State Must Pay Rs 11 Lakh for Keeping Convict in Jail 24 Days After Court Ordered His Release

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih held that bureaucratic delay in deciding whether to appeal a release order cannot justify continued detention of a person whose liberty a court has already secured.

The Supreme Court has awarded Rs 11 lakh in compensation to a convict who remained in prison for 24 days after a Rajasthan High Court single judge ordered his release on parole, finding that the State's failure to act on a court order — while it deliberated internally on whether to file an appeal — amounted to illegal detention in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The judgment, delivered on 29 May 2026 by a division bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, lays down that once a court directs release and the detenue satisfies the conditions imposed, continued custody is unlawful regardless of any pending administrative decision by the State. The bench also defined illegal detention and traced the constitutional lineage of the writ of habeas corpus before arriving at the compensation figure.

How the Dispute Reached the Court

Daudayal was convicted under Sections 148, 448, 304 Part II read with Sections 149 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Alwar in Sessions Case No. 22 of 1967. The conviction was confirmed by the dismissal of Criminal Appeal No. 451 of 1988 in 2021, after which he was arrested on 23 December 2021. He had been sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment.

On 3 December 2023, Daudayal applied for permanent parole. He had not applied for regular parole at any prior stage. The application was rejected on 18 January 2024 on that very ground. He challenged the rejection before the High Court of Rajasthan in SB Criminal Writ Petition No. 1021/2024.

The learned single judge allowed the petition on 5 November 2024 and directed his release on furnishing a personal bond of Rs 1,00,000 and two sureties of Rs 50,000 each. At that point, Daudayal had already served three years, two months and twenty days of his four-year sentence. Surety verification was completed on 13 November 2024. Despite this, he had still not been released by 25 November 2024.

He then approached the Division Bench by way of DB Habeas Corpus Petition No. 411/2024. By order dated 6 December 2024, the Division Bench directed his release forthwith. The gap between the single judge's order and the Division Bench's order was 24 days — the period Daudayal claimed as illegal detention for which he sought Rs 8 lakh in compensation.

The State's Defence and Why the Court Rejected It

The State of Rajasthan raised two principal arguments. First, it contended that the single judge's order granting permanent parole was itself contrary to Rule 9 of the Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958, because Daudayal had never been released on the three prior paroles that the rule requires before permanent parole can be recommended. The State relied on Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55, to argue that parole does not suspend a sentence and that the purpose of the three-stage parole process is to observe the parolee's conduct outside jail.

Second, the State submitted that it was “considering challenging” the single judge's order and therefore could not timely inform the concerned respondent to release the petitioner.

The Court rejected both arguments without hesitation. On the first, it held that the State had never independently challenged the single judge's findings. Having chosen not to appeal, it was not open to the State to question the legality of that order at this belated stage. The Court applied the principle of “obey first, appeal later,” drawing on Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689, Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 7 SCC 261, and Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather, (1994) 4 SCC 34. The consistent thread across these decisions is that a judicial order remains operative unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior court — mere filing of an appeal or contemplation of one does not suspend it.

On the second argument, the Court was direct: the State's internal deliberation on whether to file an appeal is a purely administrative call. Placing that call above the liberty of an individual who has already secured a court order cannot be countenanced.

Defining Illegal Detention and the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Before reaching compensation, the bench set out what it understood illegal detention to mean. Observing that there is no recognised statutory definition, the Court formulated its own: “The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention.” It added that detention becomes illegal not only when there is no legal basis but also when the procedure followed is not just, fair, and reasonable, or when the power to detain is exercised arbitrarily or for an improper purpose.

The bench then traced the writ of habeas corpus from the Magna Carta 1215 and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 through to its Indian constitutional form under Articles 32 and 226, which the Court described as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It drew on Lord Halsbury in Cox v. Hakes, (1890) LR 15 AC 506 (HL); the Constitution Bench in Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 18; P.N. Bhagwati J. in Kanu Sanyal v. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; H.R. Khanna J.'s dissent in ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521; V.R. Krishna Iyer J. in Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 3 SCC 488; and Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342.

The Court also addressed the State's argument that the judgments on compensation cited by Daudayal were distinguishable because they involved persons unlawfully detained by the State, whereas he was a convict in prison under due process. The Court found no merit in this. Once parole had been granted and sureties produced to the satisfaction of the court, non-release becomes illegal detention. The cited judgments were relevant not only on their facts but to establish that monetary compensation is an accepted public law remedy.

The Compensation Precedents the Court Surveyed

The bench surveyed six decisions in which this Court had awarded compensation for violations of Article 21.

In Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141, the petitioner was ordered released in 1968 but was actually freed only in 1982 — 14 years later. The Court awarded Rs 35,000 and held that Article 21 would be denuded of content if the Court's power were limited to ordering release without the ability to award compensation.

In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82, two persons could not be produced on a habeas corpus writ. The Court awarded Rs 1,00,000 each to their wives for torture, agony and mental oppression.

In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, (1985) 4 SCC 677, a legislator was detained and taken to an undisclosed location. The Court awarded Rs 50,000, with O. Chinappa Reddy J. holding that mischief or malice in arrest is not washed away by release alone.

In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, a young man died in police custody. The Court awarded Rs 1,50,000 and, through Dr. A.S. Anand J. (as he then was), held that compensation in public law proceedings is in the nature of exemplary damages for breach of public duty, independent of any private law tort action.

In Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 11244/2025, a convict had completed his sentence of four years and seven months before he was actually released. The Court awarded Rs 25,00,000.

In S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews, (2018) 10 SCC 804, the ISRO scientist who was arrested on espionage charges and held for nearly 50 days received Rs 50,00,000 from a three-judge bench.

The Court's Reasoning on Entitlement and Quantum

Having surveyed these precedents, the bench held that Daudayal was entitled to compensation for the 24 days of illegal custody. The reasoning rested on two pillars.

First, the due process of surety verification had already been completed on 13 November 2024. There was no explanation for the continued detention after that date. The Court acknowledged that official processes require some time but held that the State must ensure its processes do not negatively impact a person who has secured liberty through a court order.

Second, the Court applied Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446, which held that even where a certificate of appeal from the High Court was pending, the binding character of the High Court's order does not lose its force. The only scenario in which a release order need not be complied with is where a superior court has granted a stay. No such stay existed here.

The Court stated plainly that a conviction does not diminish the weight of a person's rights. The State's slow bureaucratic process of deciding whether to file an appeal cannot be placed above individual liberty.

On quantum, the Court awarded Rs 11,00,000 (Eleven Lakhs). The amount is to be deposited directly into Daudayal's bank account, the details of which are to be furnished by his counsel to the State's counsel.

Order

The appeal is allowed. The State of Rajasthan is directed to pay Rs 11,00,000 as compensation to the appellant Daudayal, to be deposited directly into his bank account. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.