Supreme Court Upholds Bihar Electoral Roll Revision, Sets Limits on Citizenship Inquiry

A bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi upholds the Election Commission's Special Intensive Revision of Bihar's electoral rolls, while confining citizenship determinations to electoral purposes only.

The Supreme Court has dismissed a batch of nineteen writ petitions challenging the Election Commission of India's order of 24 June 2025 directing a Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls across every Assembly constituency in Bihar. In a judgment authored by Chief Justice Surya Kant and decided on 27 May 2026, the Court held that the revision was validly traceable to Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, read with Article 324 of the Constitution, and that it satisfied the constitutional standard of proportionality. The Court also drew a careful line between the Commission's permissible administrative inquiry into citizenship for enrolment purposes and a formal adjudication of citizenship status, which it held remains exclusively with the competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955.

How the Dispute Reached the Court

Bihar's last Special Intensive Revision had been conducted in 2003. For over two decades thereafter, the electoral rolls were carried forward through summary revisions alone. On 24 June 2025, the Election Commission issued an order directing a fresh Special Intensive Revision across all Assembly constituencies in the State, citing rapid urbanisation, large-scale migration, and the resulting risk of duplicate, defective, or inaccurate entries. Bihar Legislative Assembly elections were anticipated for November 2025.

The Commission's order treated the 2003 electoral roll as probative evidence of eligibility. Persons not on that roll were required to produce one or more prescribed government documents. An enumeration form had to be submitted by 25 July 2025; failure to submit would result in exclusion from the draft roll. The order also provided for show-cause notices before deletion, appeals to the District Magistrate under Section 24(a) of the RP Act, and a second appeal to the Chief Electoral Officer under Section 24(b).

Petitioners — led by the Association for Democratic Reforms and represented by senior counsel including Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, and Ms. Vrinda Grover, among others — argued that the exercise would arbitrarily disenfranchise lakhs of eligible voters. The Election Commission was represented by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Maninder Singh, and others, who defended the order as squarely within the Commission's constitutional and statutory mandate.

On 10 July 2025, the Court issued notice and observed three substantial questions: the Commission's authority to conduct the exercise, the procedure adopted including the method of ascertaining citizenship, and the propriety of the timing. The Court also directed the Commission to accept Aadhaar cards, EPIC cards, and ration cards as valid proof in addition to the eleven documents already prescribed.

By 1 August 2025, the Commission published a draft roll of approximately 7.24 crore electors. The pre-revision roll had contained about 7.89 crore electors, meaning nearly 65 lakh electors were excluded for non-submission of the enumeration form. Subsequent Court directions required publication of the list of excluded electors with reasons, political party assistance through booth-level agents, and legal aid through District Legal Services Authorities. On 8 September 2025, the Court directed the Commission to treat the Aadhaar card as a twelfth document of identity, while clarifying that it does not constitute proof of citizenship. The final electoral roll published on 30 September 2025 contained 7.42 crore electors. Bihar Assembly elections were held in November 2025 and results declared on 14 November 2025.

The Central Legal Questions

The Court framed four issues: whether the Commission had power to conduct the revision; whether the exercise was founded on a legitimate purpose and was proportionate; whether the 2003 baseline and the documentation regime were arbitrary; and whether the Commission was empowered to inquire into the citizenship of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll.

Petitioners argued that Article 324 operates only in the interstices left unoccupied by parliamentary legislation, and that once Parliament had legislated through the RP Act and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, the Commission could not devise a new regime of enumeration and documentary scrutiny. They relied on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, and A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656, for the proposition that the Commission must act in conformity with, not in violation of, existing law. They further contended that Section 21(3) is constituency-specific and cannot authorise a statewide exercise, that the 2003 cut-off was arbitrary, and that the Commission had no competence to examine citizenship, a matter exclusively within the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961.

The Commission responded that Article 324 and Article 327 are complementary, not competing. It argued that Mohinder Singh Gill does not render the Commission powerless wherever Parliament has legislated; it only requires the Commission not to act in breach of law. Section 21(3)'s non-obstante clause and the phrase “in such manner as it may think fit” confer wide procedural latitude. The word “any” before “constituency” in Section 21(3) can embrace all constituencies of a State. The 2003 baseline was rational because that roll was itself prepared after an intensive revision, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 introduced a statutory cut-off of 7 January 2004. On citizenship, the Commission argued that Section 16 of the RP Act disqualifies non-citizens, so the Commission cannot maintain a valid roll without satisfying itself on that threshold condition.

The Court's Reasoning on the Commission's Power

The Court held that Articles 324 and 327 are not competing repositories of power but are designed to operate in tandem. Article 327 expressly opens with the words “subject to the provisions of this Constitution,” which means parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish the Commission's constitutional function. Equally, the Commission must act in conformity with valid law and cannot defy an express statutory prohibition. The Court described this as “mutual accommodation, and not mutual destruction.”

The Court rejected the petitioners' reading of Mohinder Singh Gill as confining Article 324 to a purely residual role. It read paragraph 92 of that judgment as saying the Commission must act in conformity with law where law exists, but retains authority to act where law is silent. It also distinguished A.C. Jose on its facts: that case involved the introduction of voting machines in a field where the Act and Rules positively contemplated paper ballots, creating a direct collision. The present case was different because Section 21(3) itself expressly authorises the Commission to conduct a special revision “in such manner as it may think fit,” providing a clear statutory conduit rather than a conflict.

On Section 21(3), the Court held that the non-obstante clause is a deliberate legislative device to displace the procedural rigours of ordinary revision under Section 21(2). The phrase “at any time” removes temporal limitations. The phrase “in such manner as it may think fit” confers wide procedural discretion. The requirement to record reasons operates as a substantive safeguard keeping the exercise amenable to judicial scrutiny. A restricted construction would render the special power otiose.

On the geographical scope, the Court applied Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the Constitution Bench decision in Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754, to hold that “any” can mean “many” or “all” depending on context. Requiring the Commission to issue a separate notification for each constituency where state-wide reasons exist would render the provision nugatory. A purposive construction permits a statewide exercise where the recorded reasons are themselves statewide in character, as they were here.

The Court found the Commission's recorded reasons — demographic change from rapid urbanisation and migration over twenty years since the 2003 revision, and the mandate to ensure only Indian citizens remain on the roll — to be cogent justifications satisfying the statutory requirement under Section 21(3).

Proportionality and the 2003 Baseline

The Court held that the impugned SIR was founded on a legitimate and constitutionally grounded purpose: restoring the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the electoral rolls. The measures adopted bore a rational nexus to that objective, were not manifestly excessive, and were accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards.

On the 2003 baseline, the Court accepted the Commission's explanation that the 2003 roll was itself prepared after a special intensive revision entailing house-to-house verification, so persons on it would have substantiated their date of birth, place of birth, and ordinary residency at that time or in an earlier intensive revision. The Court also noted the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 introduced a statutory cut-off of 7 January 2004 for certain citizenship conditions. The classification was therefore founded on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object of ensuring roll integrity.

On the presumption of validity attaching to existing entries, the Court held that inclusion in the electoral roll gives rise to a rebuttable presumption, but that presumption cannot impose a blanket embargo on the Commission's power to conduct a Special Intensive Revision. The Court distinguished Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100, as confined to adjudicatory proceedings and not extending to a systemic, inquisitorial exercise under the Commission's constitutional mandate. The Court also held that deletions under the impugned SIR were not contrary to Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules because the safeguards of notice and hearing were preserved in substance.

The Citizenship Inquiry Question

The Court drew a clear distinction between a formal adjudication of citizenship under the Citizenship Act, 1955 — which falls exclusively within the domain of the competent authority — and an administrative satisfaction as to eligibility for enrolment, which is a limited inquiry for electoral purposes.

Section 16 of the RP Act disqualifies non-citizens from registration. Citizenship is therefore a condition precedent for enrolment. The Commission cannot discharge its obligation to maintain a valid electoral roll without satisfying itself that persons included therein meet this threshold. The Court held that the Commission is empowered to undertake a limited inquiry into citizenship for the purpose of determining inclusion or exclusion from the roll, but such inquiry must be conducted with due regard to the presumption operating in favour of an elector already on the roll, and remains amenable to judicial review.

The Court was explicit that such an assessment is necessarily prima facie and contextual. Where the Commission is not satisfied that a person meets the statutory conditions, it may decline enrolment or initiate deletion strictly in accordance with law. But this does not amount to a declaration that the individual is not a citizen; it merely reflects the Commission's inability to be satisfied, for electoral purposes, that the statutory conditions are met. The individual's citizenship claims and any formal determination under the Citizenship Act remain unaffected.

Where the Commission is not satisfied as to a person's citizenship for electoral purposes, it must refer that individual to the competent authority within the Central Government for adjudication. The Commission's determination cannot assume finality on the question of citizenship, and any deletion on that ground remains subject to the outcome of such adjudication.

Order

The Court disposed of all nineteen writ petitions with the following principal directions:

The impugned SIR neither conflicts with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules nor detracts from the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections. It is traceable to Section 21(3) of the RP Act read with Article 324 of the Constitution.

The SIR as conducted satisfies the requirements of proportionality. The measures adopted bear a rational nexus to the objective, are not manifestly excessive, and are accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards.

The Commission is empowered to undertake a limited inquiry into citizenship for enrolment purposes. Such inquiry does not amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense and its consequences are confined to electoral entitlement alone.

In cases where the Commission is not satisfied that a person meets the statutory conditions for inclusion, it must refer such individuals to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act for adjudication. That authority must decide preferably before the next Parliamentary, Legislative Assembly, or Local Body election in the concerned State or constituency, whichever is earlier, after giving notice and an opportunity of hearing. If the competent authority holds such deleted individuals to be citizens, they shall be included in the electoral roll.

Regarding persons deleted from the 2003 roll on the ground of non-citizenship, the Commission shall refer such cases within four weeks to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act.

All persons domiciled in Bihar whose names have been erroneously deleted on the ground of absence, death, migration, or duplication may challenge the Commission's decision by way of judicial review.

Pending interlocutory applications stand closed.