Patna HC Acquits POCSO Accused After Finding Victim Never Corroborated FIR, Trial Court Misread Presumption Clauses

The Division Bench found the prosecution case to be a concoction lodged for extortion, the victim unaware of the case, and the trial court's reading of POCSO presumptions legally unsound.

A Division Bench of the Patna High Court on 10 August 2026 set aside the conviction of Ratan Mahto under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), holding that the prosecution case rested on no reliable evidence. The bench, comprising Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya, found that the victim herself was unaware of why her mother had lodged the FIR, that she had not made any statement before the police, and that the trial court had gravely misapplied the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. The court also granted liberty to the acquitted appellant to file a complaint under Section 22 of the POCSO Act, which penalises false complaints made with intent to humiliate, extort or defame.

The FIR and the Charges

The written information was lodged on 10 April 2015 by the mother of the victim (PW-6), a resident of English Bazar, Malda, West Bengal. She alleged that her daughter, aged about 11 years and living with her maternal grandparents near the Polytechnic College in village Goshala, Katihar, had been raped by Ratan Mahto, a neighbour of the maternal grandfather, on 9 April 2015 at 7:00 AM when the child was allegedly alone in the house. The FIR was registered at Mahila Police Station, Katihar, under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed under Sections 376 and 506 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. Cognizance was taken on 29 October 2015, and charges were formally framed on 23 January 2016.

The Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Exclusive Special Judge, POCSO, Civil Court, Katihar, convicted the appellant on 15 February 2023 and sentenced him on 21 February 2023 to twenty years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000, and in default, three months additional imprisonment. The appeal before the Division Bench was supported by Ms. Shilpi Keshari as Amicus Curiae, with Ms. Priya Kumari also appearing for the appellant. The State was represented by Mr. Ajay Mishra, and the informant-respondent by Mr. Balram Kapri.

What the Prosecution Witnesses Actually Said

Seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution. The most significant was the victim herself, PW-7, who was not even a chargesheet witness. In her examination-in-chief, she stated plainly that no occurrence had taken place with her. She said she did not know why her mother had lodged the case, and she denied having made any statement before the police. When declared hostile and cross-examined, she denied the prosecution's suggestion that she had falsely deposed in collusion with the appellant, and she stated that she and her mother had willingly compromised the matter.

The Investigating Officer (PW-4) proved her signature on the FIR and an endorsement, but her examination-in-chief made no mention of the victim or the victim's mother having supported the prosecution case during investigation. The court found this telling: the prosecution cross-examined PW-7 by suggesting she had told the police that the appellant raped her, yet when the I.O. was in the witness box, the prosecution chose not to prove any such statement made by the victim to the I.O.

PW-5, the maternal grandmother of the victim, stated that a wrong act had been committed with her granddaughter and that her daughter had lodged the case. Critically, she also deposed that on the date of the occurrence she had left her house at 10:00 AM and returned at 4:00 PM. Since the alleged rape was said to have occurred at 7:00 AM, her own testimony established that she was present in the house at the time, directly contradicting the prosecution's central assertion that the victim was alone.

PW-6, the informant-mother, stated in cross-examination that she had compromised the case of her own volition. She had not witnessed the rape. She said she lodged the case at the instance of neighbours, yet could not remember the name of the person who telephoned her. In a significant admission, she stated that she had come to know that the appellant had not committed any wrong act with her daughter, and therefore she had settled the matter. She was an illiterate witness who put her thumb impression, and the written information itself was neither exhibited nor proved before the court.

PW-3, a neighbour, was a hearsay witness who said there was a commotion in the locality that something had happened with the victim. He admitted he was not present on the day and had learnt of events only after the case was registered.

Medical Evidence and Its Limits

Dr. Kanak Ranjan (PW-1) examined the victim on 11 April 2015. Her findings included redness on the right side of the labia minora, an intact hymen, no mark of injury on the body, and no spermatozoa in the vaginal swab. On the basis of the radiological report of Dr. D.N. Poddar, she assessed the victim's age as between 10 and 11 years. Her opinion was that an attempt at sexual intercourse “might have been done.” In cross-examination, she clarified that this phrase “means may or may not be done.”

The Division Bench held that this opinion “leads nowhere and it cannot be said to be a conclusive proof” of the prosecution's case. The court also noted that the I.O. had not produced the victim before the Child Welfare Committee or the Juvenile Justice Board for age assessment, and had not independently gathered documentary proof of age. The only age evidence was the doctor's radiological-based assessment.

How the Trial Court Erred on Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act

The trial court had itself returned a finding that the offence under Section 376 IPC was not established, observing that penetration by the accused was not proved on the evidence. Despite this, the trial court went on to convict the appellant under Section 4 of the POCSO Act by invoking the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act. The Division Bench found this approach legally untenable.

Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act raise rebuttable presumptions of guilt and of culpable mental state respectively once certain foundational facts are established. The Division Bench, relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Ramanand v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2022 (SC) 5273, emphasised that the presumption of innocence is not extinguished by the POCSO Act. The court also drew on three High Court decisions — Joy v. State of Kerala reported in (2019) 1 KLT 935, Veerpal v. State reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2686, and Subrata Biswas v. State reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 1815 — which require proof of foundational facts before any presumption under Sections 29 and 30 can be drawn.

The bench concluded that the trial court had wrongly treated the POCSO presumptions as a substitute for foundational evidence. Once the victim herself had stated she was unaware of the reason the case was filed and that she had not made any statement before the police, the bench found it impossible to identify any foundational fact on which a presumption could be raised. The trial court's reasoning that the victim had compromised due to her age and family pressure — and that this compromise had no legal standing — was rejected as speculative and unsupported by the evidence on record.

Wrong Sentence Under the Pre-Amendment Version of Section 4

The Division Bench also pointed out a separate legal error in the sentence imposed. The alleged offence occurred on 9 April 2015. Section 4 of the POCSO Act was amended by Amendment Act 25 of 2019, with effect from 16 August 2019. Before the amendment, the minimum sentence under Section 4 was seven years, extendable to life imprisonment. The twenty-year minimum was introduced only by the 2019 amendment. Since the offence, if proved, would have attracted the pre-amendment provision, the trial court's imposition of twenty years rigorous imprisonment was on its face incorrect, being applied to conduct allegedly predating the amendment by over four years.

Liberty to Invoke Section 22 of the POCSO Act

Having decided to acquit, the bench went on to grant the appellant liberty to take steps under Section 22 of the POCSO Act. Section 22 makes it an offence for any person to file a false complaint or furnish false information against any person in respect of offences under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, solely with intent to humiliate, extort or defame. The penalty on conviction is up to six months imprisonment or fine or both. Where the false complaint is made against a child, a higher penalty of up to one year applies.

The bench reproduced Section 22 in full and made clear that if any such complaint is filed by the appellant, it will be considered by the competent court or investigating agency on its own merits in accordance with law. The court was explicit that it had reasons to believe the case was concocted for the purpose of extortion of money, pointing specifically to the informant's failure to recall the name of the person who called her, her admission that she lodged the case at the instance of others, and her eventual statement that she had come to know no wrong act had been committed on her daughter.

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed the criminal appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction dated 15 February 2023 and the order of sentence dated 21 February 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Exclusive Special Judge, POCSO, Civil Court, Katihar. Ratan Mahto was acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The court directed that a copy of the judgment along with the trial court records be transmitted to the learned trial court. The Amicus Curiae, Ms. Shilpi Keshari, was appreciated by the bench for her pro-bono services.