High Court Cannot Replace Injunction Decree With Compensation When No Such Relief Was Sought

A Supreme Court bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and Atul S. Chandurkar sets aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court order that substituted a removal decree with monetary compensation never prayed for.

The Supreme Court has allowed two civil appeals filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, Om Parkash, setting aside a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that twice attempted to convert decrees for mandatory injunction into directions for monetary compensation. The High Court, on remand from the Supreme Court itself, repeated the same error it had committed earlier — directing an Executing Court to assess the value of an offending wall and pay the amount to the plaintiff's heirs, even though no prayer for damages or compensation had ever been made in either suit. The Court found this course of action unsustainable on multiple grounds: absence of any prayer for compensation, lack of consent from the plaintiff's legal heirs, factual errors in the High Court's reading of the Trial Court's findings, and the procedural impossibility of directing an Executing Court to act without a subsisting decree.

Two Suits, Two Decrees, One Persistent Dispute

Om Parkash filed Civil Suit No. 426 of 1996 against the respondents — S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura and others — seeking mandatory injunction for removal of a wall the defendants had raised on common open space beyond his house. He also sought a permanent injunction restraining further construction. The Trial Court decreed the suit on 06.02.2006, directing removal of the wall and restraining further construction. The defendants' appeal was dismissed on 05.09.2007, affirming the decree.

A second suit, Civil Suit No. 148 of 2000, concerned a lintel of the school building that the defendants had erected on the wall of the plaintiff's house. The Trial Court decreed that suit on 08.11.2004, directing removal of the lintel and restraining the defendants from placing any lintel on the plaintiff's walls. The defendants' appeal was again dismissed on 05.09.2007.

Both decrees thus stood affirmed by the first Appellate Court. The defendants then preferred Regular Second Appeal Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

The High Court's First Error and the Earlier Remand

By a common judgment dated 25.11.2011, the High Court disposed of both Second Appeals by directing the defendants to pay ₹10,000 (with interest at 12% per annum) in one case and ₹7,000 (with interest at 12% per annum) in the other — being half the expenditure incurred on construction of the respective walls. On such payment, the walls were to be treated as common between the parties. This effectively reversed the decrees for removal.

The legal heirs of Om Parkash challenged this before the Supreme Court. By order dated 13.09.2013 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments. The Court held that the High Court had modified the decrees without entering into the merits of the controversy and without framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The matters were remanded for fresh consideration.

The High Court Repeats the Error on Remand

On remand, the High Court took the view that the wall had been raised long ago, that no valuation report was on record, and that the plaintiff's claim had not been proved. It then directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction, with the defendants required to deposit that amount to be paid to the plaintiff's legal heirs. The decrees passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first Appellate Court were set aside.

The appellants — legal heirs of Om Parkash — challenged this judgment, giving rise to Civil Appeal Nos. 19552-19553 of 2017. Despite service, the respondents had not appeared since 23.04.2019.

Why the High Court's Approach Was Unsustainable

The Supreme Court, after hearing Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the appellants and examining the record, identified four distinct errors in the High Court's approach.

No prayer for compensation. Neither suit contained any prayer for damages or monetary compensation. The original plaintiff had sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions. The Court held that in the absence of any such relief being sought, the decree in the plaintiff's favour could not be set aside by compelling his legal heirs to accept compensation assessed by a valuer. The legal heirs had not consented to this course either.

Executing Court cannot act without a decree. Once the Trial Court's decrees were set aside by the High Court, there was no decree left in the field for execution. Directing the Executing Court to assess the value of the wall in such circumstances would require it to undertake an exercise unsupported by any decree. The Court found that this course did not find support under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The same error, repeated. The High Court had already been corrected by the Supreme Court for attempting a similar compensation-based resolution in 2011. On remand, it adopted the same approach, this time through the Executing Court rather than directly. The Court observed that “the High Court, on remand however again committed the same error.”

Factual error regarding the Trial Court's finding. The High Court's order proceeded on the premise that the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 426 of 1996 had recorded a finding that the wall in question was a common wall. The Supreme Court found this to be factually incorrect. The Trial Court had in fact passed a decree for removal of the offending wall — a finding entirely inconsistent with treating the wall as common property.

Substantial questions of law not properly framed. The High Court's impugned order referred to three questions that the defendants urged should be framed as substantial questions of law. The order did not indicate that these were actually treated as substantial questions of law. Yet the order concluded by stating that the substantial questions were answered in favour of the defendants and the plaintiff's decrees were set aside. The Court found that the decrees had been reversed without an available question of law for consideration and by effectively making out a new prayer that had never been sought.

The Court said this course “has resulted in miscarriage of justice.”

Remand for Fresh Adjudication Under Section 100

Since the Second Appeals had not been adjudicated on their merits in either round before the High Court, the Supreme Court found it had no option but to remand the matters again. The High Court was directed to reconsider both Second Appeal Nos. 363 of 2008 and 364 of 2008 in accordance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decide them on their own merits.

Given that the Second Appeals have been pending since 2008, the Court requested the High Court to take them up expeditiously.

Order

Civil Appeal Nos. 19552-19553 of 2017 were allowed. The common judgment dated 02.05.2016 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in RSA Nos. 363 of 2008 and 364 of 2008 was set aside. The High Court was directed to reconsider both appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decide them on merits, expeditiously. No order as to costs was made.