Madras HC Dismisses Writ Seeking Forced Listing of 21 Pending Cases, Says Mandamus Cannot Override Registry's Roster Control
A practising advocate's Article 226 petition seeking to compel the Madras High Court Registry to list 21 delayed matters was dismissed; the bench held mandamus cannot bypass established listing procedures.
The Madras High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by a practising advocate who sought a direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India compelling the Registry at the Principal Seat in Chennai and the Madurai Bench to immediately list twenty-one matters pending on his behalf. The Division Bench of Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan, in an order dated 3 July 2026, held that mandamus is not available to an advocate seeking to leapfrog the court's established case-listing procedures. The bench directed the petitioner toward two existing procedural avenues and dismissed the petition without costs.
The Petition Before the Court
The petitioner, L.K. Charles Alexander, a practising advocate based in Anna Nagar West, Chennai, appeared in person before the Division Bench. He had filed W.P. No. 24309 of 2026 under Article 226 of the Constitution, naming the Registrar General of the Madras High Court and the Additional Registrar General of the Madurai Bench as respondents.
His grievance was specific: twenty-one distinct matters — spanning Civil Miscellaneous Appeals, Civil Revision Petitions, Criminal Original Petitions, and Writ Petitions filed on behalf of his clients — had not appeared in the daily cause-lists despite several letters of request addressed to the Registry. He stated that the administrative lapse had caused him significant mental distress and that he felt answerable to his litigants for the delays.
The prayer sought a writ of mandamus directing both Registry offices to list those cases forthwith. Mr. M. Kempraj appeared for the respondents.
Whether Article 226 Can Be Used to Compel Case Listing
The bench framed the central legal question squarely: can the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 be deployed as an administrative tool to direct the Registry to list specific matters ahead of those already in the queue?
The court's answer was no. The bench held that the administrative authority to control the flow of litigation is an essential facet of judicial independence. A writ of mandamus, the bench observed, cannot be issued to the Registry to bypass or disrupt the allocation of cases in accordance with the roster. An individual counsel or litigant, the bench said, has no vested or fundamental right to demand that their matter be listed ahead of litigations instituted prior in time, except through established exceptional protocols.
The bench also took judicial notice of the scale of the Registry's administrative burden. Listing is not, the court noted, a mechanical exercise of data entry. The Registry processes thousands of fresh filings every week alongside already pending matters. Maintaining equity among litigants requires cases to generally follow a chronological or category-wise queue.
The Bench's Reasoning on Mandamus
The bench was careful to distinguish sympathy from legal entitlement. It acknowledged “a sympathetic regard for the professional anxieties of a young member of the Bar” who feels answerable to his clients, but held that sympathy does not translate into an actionable right cognisable under Article 226.
The court stated that mandamus is a discretionary remedy reserved for enforcing a clear statutory right or correcting a palpable breach of legal duty. On the facts before it, no such breach existed. The Registry had not violated any statutory duty by following its standard listing protocol; delays in a high-volume court do not, by themselves, constitute a breach of legal duty capable of attracting mandamus.
The bench then flagged the systemic consequence of allowing such petitions. If every advocate whose case is delayed were permitted to file a writ petition against the Registry, the court would be flooded with internal litigation, effectively paralyzing the administration of justice. Permitting the petitioner to secure an expedited listing by judicial fiat would, the bench held, violate the principle of equal access to justice for the thousands of similarly situated litigants who had not approached the court in this manner.
Two Remedies the Court Directed the Petitioner Toward
While dismissing the petition, the bench was explicit that the petitioner was not left without recourse. It identified two procedural avenues already available within the court's framework.
The first is the filing of a formal praecipe — commonly known as a mention memo — before the Judge or Bench holding the respective roster. Where a matter carries an element of genuine urgency or has drifted into procedural limbo, this is described by the bench as “the standard, time-honored practice.” It is then for the Bench concerned, exercising its inherent judicial discretion, to determine whether the matter warrants an expedited listing.
The second avenue is a comprehensive written representation to the Registrar (Judicial), described by the bench as the custodian of the judicial business of the court and the officer possessing the administrative mandate to rectify listing discrepancies where they exist.
The bench stressed that equity demands all litigants who approach the court be treated with equal dignity and fairness. Allowing one advocate to obtain priority listing through a writ petition would work unfairness against the many others waiting their turn through the ordinary process.
Outcome
The Division Bench dismissed W.P. No. 24309 of 2026 on 3 July 2026. The court held that the relief sought could not be granted within the parameters of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There was no order as to costs. The order was made by the Chief Justice on behalf of the bench.