Conviction Upheld but Life Sentence Cut to Time Served for 1984 Truck Murder Conspirator
A Supreme Court bench upheld Gopi Chand's conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit murder but modified his life sentence to the 18-plus years already served.
The Supreme Court on 29 May 2026 upheld the conviction of Gopi Chand @ Pappu under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for his role in a 1984 conspiracy to steal a truck that resulted in the murder of its driver and cleaner. The Court, however, converted his sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone — over 18 years — and directed his immediate release. The judgment, authored by Justice Manoj Misra and decided with Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, resolves a dispute that began with two FIRs registered in July 1984 and traversed the trial court and the Delhi High Court before reaching the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 847 and 848 of 2014. The decision settles the legal position on when a conspirator who does not strike the fatal blow can still be held liable for murder under the criminal conspiracy provisions of the IPC.
How the Case Reached the Supreme Court
Two dead bodies were found in July 1984 under the jurisdiction of different Delhi police stations. A body found on 13 July 1984 gave rise to FIR No. 300/1984 at P.S. Civil Lines; another found on 16 July 1984 gave rise to FIR No. 190/1984 at P.S. Alipur. The bodies were identified as Arun Kumar and Jasbir, the driver and cleaner respectively of Truck No. URM 660, owned by Dayal Chand (PW-23). Investigation revealed that a group of five persons had hired the truck on the pretext of transporting pumpkins, killed the driver and cleaner at separate locations, and stolen the vehicle.
On 24 July 1984, co-accused Tejpal, Kishan Lal, and Ram Chhail were arrested while sitting in Truck No. OSC-4115, which a forensic report confirmed was the stolen Truck No. URM 660 with its number plate changed. Gopi Chand was arrested on 29 July 1984. A fifth person, Ashok Kumar, was arrested on 6 August 1984 and subsequently became an approver, tendering a confessional statement before a Magistrate on 23 August 1984 under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The two FIRs gave rise to Sessions Case Nos. 25 and 25-A of 2008. Since a single set of evidence was led in both trials, the trial court decided them together. On 3 March 2009, the trial court convicted Gopi Chand, Tejpal, and Kishan Lal under Sections 302, 396, 201, and 120-B IPC. Ram Chhail had died during trial. Gopi Chand was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of Rs. 2,00,000 under Section 302 IPC, ten years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 396 IPC, and six years each under Sections 201 and 120-B IPC, all to run concurrently.
Gopi Chand filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 349 and 352 of 2009 before the Delhi High Court. The High Court dismissed all six appeals by a common order dated 2 August 2013. The sentences of Tejpal and Kishan Lal were subsequently remitted by the State under its remission policy, leaving Gopi Chand's appeals as the sole live controversy before the Supreme Court.
The Approver's Testimony: Exculpatory or Inculpatory?
The sheet anchor of the prosecution case was the testimony of Ashok Kumar (PW-1), the approver. The appellant's first argument was that PW-1's statement was self-exculpatory and therefore unreliable, and second, that it was not corroborated in material particulars.
The Court surveyed the legal framework at length. Section 133 of the Evidence Act, 1872 makes an accomplice a competent witness and provides that a conviction is not illegal merely because it rests on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, however, adds a rule of prudence: a court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. The Court drew on Somasundaram @ Somu v. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, (2020) 7 SCC 722, Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275, and Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, to summarise the governing principles.
The Court distilled those principles into four propositions. First, corroboration of an approver's testimony is not mandated by law but is a rule of prudence; a court may convict even on uncorroborated testimony if it records reasons for doing so. Second, corroborating evidence may be direct, circumstantial, or both. Third, where corroboration is considered necessary, it must come from independent sources; ordinarily, one approver's testimony cannot corroborate another's. Fourth, corroboration need not independently confirm every material circumstance — it must render the approver's testimony believable in the facts of the case.
On the creditworthiness tests, the Court relied on Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (1975) 3 SCC 742, which held that an approver's story must involve him in the crime and appear intrinsically probable, and must implicate the accused in a manner giving rise to guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It also drew on A. Devendran v. State of T.N., (1997) 11 SCC 720, for the proposition that an approver's testimony cannot be discarded merely because he did not participate in the actual killing, as long as he participated in the crime.
Examining PW-1's actual deposition, the Court found that he had held the legs of the cleaner Jasbir to render him unconscious while Ram Chhail strangled him, and had stood guard while the driver Arun Kumar was killed. The Court held that this testimony was not entirely exculpatory: PW-1 had actively participated in the events leading to the murders, even if he did not inflict the fatal blows. The argument that his statement was exculpatory was rejected.
On corroboration, the Court noted that the High Court had examined in detail the circumstances corroborating PW-1's account — the stolen truck found in the possession of co-accused, the headless body of Arun Kumar with his skull found wrapped in a green pyjama, torn bilty papers near the body, and the body of Jasbir found in the agricultural fields of village Hiranki exactly as PW-1 had described, with the name “Jasbir” tattooed on the right arm. No serious challenge had been laid to those circumstances. The Court held that PW-1's testimony was reliable, creditworthy, and could form the basis of conviction.
The Charge Defect Argument and Section 464 CrPC
The appellant's second major argument was that no specific charge of criminal conspiracy to commit murder had been framed against him, and therefore his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC could not stand.
The charge history was complex. Charges were framed twice: first on 30 October 1985 and again on 21 January 1986. In the reframed charges of 21 January 1986, Charge B named all four accused — Ram Chhail, Kishan Lal, Gopi Chand, and Tejpal — for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC to commit dacoity and murder of Arun Kumar and Jasbir. Charge C, which charged the accused under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC for the murder of Jasbir, originally named Gopi Chand but his name was subsequently struck off, leaving Ram Chhail, Kishan Lal, and Tejpal. Gopi Chand's name remained on Charge A (Section 302/120-B for murder of Arun Kumar) in the initial framing, but the reframed Charge A named only Ram Chhail and Kishan Lal.
The Court applied Section 464 of the CrPC, which provides that no finding or sentence shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on account of any error or omission in the charge, unless a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. The Court found that the charge framing order itself showed Gopi Chand had pleaded not guilty to the conspiracy charge and claimed trial. He was therefore fully aware of the charge he was facing. The cross-examination of witnesses by a common counsel for all accused related to the murder charge, and no prejudice had been caused. The argument was rejected.
Criminal Conspiracy: Was Gopi Chand Liable for the Murders?
The appellant's third and most substantive argument was that even accepting PW-1's testimony, no case of criminal conspiracy to commit murder was made out against him. He contended that at most he was part of a conspiracy to commit dacoity, not murder.
The Court set out the statutory framework. Section 120-A IPC defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Section 120-B IPC provides that a party to a conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment shall be punished as if he had abetted the offence. Section 10 of the Evidence Act makes acts or statements of any conspirator in reference to the common intention relevant against all co-conspirators.
The Court drew on Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596, for the principle that one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission. It also relied on State through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT v. Nalini & Ors., (1999) 5 SCC 253, for the proposition that everything said, written, or done by any conspirator in execution of the common purpose is deemed to have been done by each of them.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the prosecution had established a prior meeting of minds among the five participants to steal the truck. They had carried a gandasa — a weapon capable of causing grievous injury. They hired the truck, separated the driver and cleaner by deception, and killed them at separate locations to secure possession of the vehicle. Gopi Chand had maintained vigil at one of the two trucks while his co-participants dealt with the driver and cleaner.
The Court rejected the argument that Gopi Chand was unaware the driver and cleaner would be killed. It held that when possession of property is taken not clandestinely but by force, causing injury to the victim — including murder — is a foreseeable event. The planned manner of the crime, and the fact that Gopi Chand is the brother of co-conspirator Ram Chhail, left no doubt that he was in cahoots with the others. His conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit murder was upheld.
Sentence: Life Imprisonment Converted to Period Undergone
Having upheld the conviction, the Court turned to the sentence. Counsel for the appellant urged that Gopi Chand had not directly participated in either murder; that his ten-year sentence under Section 396 IPC had already been served; that the sentences of co-convicts Tejpal and Kishan Lal had been remitted by the State; and that he had by then served well over 18 years.
The custody certificate dated 6 March 2024 showed that Gopi Chand had served sentence across six separate periods between 30 July 1984 and 6 March 2024, and had served a further two years thereafter, bringing the total to over 18 years.
The Court relied on its recent decision in Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 558, decided on 26 May 2026, where a life sentence was converted to the period already undergone after the appellant had served over 20 years. That decision rested on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, and Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817, which together hold that modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence is permissible as long as the sentence imposed exceeds 14 years.
Taking into account that the incident occurred in 1984, that co-convicts had received the benefit of remission, and that Gopi Chand had served over 18 years, the Court modified the sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining the conviction in full.
Order
The Supreme Court partly allowed Criminal Appeal Nos. 847 and 848 of 2014. The conviction of Gopi Chand @ Pappu under Sections 302/120-B, 396/120-B, 201/120-B, and 120-B IPC as recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the Delhi High Court was upheld. The sentence of life imprisonment was modified to the period of sentence already undergone. The Court directed that the appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case. All pending applications were disposed of.