Chief Justice S.A. Dharmadhikari Justice G.A. Murugan Madras HC PETITIONS ALLOWED A State rule cannot fence instone already mined
[ Madras High Court ]

Madras HC quashes three-month ban on rough stone leaving Tamil Nadu and strikes down Rule 3-A

A division bench led by Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari held that a State cannot stop lawfully mined stone and aggregates from crossing its border, and that Section 23-C of the mining law covers only illegal mining.

Tamil Nadu inserted one rule on 9 July 2026, and eighteen days later its mining director used it to bar rough stone, M-sand and metal jelly from leaving the State for three months. On 17 November, the Madras High Court struck the rule down and quashed the ban.

Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G Arul Murugan decided ten writ petitions together, five filed at the principal seat and five at the Madurai Bench. The common order is headed in the name of Justice Arul Murugan.

A rule written for one purpose

Rule 3-A was added to the 2011 Tamil Nadu rules on illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals by a Natural Resources Department order of 9 July 2026. It lets the Director of Geology and Mining regulate transport of rough stone and crushed material to other States.

The regulation may include a temporary ban, the rule says, to keep supply adequate inside the State. The covered material runs from boulders and khandas to M-sand, metal jelly, ballasts and mill stones.

On 27 July the Director used it. His proceedings banned transport of rough stone and aggregates to other States for three months with immediate effect, except to Puducherry and Karaikal. The stated aims were uninterrupted supply within Tamil Nadu, protection of the environment and checks on illegal mining.

The petitioners were leaseholders and crusher operators. They said they held valid leases, paid royalty and seigniorage, and had every clearance needed to mine, crush and sell.

What the petitioners argued

Senior Counsel AR.L. Sundaresan, Srinath Sridevan and Satish Parasaran, among others, argued that Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 lets a State regulate only the grant of minor mineral leases. It does not reach stone that has already been dug out.

Section 23-C, they said, was added in 1999 only to prevent illegal mining, transport and storage. Lawfully mined stone on which royalty is paid belongs to the lessee, and the State has no further role.

They added that the rule offended Articles 301, 302 and 304(b) of the Constitution. The ban, they said, was manifestly arbitrary. They relied on two Supreme Court rulings, Kavery Chetty and Kalathiya.

The State’s defence

Advocate General Vijay Narayan said the rule traced to Sections 15 and 23-C, and that Section 23-C(2)(c) allows regulation of mineral transported from a leased area. Once framed under the Act, he argued, a State rule becomes part of the parent enactment, citing Hind Stone.

He said power to regulate minor minerals includes power to prohibit, citing K. Ramanathan. The rule, he said, was meant to balance State needs and public safety against heavy inter-State movement, with minerals going mostly to the Middle East.

He added that Kalathiya had not considered Hind Stone and K. Ramanathan, which were decided by benches of equal strength. On that footing, he said, the earlier cases should be followed.

He also argued that the three-month ban had worked itself out, so the challenge was almost infructuous. The judgment does not deal with that plea separately; the bench went on to decide the challenge.

What Kavery Chetty and Kalathiya held

The bench first read out the statutory scheme. Section 15 lets a State make rules for granting quarry leases and other concessions in minor minerals, and lists the matters such rules may cover, from applications and fees to royalty and rehabilitation of vegetation.

Section 23-C, inserted from 18 December 1999, lets the State make rules to prevent illegal mining, transportation and storage. Its list covers check-posts, weigh-bridges, inspection and registers, and regulation of mineral transported from an area under a lease or permit.

Section 4-A(2) lets a State ask for premature termination of a minor mineral lease to protect the environment, control floods or prevent pollution. The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 govern the grant of such leases.

The bench began from the constitutional footing. Regulation of mines is an Entry 54 subject in the Union List, and Parliament declared Union control in Section 2 of the Act. The State’s power over minor minerals comes only through Sections 15 and 23-C.

It then turned to Kavery Chetty, where the Supreme Court struck down two Tamil Nadu rules on granite sales. That court held that the Act gives the State no power to control minor minerals once they have been excavated.

In Kalathiya, the court said, the Supreme Court looked at Gujarat rules banning the sale of sand outside the State. It held that Hind Stone and similar cases involved measures with a direct link to the grant or refusal of a lease, not the sale of minerals the lessee had already mined.

That Supreme Court decision also read Section 23-C narrowly. The words transportation and storage sit in the context of illegal mining, so no power flows from the section to regulate lawfully excavated minerals.

Part XIII and the President’s sanction

The bench also tested the rule against the Constitution. It set out Articles 301, 302 and 304. Article 301 makes trade free throughout India, Article 302 lets Parliament restrict it in the public interest, and Article 304(b) lets a State legislature do so only on a Bill introduced with the President’s previous sanction.

Rule 3-A, it held, is “directly in contravention of Part XIII” (para 19). No Bill imposing a ban beyond the State could even be introduced without that sanction, yet the State had done it by a rule.

It also reproduced the Supreme Court’s description of Part XIII as a code of checks and balances meant to achieve economic unity. A State, that court said, could not impose such a prohibition under a statute whose object is to regulate mines and mineral development, not trade.

The bench also quoted Kalathiya on the point that once a State permits stone to be excavated, it cannot restrict its movement within India. If a State’s demand is not being met, the Supreme Court had said, it may buy from other States.

Two High Court rulings no longer stand

The bench noted that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Novel Granites and the Madras High Court in D. Sivakumar had relied on Hind Stone to uphold State transit bans. It said the Supreme Court in Kalathiya explicitly overruled both.

The judgment also cites a division bench ruling from Madurai in Stephen, decided on 11 February 2021. That bench, after examining Kalathiya, held that the State cannot regulate or prevent transport of minerals outside the State.

If the State wants to regulate, it said, it can do so at the time of granting the lease. It may also prescribe maximum load and speed, or use Section 4-A of the Act, but it cannot ban transport beyond the State.

Scarcity did not change the answer

The bench recorded the State’s case that the rule responded to representations by a contractors’ association about scarcity of rough stone. It also noted the State’s reliance on domestic needs and the effect on local infrastructure.

Its answer followed Kalathiya. A temporary ban on carrying excavated minerals out of the State has, in the bench’s words, “no rationale or reasonable nexus with the object” sought to be achieved (para 26).

Where mining and transport comply with the lease and statute, it added, ownership of the mineral vests entirely in the lessee. Tracing the rule to Section 23-C, it said, was misplaced.

The judgment does not separately discuss K. Ramanathan or the State’s argument on equal-strength benches. It treats the issue as settled by Kalathiya.

Order

The bench held that Rule 3-A lacks legislative competence, is ultra vires Sections 15 and 23-C of the Act, and offends Part XIII of the Constitution. The operative finding reads:

“declared unconstitutional and ultra vires the parent Act” (para 29)

The Director’s proceedings of 27 July 2026, which imposed the three-month ban, were quashed. The writ petitions were allowed with no order as to costs and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed. The registry was told to type separate cause titles and prayers when issuing certified copies.