Widow Cannot Act as Karta to Sell Family Property Under Section 8 Hindu Succession Act

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih holds that heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act take as tenants-in-common, barring any karta claim over co-heirs' shares.

The Supreme Court on 1 June 2026 dismissed a civil appeal brought by a widow who had claimed authority as karta of the family to sell a portion of her late husband's property out of legal necessity. The Court held that when property devolves under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, all heirs — including the widow — take as tenants-in-common with separate, defined shares. Because each heir holds only her own one-fifth share, none of them can assume the role of karta to alienate the shares of the others. The ruling ends a dispute that had been running for more than half a century between a step-mother and her four step-daughters over agricultural land and two houses in village Sapti, Nanded district.

How a 1972 Suit Reached the Supreme Court in 2026

The litigation began as Regular Civil Suit No. 23 of 1972. Four daughters of the late Dajiba filed a suit for partition and separate possession, claiming to be 4/5th owners of his property as his successors-in-interest. Darubai, Dajiba's widow, was the defendant. The suit property comprised several survey numbers of agricultural land totalling several acres and two tiled houses at village Sapti.

The Civil Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs on 20 October 1995. It rejected Darubai's defence that she had sold a part of the suit property to one Dattatraya as karta of the family, out of legal necessity for the marriage of one of the plaintiffs.

The First Appellate Court — the IInd Additional District Judge, Nanded — reversed that finding on 9 March 1999. It accepted the legal necessity defence and upheld Darubai's right to manage the property, interfering with the Civil Court's decree to the extent of the sale to Dattatraya.

The fourth plaintiff then filed a Second Appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Aurangabad Bench. By its judgment dated 31 March 2022, the High Court restored the Civil Court's decree. Darubai and another appellant challenged that restoration before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13232 of 2022. Leave was granted and the matter was heard as a civil appeal.

The Two Questions Before the Court

The parties did not dispute the family relationship or the character of the property as Dajiba's separate property. The Court identified two questions for decision.

First, whether Darubai could invoke the ground of legal necessity as karta of the family to justify the sale to Dattatraya. Second, whether the parties would succeed to the suit properties as tenants-in-common or as joint tenants, given that their rights flow from Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Joint Tenancy Versus Tenancy-in-Common Under the Hindu Succession Act

The Court set out the statutory framework in detail. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act directs that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve first upon Class I heirs. Section 10 prescribes the distribution rules: the widow takes one share, and each surviving son, daughter, and the mother of the intestate takes one share each. Section 19 then provides that where two or more heirs succeed together, they take the property per capita and as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants.

The Court explained the practical difference between the two modes of holding. In a joint tenancy, all co-owners together constitute ownership and the rule of survivorship applies: when one joint tenant dies, his interest passes automatically to the surviving co-owners, not to his own heirs. No co-owner has a separate inheritable share while the joint tenancy subsists. In tenancy-in-common, each co-owner holds a distinct, undivided share. Physical possession may remain joint, but each owner's share is identifiable and notionally separate. Survivorship has no place; upon the death of one co-owner, his share devolves upon his own heirs by succession.

The Court traced this distinction through several authorities. It referred to the Privy Council's 1896 decision in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt, where Watson LJ observed that “the principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family.” It also drew on a 1939 Lahore High Court judgment in Nawab Nisar Ali Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan, which distinguished between jointness of title in coparcenary property and co-ownership where shares are known and ascertained. A 1957 Allahabad High Court decision in Azizun Nisa v. Assistant Custodian was cited for the proposition that in tenancy-in-common, a joint owner's share is inherited on death by his personal heirs, whereas in joint tenancy the property belongs to the surviving joint owners.

Section 8 Succession Is Individual, Not Coparcenary

The Court then addressed whether property inherited under Section 8 could take on the character of coparcenary property, which would be a precondition for any kartaship claim.

It relied on the Constitution Bench decision in CWT v. Chander Sen, which held that when property devolves upon a son under Section 8, the son takes it in his individual capacity and not as karta of his own Hindu Undivided Family. The Court illustrated the point: if 'A' dies intestate after 1956 leaving behind his son 'B', 'B' inherits 'A's property under Section 8 as his separate property. 'B's son 'C' acquires no right in it by birth, even though it once belonged to 'A'.

This position was reiterated in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, where the Court held that descendants of the heir do not acquire rights in property inherited under Section 8 by birth, because the inheritance is individual and statutory in nature. The Court also referred to its more recent decision in M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal, which quoted with approval the holding in Appropriate Authority (IT Deptt.) v. M. Arifulla: “they held it as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.”

Reading Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act alongside Section 19, the Court noted that the legislature intended a Hindu's interest in Mitakshara coparcenary to be virtually like self-acquired property for purposes of testamentary disposition. When Section 30 is read with Section 19, it becomes clear that property inherited under Section 8 is not to be treated as joint family property, even if it is held jointly by legal heirs as tenants-in-common until partition.

No Room for Karta Authority When Shares Are Defined

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that upon Dajiba's death, Darubai and her four step-daughters became tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares of 1/5th each. Because each of them held a separate and identifiable share, the question of Darubai acting as karta to sell any part of the property on account of legal necessity did not arise. She had the right to deal with her own 1/5th share as she wished, but no authority over the shares of the other co-owners.

The legal necessity defence — whether for the marriage of one of the plaintiffs or any other reason — was therefore unavailable to her in respect of the property as a whole. The First Appellate Court had erred in accepting it. The High Court was correct to restore the Civil Court's decree.

Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It expressed the hope that the finality of the decision would allow the parties to put the long-standing dispute behind them. There was no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.