Prior Nagar Palika Service Cannot Count for Third ACP Under State Government Scheme, Holds Uttarakhand High Court

The Uttarakhand High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the withdrawal of third ACP benefit, holding that service in a statutory local body cannot be reckoned as qualifying service under Finance Department Government Orders governing the ACP Scheme.

The High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital dismissed a service writ petition filed by Bhopal Chandra Pancholi, a Class-IV employee of the State Election Commission, who challenged the withdrawal of his third Assured Career Progression (ACP) benefit. Justice Pankaj Purohit, sitting singly, held that the service rendered by the petitioner in Nagar Palika Parishad, Pithoragarh, prior to his appointment in the State Election Commission, cannot be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of the ACP Scheme. The court found that three Finance Department Government Orders — dated 8 March 2011, 1 July 2013, and 6 November 2013 — specifically exclude service rendered in local bodies from qualifying service, and that the petitioner had not pointed to any statutory provision or executive instruction overriding those orders. The judgment was delivered on 7 July 2026.

The Employment History and the ACP Dispute

Bhopal Chandra Pancholi was initially appointed as a Peon in Nagar Palika Parishad, Pithoragarh on 1 April 1985. His services were regularised with effect from 2 April 1986. Pursuant to an order dated 19 October 1996, he was appointed as a Class-IV employee in the State Election Commission and joined the office of the District Election Officer (Panch Sthaniya), Pithoragarh on 7 November 1996, after being relieved from the Nagar Palika Parishad.

The dispute arose over the computation of qualifying service for the third ACP. The petitioner claimed that his service in the Nagar Palika Parishad from 1 April 1985 to 7 November 1996 ought to have been counted. The respondents initially agreed: by an order dated 10 March 2014, the State Election Commission granted the third ACP after including that period. However, barely two months later, by an order dated 13 May 2014, the benefit was withdrawn. The withdrawal was premised on the Finance Department Government Orders dated 8 March 2011, 1 July 2013, and 6 November 2013, which, according to the respondents, excluded service in local bodies from the qualifying period for ACP.

The petitioner filed Writ Petition Service Single No.1347 of 2015 before the Nainital bench, seeking certiorari to quash Government Order No.770/XVII(7)/(40)/2011 dated 6 November 2013, the withdrawal order dated 13 May 2014, and a consequential order dated 19 March 2015, along with a mandamus directing the respondents to count his Nagar Palika service and pay all resultant arrears.

The Petitioner's Case

Mr. Aditya Singh, appearing for the petitioner, advanced three principal contentions.

First, that the service rendered in the Nagar Palika Parishad, being a statutory local body, could not be treated as non-existent merely because the petitioner subsequently moved to a State Government establishment. The argument was that this service had been acknowledged for pay protection at the time of the petitioner's appointment in the State Election Commission, and there was no rational basis to disregard the same only for the purpose of ACP.

Second, that the Government Orders dated 8 March 2011, 1 July 2013, and 6 November 2013 had been misconstrued by the respondents. The petitioner contended that those orders did not contemplate the exclusion of service in statutory local bodies, and that the respondents had adopted an erroneous interpretation that defeated the very object of the ACP Scheme, which is meant to remove stagnation in service.

Third, that the withdrawal of a benefit already granted was arbitrary, retrospective, and in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no opportunity of hearing was afforded before passing the order dated 13 May 2014. The petitioner also pointed to recommendations and communications from the Deputy Secretary, Housing Department, the Executive Officer of Nagar Palika Parishad, and other departmental authorities, all recommending that the past service be counted. It was argued that these had been mechanically ignored. The Government Order dated 6 November 2013 was independently challenged as arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

The State Election Commission's Position

Mr. Anil Kumar Bisht appeared for respondent No.3. The State Election Commission, as the principal contesting respondent, filed a counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit placing the petitioner's appointment order, regularisation order, and other service records on record pursuant to directions of the court.

The Commission maintained that the petitioner's appointment in the State Election Commission from 7 November 1996 was a fresh appointment and did not carry continuity from his Nagar Palika service. The Commission further stated that the Finance Department alone is competent to prescribe ACP policy, and that its Government Orders are binding on all departments. The initial grant of third ACP by order dated 10 March 2014 was described as an inadvertent error in calculating qualifying service, which was rightly corrected once detected.

On the pay protection argument, the Commission drew a clear distinction: principles governing pay protection and those regulating ACP eligibility operate in distinct fields, governed by different executive instructions. Recognition of past service for pay fixation does not carry over to create an entitlement under the ACP Scheme. Similarly, the Commission contended that recommendations from the Housing Department or other authorities cannot override Finance Department policy and do not create any enforceable right.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Purohit identified the principal question as whether service in Nagar Palika Parishad, Pithoragarh, prior to appointment in the State Election Commission, can be reckoned as qualifying service for the third ACP.

The court held that the ACP Scheme is governed by the Finance Department Government Orders dated 8 March 2011, 1 July 2013, and 6 November 2013, which regulate eligibility for financial upgradation. The petitioner had failed to point to any statutory provision or executive instruction that would entitle him to count local body service for ACP purposes after his appointment in the State Election Commission.

On the pay protection argument, the court agreed with the State Election Commission's position that pay protection and financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme operate in distinct fields. The court held that recognition of past service for pay fixation per se does not confer a right to claim ACP benefit by reckoning that service.

On the argument that the initial grant of third ACP by the order dated 10 March 2014 had created a vested right, the court disagreed. It held that an order passed contrary to the applicable Government Orders does not create any vested or accrued right, and the competent authority was justified in rectifying the error by the order dated 13 May 2014.

On the constitutional challenge to Government Order dated 6 November 2013, the court found no material on record to demonstrate that the order was arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of any statutory or constitutional provision. The court accordingly found no grounds to interfere with that order.

The court also found no merit in the argument that the withdrawal order dated 13 May 2014 violated natural justice or that the respondents had acted in a manner inconsistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It held that the impugned action was taken strictly in accordance with the applicable Government Orders and uniformly applied to similarly situated employees.

Outcome

The writ petition was dismissed. All pending applications were disposed of along with the main petition. No costs were imposed. The judgment was delivered orally on 7 July 2026.