Supreme Court upholds 25% viva-voce cut-off for Rajasthan judicial service

A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale dismissed a candidate’s challenge to Rule 41, holding a decade-old judicial recruitment cannot be reopened.

The Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal of Manoj Goyal, an aspirant for the post of Additional District Judge in Rajasthan, who challenged a minimum 25% qualifying mark in the viva-voce introduced through a 2011 amendment to the state’s judicial service rules. In a judgment authored by Justice Prasanna B. Varale, a Bench also comprising Justice Sanjay Karol held that the interview cut-off fell within the State’s legislative competence and was rationally connected to selecting capable judicial officers. The Court found the challenge to Rule 41 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 had become academic after the offending proviso was deleted in 2017, and that appointments finalized in July 2013 could not be disturbed. The appellant, who missed the interview threshold by 0.50 marks despite ranking 11th on aggregate merit, had no vested right to appointment.

How the dispute reached the Court

The recruitment concerned Additional District Judges from the advocates’ quota in Rajasthan. The background traces to the Shetty Commission, the First National Judicial Pay Commission constituted on 21 March 1996 under Justice K.J. Shetty. The Commission recommended a written examination of 200 marks and a viva-voce of 50 marks, with no cut-off in the interview and a merit list based on aggregate marks. In All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247, the Court accepted these recommendations and directed States and High Courts to frame rules accordingly.

Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, and Rule 41 originally prescribed no minimum viva-voce marks. An advertisement for 36 vacancies issued on 15 April 2010 was cancelled on 22 September 2010 following allegations of anomalies. On 10 June 2011, the State amended Rule 41 to insert a proviso requiring a minimum of 25% marks in the interview. A fresh advertisement for 39 vacancies followed on 19 July 2011.

Goyal scored 161 out of 250 (64.4%) in the written examination held in May 2012 and cleared for the interview. When the final results were published on 25 May 2013, his name was excluded. He had an aggregate of 168 marks, placing him 11th purely on merit, but was awarded 7 out of 30 in the viva-voce. The amended rule required 7.5 marks, so he fell short by 0.50 marks — despite outscoring some selected candidates on aggregate.

The procedural path and the withdrawal question

Goyal first approached the Court under Article 32 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 595 of 2013. On 13 October 2014, a coordinate Bench dismissed the petition insofar as it challenged the select list and appointment orders, keeping alive only the challenge to the vires of Rule 41 and Schedule IX. By order dated 3 December 2014, the Court permitted withdrawal with liberty to approach the High Court, directing that all contentions be kept open.

He then filed D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2302 of 2015 before the Rajasthan High Court. While it was pending, the State again amended the rules on 28 November 2017, deleting the 25% interview proviso. The Division Bench dismissed the petition on 8 February 2018, reasoning that the challenge to Rule 41 had become academic and that the earlier dismissal of the challenge to appointments had attained finality.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that withdrawal caused all interim orders to lapse, relying on Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia and St. John’s School v. Asha Bhan. He contended the 2011 amendment was void ab initio and that the rule-making authority could not override a binding judgment, citing State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder. He relied on Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi and Ramesh Kumar v. Delhi High Court for the position against viva-voce cut-offs, and on P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka against retrospective application of the amendment.

What the Court held on the withdrawal and vires

The Court rejected the argument that withdrawal erased the earlier dismissal. It held the order of 13 October 2014 was “a conscious, substantive judicial determination” declining to interfere with the finalized appointments, and that the withdrawal permitted on 3 December 2014 pertained only to the surviving challenge to the vires of Rule 41. The doctrine of withdrawal, the Court said, could not be used to erase a final substantive dismissal.

On the interview cut-off, the Court held the Shetty Commission recommendations did not bind the recruiting authority as a rigid mandate. Relying on Mahinder Kumar v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 11 SCC 87, it observed the prescriptions in paragraph 10.97 of the report “can at best be stated to be a guideline” that a High Court should keep in mind. Once statutory rules are framed, the selection must follow those rules. The Court also relied on Syed T.A. Naqshbandi v. State of J&K and Malik Mazhar Sultan v. UP Public Services Commission.

Estoppel and the rationale for the benchmark

The Court found the appellant barred by estoppel, having participated in the process under the 2011 rules without protest. It relied on Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, Madan Lal v. State of J&K, and Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, holding a candidate who takes a chance in a selection cannot challenge the criteria after being found unsuccessful.

On the merits of the benchmark, the Court held the 25% cut-off was neither arbitrary nor whimsical but rooted in administrative necessity. Citing Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan, it reasoned that while a written test assesses academic knowledge, the viva-voce brings out qualities such as alertness, resourcefulness and capacity for discussion required of a judge. It described the cut-off as a rational benchmark to preserve the quality of judicial administration.

The Court also addressed the practical consequences of granting relief. It noted the selected candidates were appointed as far back as July 2013 and had served for over a decade. Reopening the list would disrupt the settled seniority matrix, prejudice serving officers, and prejudice other candidates who accepted disqualification. Granting relief, the Court said, would “effectively open a Pandora’s box” of retroactive litigation.

Order

The Court held the appellant had no vested right to appointment, having failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce. The civil appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit, and the High Court’s judgment dated 8 February 2018 was affirmed. Pending applications were disposed of, with no order as to costs.