Supreme Court declares the right to walk on demarcated footpaths a fundamental right

A Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar held the right to walk integral to Articles 19(1)(d) and 21, with footpaths a correlative enforceable duty.

The Supreme Court has held that the right to walk on demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. Deciding a motor accident compensation appeal, a Bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar located the right within Article 19(1)(d), read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) and 21. The case arose from the death of a five-year-old boy struck by a tanker while walking to school, on a stretch with neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing. The Court treated the tragedy as a window into a deeper failure to recognise walking itself as a protected activity. It declared that footpaths carry a correlative, enforceable duty on civic bodies, and that the right to walk takes priority over movement by motorised vehicles.

How a tanker death became a constitutional question

The appellant had readied his five-year-old son and left home at 9 am to drop him at the neighbourhood school. As father and son walked towards the school, a tanker came from behind, struck the boy and crushed his lower body. He succumbed to the injuries. There was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing on the road.

The Court said accidents like this continue to occur and will until the rights regime governing access to roads is restructured to recognise correlative duties. It distinguished its concern here from road safety, which it is already monitoring, and framed the issue as something more fundamental — the recognition of “walking” itself.

The Court read the right to move freely under Article 19(1)(d) as not confined to movement on wheels. The primary right of movement, it held, is the fundamental right to walk, a right that precedes movement on wheels and must extend to safe, well-demarcated footpaths. That right is primary and has priority over motorised vehicles.

Why the Motor Vehicles Act could not house this right

The Court held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is not and has never been the statute that recognises the fundamental right to walk. Its predecessor of 1939 was enacted to standardise commercial transport and generate revenue through registration, licensing and permits. The 1988 Act continues that tradition, built upon the “vehicle” as its subject, with human interests treated as incidental.

The Court noted the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017, which define a road user to include pedestrians and impose duties on drivers towards vulnerable road users. These, it said, are guiding principles for drivers and neither recognise the right to walk on demarcated footpaths nor prioritise that right over motorised roads. The Court also observed that Parliament has not put in place a full-time regulatory body for motor transport, the Transport Authorities under Chapter V not being regulatory bodies.

The duty bearers and the call for legislation

The Court held that where a road exists, there is a duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated and maintained, and that this is an enforceable duty. The duty bearers are the Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities and Panchayats.

Drawing on the structure of rights-based statutes, the Court pointed to the Right to Education Act, the National Food Security Act, 2013, and the Right to Information Act as models that declare a right, identify duty bearers, provide remedies and establish regulators. It said no such legislation exists for the right to walk, though the right is integral to Articles 21 and 19(1)(d).

The Court directed the Registry to send a copy of the judgment to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways to reflect on the need for a legal framework. A copy was also directed to the Law Commission to examine a statutory framework for the right, its duty bearers and remedies. The Court added that a restitutionary remedy is available under the Constitution and under Sections 38-40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, distinct from any claim under the Motor Vehicles Act.

The compensation recalculated

On the facts, the father had sought compensation of Rs. 25,00,000. The MACT, by award dated 30.05.2016, granted Rs. 7,82,000 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition. On appeal, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and, allowing the Insurance Company’s appeal, reduced the compensation to Rs. 4,70,000.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reducing the award. Relying on Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, which involved a six-year-old deceased child, it fixed the child’s income by reference to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Taking the annual income at Rs. 1,12,392 after 40% future prospects, deducting 50% for personal expenses and applying a multiplier of 18, the loss of dependency came to Rs. 10,11,528. With Rs. 96,800 for loss of consortium, Rs. 18,150 for loss of estate and Rs. 18,150 for funeral expenses, the total was Rs. 11,44,628.

Order

The Court held that the appellants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 11,44,628, to be paid within two months. It declared the right to walk a fundamental right under Part III, integral to Article 19(1)(d) read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) and 21, with the right to demarcated footpaths within its sweep, and priority over motorised vehicles. The correlative duty falls on urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats. Violation entitles citizens to constitutional and legal remedies for restitution and compensation, independent of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Court recorded the assistance of amicus curiae Mr. Mamidipudi V. Mukunda and directed the Registry to re-number the case as a petition under Article 32, with the cause title changed to Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath. The Government of India, through the three Ministries, was impleaded, and the Court requested ASG Mr. K.M. Nataraj to assist. The appeals and pending applications were disposed of with no order as to costs.