IBC Appeal Dies After 60 Days Plus 28: Supreme Court Bars Refiling Delay Condonation Under Section 62

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma holds that once the 60-day filing window and 28-day defect-cure window close, a Section 62 IBC appeal is extinguished and no condonation is possible.

The Supreme Court on 1 June 2026 dismissed a civil appeal filed by the liquidator of a corporate debtor under liquidation, holding that an appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 cannot survive once both the outer filing limit of 60 days and the 28-day window for curing defects under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 have elapsed. The Court, comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, ruled that no application for condonation of refiling delay is maintainable in such circumstances, regardless of the cause shown. The decision settles that the strict limitation architecture of the IBC admits no judicial enlargement through the back door of defect-cure proceedings, and that a liquidator's status as a neutral officer of the Court does not attract any special dispensation.

How the Dispute Reached the Court

The appellant, CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary, was acting as liquidator of a corporate debtor. He challenged a judgment and order dated 8 December 2025 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 316 of 2024.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was presented on 29 January 2026. That date fell beyond the 45-day period prescribed under Section 62(1) of the IBC but within the 15-day grace period under Section 62(2), producing a filing delay of 7 days. The Registry marked the appeal defective. After the defects were pointed out, the appellant re-filed the appeal with a further delay of 82 days beyond the 28-day window allowed under Order VIII Rule 6(3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Two separate applications — one for condonation of filing delay and one for condonation of refiling delay — were placed before the Court.

The same liquidator had previously obtained relief from this Court in an earlier round of the same litigation. In that earlier matter, a coordinate bench had set aside the NCLAT's refusal to condone delay in refiling an appeal under Section 61 of the IBC, and had remanded the matter for hearing on merits. The NCLAT then decided the appeal, producing the impugned order now under challenge. Critically, the earlier order of this Court had expressly recorded that it was not to be treated as a precedent.

The Statutory Framework: Two Windows, No Third

Section 62(1) of the IBC allows an appeal to the Supreme Court from the NCLAT within 45 days of receipt of the appellate tribunal's order. Section 62(2) permits the Court to condone delay up to a further 15 days on sufficient cause being shown. The outer statutory limit is therefore 60 days. Beyond that, the Court held, its jurisdiction to condone delay ceases entirely.

For appeals that are filed within time but are marked defective, Order VIII Rule 6(3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 provides a 28-day window to cure defects. The Court examined whether, where an appeal under Section 62 is filed within the 60-day outer limit but is defective, the Court retains power to condone a refiling delay that runs beyond those 28 days.

The Court answered that question in the negative. It held that an appeal under Section 62 must be a defect-free appeal to be regarded as having been instituted within the prescribed period. A defective appeal, for all practical and legal purposes, remains a defective appeal. Permitting a litigant to file a defective appeal to save limitation and then cure defects at leisure would, the Court said, defeat the object of the IBC and render nugatory the discipline of timelines in both Section 62 and the Supreme Court Rules.

The Court's Reasoning on Jurisdiction and the IBC's Primacy

The Court drew a clear hierarchy between the IBC and the Supreme Court Rules. The Rules are subordinate legislation. Where they clash with the express provisions of the IBC, the IBC must prevail. The Court held that Section 62 is a complete code in itself for the filing of appeals and is different from proceedings under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure or constitutional remedies, where the less rigorous standard for refiling delay applies.

The Court stated the combined effect of the two windows in precise terms: once the 60-day filing window closes and the 28-day defect-cure window also closes, the right to appeal stands extinguished. No application for condonation of refiling delay arises for consideration. Where the statute erects an insurmountable jurisdictional bar, no enquiry into the adequacy of the cause shown can alter the legal consequence.

The appellant's senior counsel, Mr. Fernandes, argued that the liquidator is a neutral officer acting under the aegis of the Court for the benefit of all stakeholders, and that the delay — attributed to an internal administrative oversight within the liquidator's office — ought to be viewed liberally. The Court rejected this. The IBC does not prescribe a different threshold for officers such as a liquidator, and reading such words into the statute would not be a permissible interpretational exercise. The Court also declined to invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute the express statutory timeframes.

Why the Earlier Indulgence Did Not Help

The appellant pressed the earlier coordinate bench decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406, where refiling delay in an appeal under Section 61 before the NCLAT had been condoned. That decision had emphasised the distinction between lapses attributable to the advocate-on-record and lapses attributable to the litigant, and had applied a liberal construction of “sufficient cause” in the context of a Section 61 appeal before the NCLAT.

The Court distinguished that decision on multiple grounds. First, it concerned a Section 61 appeal before the NCLAT, not a Section 62 appeal before the Supreme Court. Second, the earlier order had itself recorded that it was not to be treated as a precedent. Third, the present case involved the same litigant seeking a further indulgence at the next appellate stage after having already secured one at the previous stage.

The Court held that a litigant who has once secured indulgence in relation to delay cannot proceed on the assumption that further defaults at the next appellate stage will automatically attract a similar exercise of discretion. To hold otherwise would render the law of limitation under the IBC progressively elastic at every successive stage of challenge, defeating the legislative objective of expedition and finality. The Court was direct: “The discipline of limitation, particularly in the context of the IBC, does not countenance serial condonations of delay across successive appellate stages.”

Precedents Relied Upon

The Court drew on a line of decisions affirming the strict limitation scheme of the IBC. It quoted from Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353, which had observed that the strict adherence to timelines is of essence to both the triggering process and the insolvency resolution process. It also cited Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 401, for the proposition that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors has been given paramount status without judicial intervention, to ensure completion of processes within prescribed timelines.

Further support was drawn from National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Dunar Foods Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2022) 11 SCC 761; V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 244; and Tata Steel Limited v. Raj Kumar Banerjee and Others, (2025) 9 SCC 483 — all arising under Section 61 of the IBC — which reaffirm that condonation of delay beyond the period expressly prescribed by the statute is impermissible.

The Court also referred to PEC Ltd. v. M/s Phulchand Exports Private Ltd., Civil Appeal (Diary) No. 37293 of 2022, where a delay of 21 days in filing an appeal under Section 62 was held to be beyond the maximum condonable period and the appeal was dismissed on limitation. In Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484, a delay of even two days in presenting a Section 62 appeal was not condoned on the same basis.

The Explanation Offered and Why It Failed

The application for condonation of refiling delay attributed the 82-day lapse to an internal oversight within the liquidator's office: a concerned officer either mistakenly believed the requisite details had already been conveyed to the advocate-on-record, or did not promptly relay them, and had since left the position. The Court found this explanation insufficient on two independent grounds.

First, as a matter of jurisdiction, the question of sufficiency of cause does not arise at all once the statutory windows are shut. Second, even on the merits of the explanation, the Court found that sufficient cause had not been shown to satisfactorily explain the delays in both filing and refiling. The Court noted that the appellant had already availed the benefit of a liberal construction of “sufficient cause” at the previous stage of the same litigation and could not legitimately seek a further relaxation at this stage.

The Settled Legal Position Summarised

The Court summarised the position as follows. Under Section 62(1), 45 days are available from receipt of the NCLAT order to file an appeal involving a substantial question of law. Under Section 62(2), the Court may allow filing within a further 15 days on sufficient cause, but not beyond. For a defectively filed appeal, defects may be cured within 28 days of notification by the Registry, after which the appeal would deserve registration. There is no scope for curing defects after the 28-day period expires in respect of a Section 62 appeal. No application for condonation of refiling delay therefore arises. Once both windows close, no condonation — even for a single day — is available.

Order

The Court dismissed the defective appeal as time-barred, having been filed beyond the maximum period condonable under the IBC. All connected applications were also dismissed. The Court expressly stated that, given the settled legal position, it was unnecessary to venture into the merits of the explanations furnished in support of the condonation applications.