Telangana HC Refuses to Quash Criminal Case Against Film Industry Family Over Alleged Forcible Dispossession of Lessee
Justice N. Tukaramji declines to quash trespass, theft and criminal conspiracy proceedings against D. Suresh Babu and four others, holding disputed facts must go to trial.
The High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad, has dismissed a petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to quash criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 395 of 2024 before the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal Court, Nampally, Hyderabad. Justice N. Tukaramji, sitting singly, ruled on 30 July 2026 that the complaint filed by K. Nandukumar, the second respondent, discloses a prima facie case of criminal trespass, theft, criminal intimidation, and criminal conspiracy, and that several disputed questions of fact arising from the rival claims over leasehold possession cannot be resolved in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The petitioners — film producer D. Suresh Babu, film actor D. Venkatesh, cine artist Daggupati Rama Naidu @ Rana, film producer D. Abiram, and accountant Gaddam Vishwanatham — are arraigned as Accused Nos. 1 to 5 in the calendar case.
The Dispute Before the Court
The calendar case arises from a private complaint filed by K. Nandukumar under Section 200 of the CrPC. The complainant alleged that the petitioners, acting in conspiracy with officials of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), facilitated the demolition of structures on leased premises and thereafter unlawfully entered the property, broke open doors, removed movable articles, and forcibly dispossessed him and his family members. The Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 448, 452, 380, 506, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and issued summons to all five accused.
The complainant contended that valid registered lease deeds were in place in favour of M/s. W3 Hospitality Services Private Limited. He also pointed to two civil suits — O.S. Nos. 930 and 1512 of 2018 — in which competent Civil Courts had granted interim injunction orders protecting his possession, and submitted that those orders continued in force at the time of the alleged forcible dispossession.
The petitioners had themselves filed O.S. Nos. 282 and 283 of 2020 seeking eviction and obtained status quo orders restraining sub-letting. Respondent No. 2 argued that in affidavits filed in interlocutory applications and Civil Revision Petitions arising from those suits, the petitioners admitted regaining possession of the property following the GHMC demolition — without a decree of eviction from any Civil Court. The complainant relied on these admissions, together with sworn statements, photographs, video recordings, and documentary material placed before the Magistrate, as the basis for the prima facie case.
Petitioners' Case for Quashing
Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. T. Raghuram, advanced three broad lines of argument. First, he submitted that the entire dispute is civil in character, rooted in questions of leasehold rights, possession, and eviction, and that the complainant had deliberately clothed a civil controversy in criminal garb. Second, he argued that the complaint, even accepted at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and that no prima facie material connects the petitioners to criminal trespass, theft, or criminal intimidation. No stolen property, he pointed out, was identified or recovered.
Third, counsel contended that the complaint was filed after an unexplained delay of nearly one year from the alleged incident, casting doubt on its bona fides. He also drew attention to the fact that although the demolition is attributed in the complaint to GHMC officials, none of those officials were arrayed as accused. He further submitted that the complainant was himself in judicial custody during the period when the alleged acts are said to have occurred, making the allegations inherently improbable.
The petitioners argued that the Magistrate had mechanically issued process without proper application of judicial mind, relying on Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420, for the proposition that an order taking cognizance on a private complaint must demonstrate actual judicial satisfaction. They also relied on V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78, and Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 10 SCC 663, for the principle that criminal law cannot be used to enforce civil or contractual rights, and on the Andhra Pradesh High Court's ruling in A. Vidyadhar Rao v. K.V.S. Narayana Rao, 2012 LawSuit (AP) 1051, that property possession disputes belong ordinarily before Civil Courts.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Tukaramji began by restating the limited scope of scrutiny available at the cognizance stage. At this threshold, the Court examines only whether the complaint, the sworn statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, and the supporting material prima facie disclose cognizable offences. It does not weigh probative value or assess the likelihood of conviction — those are for the trial Court.
The Court accepted the legal propositions in V.Y. Jose and Binod Kumar without reservation: criminal law cannot be pressed into service to settle civil disputes. It equally accepted that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC serves to prevent abuse of the process of court. But it immediately applied the established counter-principle: the mere existence or pendency of civil proceedings does not bar criminal prosecution where the allegations independently disclose the essential ingredients of criminal offences. The Court drew on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, and Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736, for the proposition that civil and criminal proceedings may coexist when the same facts constitute both a civil wrong and a criminal offence.
On the mechanical cognizance argument, the Court applied the standard from Mehmood Ul Rehman. It acknowledged that an order merely reproducing the complaint without any independent consideration of the material under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC would warrant interference. However, on perusing the impugned cognizance order, it found that the Magistrate had actually considered the complaint averments, the sworn statements from the preliminary enquiry, and the supporting documentary material before recording prima facie satisfaction. That took the order outside the category of mechanical process-issuance.
The Court then catalogued the factual disputes that the petitioners' arguments necessarily required it to resolve: whether the complainant was in judicial custody during the alleged incident; whether the petitioners actively participated in the alleged acts; whether the demolition was carried out exclusively by municipal authorities; whether the admissions in the civil proceedings establish unlawful dispossession; and whether the stolen articles existed at all. Justice Tukaramji held that none of these could be determined on affidavits and submissions in Section 482 proceedings. Doing so would amount to conducting a mini-trial, which is precisely what Niharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, prohibits.
The contentions about delay, non-impleadment of GHMC officials, non-recovery of stolen property, and alleged mala fides were treated as matters of defence to be raised before the trial Court. So too was the submission that the complainant was in judicial custody and that the petitioners were merely exercising proprietary rights over their own property.
Turning to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court reiterated that the power to quash is extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases where allegations disclose no offence, are inherently absurd, or where continuation of prosecution is a plain abuse of process. The present complaint — alleging entry into leased premises over which injunction orders were subsisting, forcible removal of articles, and intimidation — did not fall within any of the Bhajan Lal categories.
The Court was explicit that the dispute carries civil overtones. But it held that civil overtones do not extinguish criminal liability where the complaint independently discloses cognizable offences. The specific allegation that the petitioners dispossessed the complainant while interim injunction orders remained operative — and that they did so without a decree of eviction — provided the factual core that distinguished this from a purely contractual quarrel.
Outcome
Criminal Petition No. 501 of 2025 was dismissed. The proceedings in C.C. No. 395 of 2024 before the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal Court, Nampally, Hyderabad, are to proceed in accordance with law. The Court directed that the trial Court shall not be influenced by any observations made in this order, which are confined solely to the adjudication of the quashing petition. The petitioners remain at liberty to raise all factual and legal defences before the trial Court. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stand closed.