Step-Mother Cannot Sell as Karta When Heirs Hold Property as Tenants-in-Common Under Section 8 HSA

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih holds that heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act take as tenants-in-common, extinguishing any karta authority over co-heirs' shares.

A dispute between a step-mother and her four step-daughters over agricultural land and houses in village Sapti, Nanded district, has finally ended after more than half a century of litigation. On 1 June 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the step-mother's appeal, holding that when property devolves under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, all heirs take as tenants-in-common with defined, separate shares. That character of ownership, the Court held, leaves no room for any one co-heir to act as karta of the family and alienate the property on grounds of legal necessity. The judgment settles the interplay between Section 8, Section 19, and the concept of karta-ship in a post-1956 intestate succession.

A Fifty-Year Family Dispute Over Land in Nanded

Dajiba died leaving behind his wife Darubai and four daughters. The daughters filed Regular Civil Suit No. 23 of 1972 for partition and separate possession, claiming to be 4/5 owners of Dajiba's separate property as his successors-in-interest, with Darubai holding the remaining 1/5 share as his widow. The suit property comprised agricultural survey numbers and two tiled houses at village Sapti.

Darubai's defence rested on a sale she had made of part of the suit property to one Dattatraya. She argued she had acted as karta of the family and that the sale was justified by legal necessity — specifically, the marriage expenses of one of the daughters. The Civil Court rejected that defence and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs on 20 October 1995.

The First Appellate Court reversed that finding. It accepted the legal necessity argument and upheld Darubai's right to manage the property as karta, interfering with the Civil Court's decree to the extent of the sale to Dattatraya. Plaintiff No. 4 then filed Second Appeal No. 1648 of 2005 before the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. By its judgment dated 31 March 2022, the High Court restored the Civil Court's decree. Darubai and one other appellant then approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13232 of 2022.

The Two Questions Before the Court

The parties did not dispute the family relationship or the fact that the suit property was Dajiba's separate property. The Court identified two questions: first, whether Darubai could claim karta-ship and invoke legal necessity to validate the sale; and second, whether the heirs succeeded to the property as tenants-in-common or as joint tenants, their rights flowing from Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Joint Tenancy Versus Tenancy-in-Common: The Statutory Framework

The Court set out the relevant provisions at length. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act governs succession to the property of a male Hindu dying intestate, directing devolution first upon Class I heirs. Section 10 distributes that property among Class I heirs, giving the widow one share and each surviving son, daughter, and the mother one share each. Section 19 then provides that where two or more heirs succeed together, they take the property per capita and as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants.

The Court explained the practical difference between the two forms of co-ownership. In a joint tenancy, all co-owners together constitute ownership and the rule of survivorship applies: when one joint tenant dies, that person's interest passes automatically to the surviving co-owners, not to the deceased's own heirs. No co-owner has a separately inheritable share while the joint tenancy subsists. The Court illustrated this with the Mitakshara coparcenary: if A and B jointly hold property and A dies, B absorbs A's interest by survivorship without any separate succession.

In a tenancy-in-common, by contrast, each co-owner holds a distinct, undivided share. Physical possession may remain joint, but each owner's share is identifiable and notionally separate. Survivorship plays no role. When one co-owner dies, that person's share devolves upon their own heirs by succession. The Court drew on Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt (1896), where the Privy Council recognised that joint tenancy is essentially unknown to Hindu law except in the case of coparcenary between members of an undivided family.

The Court also quoted from Nawab Nisar Ali Khan v. Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan (Lahore High Court, 1939), which drew the distinction between jointness of title — where each coparcener is in possession of every portion and no share is defined — and co-ownership where shares are known and ascertained. A 1957 Allahabad High Court judgment in Azizun Nisa v. Assistant Custodian was cited for the proposition that in a tenancy-in-common, a joint owner's share is inherited on death by personal heirs, whereas in a joint tenancy the property belongs to the surviving joint owners.

Section 8 Property Is Individual, Not Coparcenary

The Court then addressed whether property inherited under Section 8 could take on the character of coparcenary property in the hands of the heir. It relied on CWT v. Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567, where the Court held that when property devolves upon a son under Section 8, the son takes it in his individual capacity and not as karta of his own Hindu Undivided Family. The son's own children acquire no birthright in that property merely because it once belonged to the paternal ancestor.

This position was reiterated in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (1987) 1 SCC 204, authored by Sabyasachi Mukharji J. (as he then was), who had also written Chander Sen. The Court in Yudhishter held that descendants of the heir do not acquire rights in property inherited under Section 8 by birth, because the inheritance is individual and statutory in nature.

The most recent iteration cited was M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal (2020) 11 SCC 103, which in turn referred to Appropriate Authority (IT Deptt.) v. M. Arifulla (2002) 10 SCC 342. That case had confirmed that property devolving under Section 8 is the individual property of the inheriting person and not that of the HUF, and that co-heirs hold it as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. The Court in Arumugam also read Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act alongside Section 19, noting that the legislature intended the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary to be virtually like self-acquired property, and that co-heirs hold jointly inherited property as tenants-in-common until it is divided, apportioned, or dealt with in a family settlement.

No Room for Karta-Ship When Shares Are Defined

Applying these principles, the Court held that upon Dajiba's death, Darubai and her four step-daughters became tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares of 1/5 each. Because each heir held a separate and identifiable share, the question of Darubai acting as karta to sell part of the property on grounds of legal necessity simply did not arise. Her authority extended only to her own 1/5 share. The Court stated plainly: “there arises no question of the defendant acting as karta to sell off a part of the property on account of legal necessity.”

The Court observed that in the context of Section 8, the question of karta-ship ordinarily does not arise merely because property has come from a paternal ancestor. The heirs succeed as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and the property devolves by succession rather than by survivorship. The First Appellate Court's reasoning, which had accepted the legal necessity defence and Darubai's right to manage the property, was therefore unsustainable.

Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The High Court's judgment of 31 March 2022, which had restored the Civil Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs, was affirmed. The Court expressed hope that the finality of the decision would allow the parties — step-mother and step-daughters — to put behind them a dispute that had persisted for more than half a century. No order as to costs was made. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.