Rajasthan HC Rejects Voter List Challenge After Municipal Poll Process Began, Citing Article 243-ZG Bar

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand held that once Rajasthan State Election Commission declared the municipal election schedule, courts cannot interfere with voter list deletions under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution.

The Rajasthan High Court on 3 September 2026 rejected a writ petition filed by a resident of Neem Ka Thana, Sikar, who challenged his deletion from the voter list for the Nagar Palika General Elections, 2026. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, sitting singly at the Jaipur Bench, held that the constitutional bar under Article 243-ZG operates automatically once the State Election Commission notifies the election programme, and no court can entertain a challenge to any step in the election process after that point. The petitioner's grievance — that his name was removed without notice or hearing — was found to be one that could not be adjudicated at this stage, regardless of its merit on natural justice grounds.

The Deletion from the Nagar Palika Voter Roll

Kuldeep Kumar, aged about 42 years and a resident of Ward No. 29, Village Godawas, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar, had his name removed from the voter list in connection with the Nagar Palika General Elections, 2026. Two revised voter lists were published — on 28 August 2026 and 31 August 2026 — and both omitted his name, along with the names of other persons listed in a Schedule-A annexed to the petition.

Kuldeep Kumar's counsel, Dr. Mahesh Sharma with Ms. Harshita Sharma, argued before the court that his name had been present in an earlier voter list and was deleted without any basis and without providing an opportunity of hearing. The deletion, counsel submitted, contravened applicable rules and violated the principles of natural justice, making the impugned voter lists liable to be quashed. The relief sought was a direction to quash the two lists and to issue a revised voter list re-including the petitioner's and Schedule-A persons' names.

Respondents were the State of Rajasthan through the Chief Election Commissioner, the District Collector-cum-District Election Officer (Sikar), the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Electoral Registration Officer (Neem Ka Thana), and the Returning Officer/Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika, Neem Ka Thana. The State was represented by Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, Additional Advocate General, with Mr. Ashutosh Udawat.

The Election Schedule Already in Motion

Justice Dhand noted that the Rajasthan State Election Commission had already issued a detailed election programme for the municipal elections. Under that schedule, nominations closed on 31 July 2026, the entire election process was set to commence from 27 August 2026, and the process was scheduled to be completed by 29 September 2026. The voter lists challenged in the petition — dated 28 and 31 August 2026 — were published after the election process had commenced.

This factual backdrop was decisive. The court found that Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, which bars courts from calling in question or interfering with the election process after it has been initiated, came into operation automatically upon the notification of the election schedule.

How the Bench Reasoned: Ponnuswami and Mohinder Singh Gill

Justice Dhand drew on two Supreme Court decisions to frame the constitutional position. The first was N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Ors., reported in (1952) 1 SCC 94, decided by a six-Judge Constitutional Bench. The court quoted at length from paragraphs 15, 20, 24 and 25 of that decision.

The Constitutional Bench in Ponnuswami held that the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act contemplates that any matter which may vitiate an election should be raised only before a special tribunal at the appropriate stage, and not before any court at an intermediate stage while the election is in progress. The Bench observed that if grounds for questioning an election could be raised at an earlier stage and errors rectified then, there would be no purpose in enacting Article 329(b) or establishing a special tribunal. The Constitutional Bench's conclusion, as quoted by Justice Dhand, was that “elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over.”

The second decision relied upon was Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. Justice Dhand quoted paragraph 29 of that judgment, which distinguished between two categories of court intervention: proceedings that interfere with the progress of an election, and proceedings that accelerate its completion. The Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill reiterated the Ponnuswami principle and directed attention to whether the relief sought in a writ petition would halt or facilitate the election process.

Applying this framework, Justice Dhand held that the petitioner's challenge to the voter lists — aimed at quashing them and requiring a revised list to be issued — amounted to interference with an ongoing election process. Article 243-ZG, the constitutional provision governing State elections to municipalities, operates in the same manner as Article 329 does for parliamentary and assembly elections: once the election process is initiated, the bar comes into force and courts cannot entertain grievances that would disrupt the schedule.

Natural Justice Arguments Did Not Override the Constitutional Bar

The petitioner's primary grievance was procedural: deletion without notice and without a hearing. This is ordinarily a well-recognised ground for judicial review under Article 226. Justice Dhand did not dispute that the deletion may have occurred without an opportunity of hearing, but held that this alone could not circumvent the constitutional bar. The court observed that the grievance raised by the petitioner “cannot be adjudicated by this Court, in the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the above noted cases, at this stage after the election process has been initiated.”

The reasoning reflects the established position that the bar under Article 243-ZG (and its analogue, Article 329) is absolute in its temporal operation: it attaches to the stage of the proceedings, not to the nature of the grievance. A violation of natural justice in deleting a voter's name is not exempt from the bar simply because it sounds in procedural unfairness rather than substantive electoral dispute.

Outcome

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17875/2026 was rejected on 3 September 2026. The stay application and all other pending applications in the matter also stand rejected. Justice Dhand made clear that the rejection rested on the single ground that the election process had already commenced, triggering the bar under Article 243-ZG, and that no further examination of the merits was warranted at this stage.