Supreme Court Acquits Talati and Peon in Gujarat Bribery Case, Finds Demand Not Proved Beyond Doubt
A Division Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar sets aside concurrent convictions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, finding the bribery demand unproved and the prosecution sanction invalid.
The Supreme Court has acquitted a Talati-cum-Mantri (village revenue officer) and a Peon of a Gram Panchayat in Gujarat who had been convicted for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹120 in 1996. Setting aside concurrent findings of the trial court and the Gujarat High Court, a Division Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held on 19 August 2026 that the prosecution had failed to prove the initial demand of bribe beyond reasonable doubt against both accused, and that the order sanctioning prosecution of the Talati was additionally vitiated by having been granted by an authority not competent to remove him from office. The judgment in Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, reported as 2026 INSC 890, also clarifies that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 cannot be invoked unless the initial demand is first proved.
How the Case Reached the Supreme Court
The case arose from an Anti-Corruption Bureau trap laid on 19 February 1996. Hasmukhlal Maganbhai Chauhan, a student seeking an Income Certificate for educational concessions, had approached the Mamlatdar's office on 6 February 1996. His application was forwarded to the Talati-cum-Mantri of Village Bechri, identified in proceedings as A1. When the complainant met A1 on 7 February 1996, A1 allegedly demanded ₹120 — ₹100 for himself and ₹20 for the Peon (A2). The demand was repeated on 14 February 1996.
On 19 February 1996, the complainant lodged a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Bureau and participated in a trap. At the office, after receiving his certificate, the complainant gave a ₹20 note to A2, who placed it in his pocket. The raiding party then moved in, drew a panchnama, and registered a case. A chargesheet was filed alleging offences under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The trial court convicted A1 and A2 under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act by its judgment dated 30 November 1999, sentencing each to rigorous imprisonment of one year for the Section 13(1)(d) offence and six months with a fine of ₹2,000 for the Section 7 offence. Both were acquitted of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B. The Gujarat High Court, by a common judgment dated 22 January 2015, dismissed the appeals of A1 and A2, and also dismissed the State's appeal seeking enhancement of sentence, observing that both accused had since been dismissed from service. A1 and A2 then appealed to the Supreme Court by way of Criminal Appeal Nos. 1177 and 1183 of 2015.
The Demand: Contradictions in the Complainant's Evidence
The Court's analysis began with the complainant's deposition. In the present proceedings, the complainant stated that A1 had demanded ₹120 on 7 February 1996. However, in his deposition in a separate case — Criminal Case No. 826 of 1996, filed against A1 and A2 for threatening him — the complainant had stated that A1 initially demanded ₹200 and that ₹120 was agreed upon as a final settlement. That complaint had been filed on 6 March 1996, within a month of the alleged demand.
The Court found the two accounts materially inconsistent. In the present proceedings the complainant made no reference to any initial demand of ₹200 or to any negotiated settlement. This variance, the Court said, cast doubt on the reliability of the complainant's version of how and when the demand was made.
The Court also examined what happened during the trap itself. The complainant had been instructed by the Anti-Corruption Bureau to give the entire amount of ₹120 — in two notes of ₹50 and one note of ₹20 — whenever the demand was made. Instead, he gave only ₹20 to A2. A2 did not ask why only ₹20 was being given when A1 had told the complainant to hand over ₹120. No explanation was offered for why the Bureau's instructions were not followed.
An additional discrepancy arose between the complainant and the Panch witness on the physical manner in which the note was handed to A2. The complainant said he held the note with his first two fingers and thumb; the Panch witness said all five fingers of the right hand were used and specifically denied the three-finger version. The Court accepted that this alone might not be decisive, but treated it as one more element casting doubt on the prosecution account when read alongside the other infirmities.
Taken together, the Court found that the prosecution evidence fell “woefully short of proving the charge against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”
Section 20 Presumption Cannot Substitute for Proof of Demand
The State argued that once the ₹20 note smeared with anthracene powder was found in A2's possession, the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was available to sustain conviction. The Court rejected this squarely.
Drawing on the three-judge bench decision in N. Vijaykumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021 INSC 60), the Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 20 is triggered only after the prosecution first proves the initial demand beyond reasonable doubt. If the demand itself is not proved, mere recovery of a currency note does not allow a court to invoke the presumption and treat the charge as established.
The High Court had drawn the Section 20 presumption on the basis that both accused were public servants and that A2 was found with anthracene-stained currency. The Supreme Court held this approach was legally incorrect given the unresolved doubts about the demand.
The Court also noted a further factual difficulty: the ₹20 was given to A2 only after the complainant had already received the Income Certificate from A1. Referring to State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj (2025 INSC 736), the Court observed that payment made after the purpose for which bribe was allegedly sought had already been served cannot, ipso facto, be treated as payment pursuant to a demand.
Prosecution Sanction Against A1 Was Invalid
A separate ground pressed for A1 concerned the validity of the sanction for prosecution. Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 requires that cognizance of offences under Sections 7 and 13 shall not be taken without previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the public servant from office.
The sanction for prosecuting A1 was granted by PW-2, who was serving as Deputy District Development Officer. A1 held the substantive post of Talati-cum-Mantri. The prosecution did not place on record any material showing that the Deputy District Development Officer was empowered to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri from office. PW-2 himself admitted in his deposition that it was the District Development Officer who had authority to issue a no-objection certificate when a Talati-cum-Mantri wished to travel abroad — indicating that it was the District Development Officer who exercised supervisory authority.
The Court acknowledged that A1 may have initially been appointed on an ad-hoc basis by an order of the Deputy District Development Officer. However, what Section 19(1)(c) requires is sanction by the authority competent to remove the public servant. At the time sanction was sought, A1 held the substantive post, and removal power under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 vested with the District Development Officer. The sanction granted by the Deputy District Development Officer was, therefore, found to be invalid.
The Court, however, expressly declined to set aside A1's conviction solely on the ground of invalid sanction. It proceeded independently to examine the evidence and found the prosecution case wanting on the merits as well.
A2's Position: No Demand, Probable Defence
Both the trial court and the High Court had already found that no demand was made by A2. The only material against him was that the ₹20 note was found in his pocket. The Court noted A2's defence that the festival of Eid was to be celebrated the following day and the complainant had voluntarily given him the money after collecting his certificate. Given that no demand by A2 was proved, and that the prosecution's own case was that it was A1 who had demanded the bribe, the Court found A2's explanation probable in the circumstances.
Both courts had also acquitted A1 and A2 under Section 120B of the Penal Code, finding no evidence of criminal conspiracy. Neither the High Court nor the State disturbed that acquittal. This finding, the Court observed, sat uneasily with the concurrent holding that A1 had made the demand while A2 received the money — an arrangement that, if proved, would ordinarily suggest concert between them. The absence of a conspiracy finding reinforced the Court's view that the prosecution case contained inherent gaps.
Outcome
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the trial court in Special Case No. 15 of 1996 dated 30 November 1999 and the common judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 22 January 2015 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1343 of 1999 and 1344 of 1999. Both appellants were acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellants, who had been enlarged on bail, were directed to have their bail bonds cancelled. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1177 of 2015 and 1183 of 2015 were allowed.