). The rule-making power is conferred for the purposes of the Act, and any exercise of that power which runs counter to the Act's foundational objectives — empowering citizens, promoting transparency and accountability, and containing corruption — must fail.

Outcome

Justice Mohammed Nias C.P. held that the proviso to Rule 4(4) of the Kerala Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2006, travels beyond the scope of the rule-making power under Section 27 of the RTI Act, is inconsistent with Section 7(5) of the Act, and defeats the substantive provision of Rule 4(4) itself.

The proviso was declared ultra vires the Right to Information Act, 2005, and was struck down as illegal and void. The writ petition was allowed.