Supreme Court Orders Fresh Review of IPS Officer's Voluntary Retirement After Years of Inconclusive Disciplinary Proceedings
A Division Bench sets aside the Central Government's 2019 rejection of an IPS officer's VRS notice, directing MoHA to reconsider within three months in light of prolonged, unresolved disciplinary proceedings.
The Supreme Court has set aside the Ministry of Home Affairs' October 2019 order rejecting the voluntary retirement notice of Abdur Rahman, a 1997-batch Maharashtra-cadre IPS officer, and directed MoHA to reconsider the application afresh within three months. A Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe, deciding Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21390 of 2024, held that the Central Government had not examined the pending complaints in adequate detail before refusing the notice, and that the subsequent issuance of three chargesheets, none of which has been concluded after years of proceedings — materially changed the landscape that must now be weighed. The Court also settled, for the first time with clarity, that the Central Government's power of “acceptance” under the proviso to Rule 16(2A) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 is neither automatic nor ministerial, but is a genuine, independent discretion constrained by Guideline 3(ii) of the DoPT Guidelines.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
Abdur Rahman tendered a notice dated 1 August 2019 for voluntary retirement under Rule 16(2A) of the 1958 Rules, his third such attempt. His first application had been withdrawn to pursue promotional remedies before the Central Administrative Tribunal. His second was rejected by MoHA on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were pending against him under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It was only after those RTI proceedings closed that he filed the present notice.
At the time of the August 2019 notice, three complaints were pending against him. Complaint I, filed in July 2014, alleged torture of a complainant's wife. Complaint II, filed in April 2016 by his father-in-law, alleged a second marriage without consent and harassment of his first wife and son. Complaint III arose from a speech he gave at the launch of his book Denial and Deprivation on 29 March 2019, which triggered an enquiry for alleged violation of Rules 6 and 7 of the All India Service (Conduct) Rules, 1968.
On 16 October 2019, the State Government of Maharashtra considered the application and recommended acceptance, recording that none of the three complaints was likely to result in a major penalty and that no chargesheet had been issued in any of them. Nine days later, on 25 October 2019, the Central Government rejected the notice, stating that disciplinary proceedings were “pending or being contemplated” against the officer and that he was therefore not clear from the vigilance angle.
Rahman challenged the rejection before the CAT, which dismissed his Original Application on 7 December 2023. The CAT held that the complaints were admittedly pending on the date of the VRS notice and that the State Government's simultaneous assertion that proceedings were under contemplation and that no major penalty was likely could not coexist. The Bombay High Court upheld the CAT's order on 23 July 2024, holding that the Central Government's acceptance under the proviso to Rule 16(2A) is not a ministerial act and that the Central Government was entitled to form its own view independent of the State Government's recommendation. Rahman then approached the Supreme Court.
The Central Question: Who Has the Final Word on VRS Acceptance?
The core legal dispute was whether the Central Government is bound by the State Government's opinion that pending disciplinary proceedings will not result in a major penalty, or whether it may independently assess that question and refuse the VRS notice on that basis.
Senior counsel for Rahman argued that Guideline 3(ii) of the DoPT Guidelines assigns the opinion on likelihood of major penalty to the “disciplinary authority”, and that the State Government, being the authority with direct supervisory knowledge of the officer, holds that role. Once the State Government expressed a considered view that no major penalty was warranted, the Central Government was bound to accept it. He further argued that on 1 August 2019, the date of the VRS notice, no formal chargesheet had been served and no proceedings were genuinely “contemplated” within the meaning of the Guideline, relying on State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357.
The Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Union, countered that Rule 7(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 vests the power to impose major penalties, that is, dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement exclusively in the Central Government. It would be anomalous, she submitted, for the Central Government to be bound by the State Government's assessment of whether a major penalty is warranted when it alone can impose one. She also argued that the relevant date for assessing whether proceedings were pending or contemplated is the date on which the Central Government considered the application, not the date of the VRS notice itself.
The Court's Reasoning on the Scope of Central Government Power
The Court traced the legislative history of Rule 16(2A). Before its amendment with effect from 1 July 1988, the proviso required acceptance by the State Government. After the amendment, acceptance by the Central Government became mandatory. The Court read this shift as a deliberate policy choice: the Central Government is the repository of ultimate authority over career-terminating decisions for IPS officers, and voluntary retirement which severs the employer-employee relationship must be treated consistently with that scheme.
The Court drew on its earlier decision in Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704, which had examined the same amendment and held that “acceptance” requires application of mind by the competent authority and is distinct from mere “approval”. The Court affirmed that the Central Government's acceptance is a sine qua non for VRS to take effect and cannot be treated as a routine forwarding exercise.
At the same time, the Court was careful to qualify the scope of that power. Guideline 3(ii) of the DoPT Guidelines provides that where disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated for imposition of a major penalty, the VRS notice “may not ordinarily be accepted”. The Court read the phrase “may not ordinarily” as conferring a genuine, case-by-case discretion: in a given case, the Central Government may accept a VRS notice even where major penalty proceedings are pending. The discretion is not unconstrained. The Central Government cannot form an opinion unsupported by material on record, and the State Government's recommendation, though not binding, carries persuasive weight given its direct supervisory knowledge of the officer.
The Court therefore held that the Central Government has the last word on VRS under Rule 16(2A) and is not bound by the State Government's recommendation, but that its exercise of discretion must engage with the State Government's views and must be based on relevant material. To this extent, the Court agreed with the High Court's broad framing of the Central Government's authority.
Whether the October 2019 Rejection Was Justified
Having settled the legal framework, the Court turned to whether the Central Government's order dated 25 October 2019 was a valid exercise of that discretion.
The Court noted that a disciplinary proceeding is “pending” only when a formal chargesheet is issued, citing Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109. As on 25 October 2019, no chargesheet had been served on Rahman. The question therefore was whether proceedings were genuinely “contemplated” at that date.
The Court found that the Central Government's rejection order did not engage with the State Government's detailed assessment that no major penalty was likely. The order merely reproduced the conclusion that proceedings were “pending or being contemplated” without examining the nature of the complaints or the State Government's reasoning. This, the Court held, amounted to non-application of mind to the relevant material.
The Court then turned to what happened after the rejection. Three chargesheets were eventually issued: Chargesheet I on 17 June 2020 for major penalty in relation to the alleged second marriage; Chargesheet II on 6 October 2020 for minor penalty (later converted to major penalty) in relation to the book launch speech; and Chargesheet III on 24 April 2022 for major penalty in relation to alleged misconduct including absence from duty after filing the OA, social media posts about his VRS application, and participation in protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
The Court recorded the state of those proceedings with evident concern. For Chargesheet I, issued in June 2020, an Inquiry Officer was appointed only after a delay of two years, and Rahman received summons for a preliminary hearing only in 2025. For Chargesheet II, no Inquiry Officer had been appointed at all despite five years having elapsed. For Chargesheet III, issued in April 2022, summons for a preliminary hearing arrived only in 2026. The Court described the method and manner of conducting the disciplinary proceedings as “unacceptable”.
The Court relied on State of AP v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154, which held that unexplained delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings is itself an indication of prejudice against an officer and that delay defeats justice when it is abnormal and without explanation. The Court observed that a great deal of time had passed since the first complaint in 2014 and since the first chargesheet in 2020, yet the process was far from reaching a conclusive finding.
The Article 142 Question
Senior counsel for Rahman had urged the Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to permit the appellant to retire subject to the conduct and conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, as was done in Ashok Kumar Sahu. The Court declined. It distinguished Ashok Kumar Sahu on the ground that the facts there were entirely different: that case concerned an attempt to withdraw a VRS application after it had already been accepted, not a case involving pending disciplinary proceedings. The Court left it open to Rahman to avail such remedies as may be available to him in law, including challenging the delay in the disciplinary proceedings.
Order
The Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 23 July 2024 in Civil Writ Petition No. 1018/2024 and the order of the Central Government dated 25 October 2019. MoHA was directed to take into account the facts and circumstances set out in the judgment and pass appropriate orders under the proviso to Rule 16(2A) of the 1958 Rules on Rahman's VRS application. The decision is to be taken within three months from 26 May 2026. The Court clarified that against whatever order MoHA may pass, Rahman would be entitled to avail such remedies as are available in law, including approaching the CAT.