Tree Fall on Autorickshaw Not an MVA Claim, But Supreme Court Raises Compensation to Rs 25 Lakh Under Article 142
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Kotiswar Singh held that a falling tree branch is not a Motor Vehicles Act accident, yet invoked Article 142 to enhance compensation to Rs 25 lakh.
The Supreme Court has held that a tree branch falling on a stationary autorickshaw sheltering from rain does not constitute an accident arising out of the “use of a motor vehicle” under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and that a claim under Section 166 of that Act is therefore not the appropriate remedy. The Court, however, refused to leave the injured respondent without relief. Finding that the compensation awarded by the High Court of Karnataka was insufficient, the bench invoked Article 142 of the Constitution and enhanced the total award to Rs 25,00,000, directing all parties to disburse their respective shares within four weeks. The judgment, authored by Justice Sanjay Karol and decided on 11 June 2026, settles the legal question while ensuring the respondent — who suffered total paraplegia — is not driven into yet another round of litigation.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
On 23 June 2007, K.K. Umesh Kumar was travelling by autorickshaw from Queens Road to Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru. Heavy rain prompted the driver to pull over to the side of the road. The vehicle came to rest beneath one of several old roadside trees, some reportedly a hundred years old. A branch detached and fell on the stationary vehicle, causing severe injuries to the respondent. He was admitted to Mallya Hospital and treated for what turned out to be total paraplegia of both lower limbs with bladder and bowel incontinence.
A claim petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore, in MVC No. 1313/2020, seeking compensation of Rs 50 lakhs. The Tribunal dismissed the claim on 10 April 2013, treating the incident as a natural calamity. The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru dismissed the claim on the ground of delay in MFA No. 6470/2015. That concurrent dismissal was challenged before the Supreme Court, which remanded the matter in Civil Appeal No. 20865/2017 on the limited point of non-condonation of delay.
In the second round, the High Court allowed the appeal and awarded Rs 17,10,500. It apportioned liability as follows: 25% to the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), 50% to the insurer of the autorickshaw, and 25% to the Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka. The BBMP challenged its 25% share before the Supreme Court, arguing that the incident was an act of God for which it bore no responsibility.
The Act of God Doctrine and Its Limits
The Court traced the doctrine of vis major through a line of English, American, and Indian authorities before applying it to the facts.
Starting with Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1, the Court noted that the defence of act of God was accepted against a strict liability claim under Rylands v. Fletcher where flooding from artificially created ponds was caused by extraordinarily heavy rainfall that was not reasonably foreseeable. In Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway Co [1917] UKHL 3, the House of Lords dismissed a claim of damnum fatale because the defendant had altered the course of a stream, thereby disentitling itself from the defence. The United States Supreme Court's 1897 decision in The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, was cited for the proposition that an act of God is limited to causes in which no human agency whatever is involved.
Turning to Indian precedent, the Court relied on S. Vedantacharya v. Highways Deptt. of South Arcot (1987) 3 SCC 400, where this Court held that heavy rain or flood is not outside the contemplation of a department responsible for bridges and culverts, and overturned a dismissal where no preventive action had been taken. In Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai v. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 1, the Court extracted the definition of an act of God as “a direct, violent, sudden and irresistible act of nature as could not, by any amount of ability, have been foreseen, or if foreseen, could not by any amount of human care and skill have been resisted.”
The Court also examined Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum (1997) 9 SCC 552, on which the BBMP placed heavy reliance. In that case, a pedestrian was killed when a tree fell on him, and the municipal corporation was held liable in negligence. The Court extracted the principle that a statutory authority is liable for tortious negligence when it fails to safeguard the public from a latent source of physical danger that was reasonably foreseeable.
Applying these principles, the Court acknowledged that a municipal corporation does have a duty to maintain roadside trees — not merely for their health but to prevent incidents of this kind through periodic maintenance. At the same time, the Court was candid about practical limits: cities are expanding, the number of trees is vast, and it would be unrealistic to expect constant vigil over every tree or branch. The Court added that the prudent answer cannot be to slash all branches with a saw, given the importance of green cover in urban areas.
On the specific facts, the Court found that neither the sheltering of the autorickshaw under the tree nor the falling of the branch was within the contemplation of any authority or even the driver. In those circumstances, fastening liability on the BBMP under the Motor Vehicles Act was held to be unfair.
Whether the Incident Was an Accident Under the Motor Vehicles Act
The Court then addressed the statutory question directly: does a tree branch falling on a stationary autorickshaw qualify as an accident arising out of the “use of a motor vehicle” under Section 165(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, so as to support a claim under Section 166?
Section 165(1) covers claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury “arising out of the use of motor vehicles.” The Court examined how this phrase was interpreted in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More (1991) 3 SCC 530, where the word “use” was given a wide meaning to include periods when a vehicle is stationary, parked, or immobilised. The phrase “arising out of” was also construed broadly, as requiring a less proximate causal relationship than “caused by.”
Even accepting that liberal interpretation, the Court held that the motor vehicle itself played no active role in this accident. The branch would equally have fallen on a pedestrian standing under the same tree. The vehicle was not part of the proximate cause. The Court therefore concluded that a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not the appropriate remedy for this incident.
Article 142 and the Enhancement of Compensation
Having settled the question of law against the respondent on the MVA point, the Court confronted what it described as a question that “refuses to leave us”: would the respondent be forced into yet another round of litigation to recover compensation?
The Court noted that the respondent had suffered life-altering grievous injuries — total paraplegia of both lower limbs with bladder and bowel incontinence, confirmed by clinical and radiological assessment. Leaving such a person without money to sustain himself, the Court said, did not appeal to the conscience of justice.
The Court also found that the compensation of Rs 17,10,500 awarded by the High Court was itself insufficient under settled principles, owing to a somewhat technical approach adopted by the High Court in its calculation.
Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court enhanced the total compensation to Rs 25,00,000, with interest as determined by the High Court, calculated from the date of filing of the claim petition. The existing apportionment of liability — 25% BBMP, 50% insurer of the autorickshaw, 25% Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka — was left undisturbed.
Order
The civil appeal was disposed of on 11 June 2026. The Court directed that the enhanced compensation of Rs 25,00,000 along with interest be deposited directly into the bank account of the respondent. Counsel for the respondent was directed to furnish the bank details to counsel for the appellant. All parties directed to pay — the BBMP, the Insurance Company, and the Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka — were required to disburse their respective shares within four weeks from the date of pronouncement. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. No costs were awarded.