Supreme Court Upholds Murder Conviction Without Recovery of Body in Child Custody Case

A division bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale affirms conviction under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, holding that non-recovery of a body does not defeat a murder charge when other evidence is cogent.

The Supreme Court has dismissed a criminal appeal challenging concurrent convictions for murder and causing disappearance of evidence under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant, Debojit Pankika of Charaideo, Sonari, had been charged with the murder of a minor girl who was in his sole custody when she went missing in June 2015. Her body was never recovered from the Teok River into which, the prosecution alleged, the appellant disposed of it. The Court, speaking through Justice Prasanna B. Varale, held that the absence of a recovered body does not foreclose a murder conviction where reliable evidence establishes both the fact of death and a criminal agency. The judgment is marked non-reportable and bears the citation 2026 INSC 687.

How the Case Reached the Supreme Court

The deceased, a minor girl named Soru Kharia (also referred to as Haru Kharia), aged approximately 10 years, had been adopted by Smt. Sumitra Panika, the appellant's mother. The child had lived with the appellant and his mother for approximately seven years. In the first week of June 2015, Sumitra Panika left the residence to receive medical treatment, leaving the child in the sole custody of the appellant. The child subsequently went missing.

Twenty-two days passed before any complaint was made. On 27 June 2015, one Babu Paik, the deceased's maternal uncle, lodged a written complaint at Sonari Police Station. His complaint noted that the appellant had neither searched for the child nor informed her family of her disappearance. FIR No. 130/2015 was registered, initially under Section 365 IPC.

The investigation pivoted on the disclosure statement of Kishore Mall (PW-4), who told investigators that the appellant had informed him that the deceased had burnt herself. According to PW-4, the appellant then compelled him, under threat of a dagger, to assist in disposing of the body. PW-4 stated that the body was placed in a sack, tied to a bicycle, and thrown into the Teok River. Following the investigation, a chargesheet was filed under Sections 365, 302 and 201 IPC.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari, framed charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC by order dated 31 August 2016. The prosecution examined nine witnesses; the appellant examined none. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the appellant denied the prosecution case entirely. By judgment dated 28 September 2018, the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the murder offence, and to rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence under Section 201.

The appellant challenged the conviction before the Gauhati High Court. A Division Bench dismissed the appeal on 22 December 2022, sustaining both the conviction and the sentence. The present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against that judgment.

Appellant's Contentions

Counsel for the appellant, Mr. D.B. Goswami, raised five distinct challenges.

First, it was argued that the charges were vague and non-compliant with Section 212 Cr.P.C., which requires that a charge specify the time, place and manner of the alleged offence with sufficient particularity to allow the accused a fair opportunity to defend himself. The charge, counsel submitted, specified neither the exact date and time nor the place of the murder nor the manner in which it was committed.

Second, counsel pointed to the Investigating Officer's admission in cross-examination that he did not know the actual date of the incident or the date of disposal, and that neither the dead body nor any incriminating material was recovered against the appellant.

Third, the characterisation of PW-4 as a “sterling witness” was contested. Counsel argued that PW-4 harboured a long-standing enmity towards the appellant, since the appellant had previously been prosecuted for the murder of PW-4's uncle. PW-4 was also said to have no basis to identify the contents of the sack as the deceased's body, since he was not an eyewitness to the killing and had only accompanied the appellant for part of the journey. His account of what the appellant told him about the burning was said to be inadmissible hearsay.

Fourth, even accepting PW-4's testimony, counsel argued he was an accomplice whose evidence carried no independent evidentiary value under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, since he had not been charged as an accused.

Fifth, counsel relied on the judgment in Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193, to argue that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 and does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence, he submitted, was not cogent or compelling enough to establish homicidal death.

State's Response

Senior Additional Advocate General Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, for the State of Assam, submitted that the prosecution had established a complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence satisfying the conditions laid down in Sharad Birdi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, excluding every hypothesis of innocence.

The State stressed that the deceased was under the appellant's exclusive custody when she disappeared; that the appellant's silence for 22 days and his total failure to search for the child or inform her family was a strong incriminating circumstance; that PW-4's testimony was consistent with his statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.; and that prior enmity alone does not warrant discarding a deposition that is otherwise convincing and corroborated. The State relied on Sadhu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 1506, Raman Kalia v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1261, and Lakhwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 87 on that point.

On the body recovery issue, the State relied on Sanjay Rajak v. State of Bihar, (2019) 12 SCC 552, to contend that where the accused himself disposed of the body, making recovery improbable, non-recovery is not fatal. The State also pointed to half-burnt green apparel seen by the informant in the appellant's courtyard as supporting the prosecution case.

The State urged that concurrent findings of guilt arrived at by two courts after careful scrutiny of the evidence should not be disturbed in the absence of perversity or omission.

The Court's Analysis on Corpus Delicti

The Court began by framing the case as one falling squarely within the category of corpus delicti. It explained that corpus delicti in murder has two components: death as the result, and criminal agency as the means. Where there is direct proof of one, the other may be established by circumstantial evidence. Critically, the Court stated that corpus delicti means that the offence has been committed, not that the dead body must have been recovered.

The Court quoted with approval from its earlier judgment in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471, to the effect that requiring body recovery as an absolute condition would allow a guilty person to escape punishment simply by ensuring the body is destroyed. What is required, the Court reiterated from that passage, is “reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder…was committed” by direct or circumstantial evidence. It also referred to Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536, and Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10, as cases with similar fact patterns.

Assessment of PW-4's Testimony

The Court identified the oral testimony of PW-4 as the most important evidence against the appellant. PW-4's account was that the appellant told him the deceased had burnt herself after the appellant accused her of stealing Rs. 40/-; that the appellant had wrapped the body in a sack; and that, under threat of a dagger, PW-4 was compelled to accompany the appellant before stopping short of the Teok River. PW-4 confirmed the body was carried on a bicycle.

The Court addressed the argument that PW-4 was an interested witness motivated by grudge. It reasoned that if PW-4 had genuinely fabricated evidence out of enmity, he could have claimed to have witnessed the murder itself. Instead, his testimony was measured: he stated only that he accompanied the appellant for some distance. The Court quoted PW-4's examination-in-chief directly: “I had to accompany the accused as he had threatened me to kill me.” That restraint, the Court found, lent the testimony credibility rather than diminishing it.

The Court further noted that PW-4's deposition was entirely consistent with his earlier statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., that there were no material discrepancies or contradictions, and that his evidence had withstood cross-examination. On this basis, the Court agreed with the High Court's characterisation of PW-4 as a reliable and credible witness.

The Appellant's Failure to Explain the Child's Disappearance

The Court placed significant weight on the appellant's conduct after the child went missing and on his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement. In that statement, the appellant had himself admitted that the deceased lived with him, that his mother had adopted her, and that he resided in the same house. He also admitted that his mother had left for medical treatment, leaving the child with him.

Given these admissions, the Court held that it was the natural conduct expected of the appellant to either report the child's disappearance to the police or inform relatives. He did neither for 22 days. His failure to offer any plausible explanation for the child's disappearance from his exclusive custody formed, in the Court's assessment, an additional and vital link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.

The Court found that the circumstances established were consistent only with the hypothesis of the appellant's guilt and could not be explained on any other hypothesis.

Outcome

The Supreme Court held that neither the Trial Court nor the Gauhati High Court had committed any error. The conviction under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and the sentences awarded — life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence under Section 302, and rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence under Section 201 — were affirmed. The appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit.