Supreme Court Upholds DNA Test Order in Paternity Suit, Balances Privacy Against Child's Right to Know

A Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh dismissed a father's challenge to a DNA test order, holding the balance of interests favoured the child seeking paternity declaration.

The Supreme Court on 29 May 2026 dismissed a civil appeal filed by Chaturbhuj Pradhan (“CP”) against concurrent orders of the First Additional Civil Judge, Class II, Basna and the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, both of which directed him to undergo a DNA test to determine whether he is the biological father of Amar Pradhan. The Court, applying the two-stage framework drawn from a line of its own precedents, found that paternity was directly in issue in the pending civil suit, that no other evidence could provide a categorical answer, and that the balance of interests lay in favour of Amar. The appeal was dismissed and the Civil Court was directed to fix a date for the DNA test and proceed in accordance with the result.

How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court

Amar Pradhan was born on 10 September 1999. His mother — the second respondent — has consistently maintained that CP is his father, asserting that a consensual relationship between them took place in January 1999. CP has denied paternity throughout. He was acquitted in a case registered by the second respondent under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in Sessions Case No. 268/1999 by judgment dated 31 December 1999.

Between 2003 and around 2010, the parties were engaged in several rounds of maintenance litigation. In Misc. Crl. Case No. 113 of 2005, CP's appeal before the High Court against a maintenance grant produced an observation that Amar and the second respondent had failed to establish any relationship with CP. That order was challenged before the Supreme Court and was disposed of in Lok Adalat. The Lok Adalat noted that Amar had been a minor when the proceedings were filed but was 24 years old at the time of the Lok Adalat hearing, and recorded that nothing survived in the matter. Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2011 was disposed of on 31 July 2024.

During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, Amar — having attained majority — filed Civil Suit No. 13A/2019 seeking a declaration that he is CP's son and is entitled to a one-third share in CP's property. The Civil Court passed an order on 21 September 2019 directing a DNA test. CP appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the challenge by order dated 16 June 2025, observing that no other kind of evidence would be sufficient to clearly establish Amar's paternity. CP then filed Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4016 of 2026 before the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the matter as a civil appeal.

Arguments Before the Court

CP's counsel contended that no one can be compelled to give a DNA sample, that there was no eminent need for such a test, and that no adverse inference under Section 114(h) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 could be drawn against him at this stage. It was also argued that Amar's civil suit was barred by res judicata in view of the earlier findings in the maintenance proceedings.

On behalf of Amar, it was submitted that CP's continuous denial of paternity left no other recourse to resolve the question. It was argued that the balance of interests favoured Amar because the presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act had no application on the facts, and that CP's right to privacy was not absolute. On res judicata, Amar's counsel submitted that the earlier proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were instituted by the second respondent, were summary in nature, and did not amount to a proper finding on paternity.

The Controlling Precedents Applied

The Court surveyed four judgments that it treated as controlling on the question of when a DNA test may be directed.

In Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B., (1993) 3 SCC 418, the Court had laid down that courts cannot order a blood test as a matter of course, that there must be a strong prima facie case, and that “no one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.”

In Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, (2015) 1 SCC 365, the Court held that depending on the facts and circumstances, it is permissible to direct a DNA examination to determine the veracity of allegations, but that “if the direction to hold such a test can be avoided, it should be so avoided” because the legitimacy of a child should not be put to peril.

In Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, (2024) 7 SCC 773, the Court synthesised earlier decisions into a set of principles. A DNA test is not to be ordered routinely in matrimonial disputes. It may be directed only where there is no other mode of proving the assertion and only in exceptional and deserving cases where the test becomes indispensable to resolve the controversy. The court must also be mindful of consequences for the child, including inheritance-related consequences and social stigma.

In Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 175, the Court articulated a two-stage framework: first, the court must assess whether existing evidence is insufficient to reach a finding; second, only if that insufficiency is established must the court consider whether ordering a DNA test is in the best interests of the parties and does not cause undue harm. The Court described these as “two blockades to ordering a DNA test: (i) insufficiency of evidence; and (ii) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests.”

The Court noted that all four judgments had been recently followed by the same bench in Nikhat Parveen v. Rafique, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 652.

The Court's Reasoning on the Facts

Drawing the principles together, the Court stated that the only test to be satisfied is whether the result of the DNA test is directly in issue and whether any other evidence on record can substitute for the answer that the scientific process would provide, and whether the test is in the best interest of the parties and justice.

On the first stage, the Court found that the alleged relationship between CP and the second respondent was in January 1999 and Amar was born in September 1999. CP had consistently denied paternity. There was no other evidence that could provide a categorical answer. It was nobody's case that the second respondent had ever had an intimate relationship with anyone else. The question of paternity was directly in issue in the civil suit filed by Amar for a declaration of filiation and a share in property.

The Court also addressed the earlier findings against the second respondent in the maintenance proceedings. It held that those findings were not the product of a full-dress trial and therefore could not foreclose the question. This reasoning also disposed of the res judicata argument: since the earlier proceedings were summary in nature and did not constitute a proper finding on paternity, they could not bar the civil suit.

On the second stage — the balance of interests — the Court weighed CP's right to privacy against Amar's interest in obtaining a definitive answer to a question that had shaped his entire life. The Court observed that Amar had watched, from childhood, his mother assert CP's paternity while authorities consistently found otherwise. If no positive answer were ever obtained, Amar could be permanently denied rights he might otherwise hold as CP's son. The Court found that the balance of interests definitively lay in favour of Amar.

On the privacy argument, the Court accepted that CP's right to privacy is not absolute and that it must yield when weighed against Amar's interest in closure on a question of fundamental personal status.

Order

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It directed the concerned Civil Court to fix a date for conducting the DNA test and to proceed further in the civil suit in accordance with the result received. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. No order as to costs was made.