Supreme Court Alters Section 307 Conviction to Section 325 IPC, Finds No Proof of Intent to Murder

A Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh held that grievous injuries alone cannot sustain an attempt-to-murder conviction without proof of murderous intent.

The Supreme Court has partly allowed three criminal appeals arising from a 2000 assault in Rewari, Haryana, altering the conviction of three accused persons from attempt to murder under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, deciding Criminal Appeal Nos. 2207, 2209 and 2210 of 2011, found that while the prosecution had proved grievous injuries on vital parts of the complainant's body, it had failed to establish the requisite intention or knowledge to commit murder. The Court sentenced all three appellants to the period already undergone and imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000 each, payable to the injured informant.

How the Case Reached the Supreme Court

The incident occurred on the night of 5 June 2000. Amar Singh (PW3), working as a night watchman in his village, came upon a group of persons assaulting an individual near the house of one Rama Nand. When he intervened, the accused turned upon him. Accused Sajjan Singh struck him on the head with a lathi; Satya Prakash dealt a lathi blow on his right hand; Roshan Lal also delivered a lathi blow on his head; and a fourth accused, Dharamvir, assaulted him with fists and kicks. The accused also threatened to kill anyone who came to the complainant's aid.

FIR No. 116/2000 was registered at 8:30 AM on 6 June 2000. Amar Singh was taken to the General Hospital, Rewari, and subsequently referred to Central Hospital, Northern Railway, New Delhi, where he remained from 8 June to 1 July 2000, and again from 15 to 20 July 2000. Medical examination revealed a lacerated wound on the left parietal region of the scalp with the underlying bone visible, a compound fracture of the scalp, a small parietal haematoma, and weakness on the right side of the body. A CT scan dated 12 June 2000 from Lok Nayak Hospital revealed fractures in both parietal bones near the midline. Dr. Sanjeev Singhal (PW11), a neurosurgeon, noted that the victim was developing multi-organ failure, with deranged kidney and liver functions.

The case was initially registered under Sections 323, 325 and 506 IPC, with Section 307 IPC added later. The Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, convicted Roshan Lal, Satya Prakash and Sajjan Singh under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 506 IPC by judgment dated 2 May 2002, sentencing each to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000 under Section 307, and one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under Section 506. Dharamvir was acquitted, the court finding that the injuries attributed to him were not corroborated by medical evidence and that the prosecution witnesses were insufficient to establish his guilt under Section 307 IPC.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appeals of the three convicted accused by a common judgment dated 16 August 2010, upholding both conviction and sentence. The three appellants then approached the Supreme Court.

Arguments Before the Supreme Court

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants raised several contentions. Roshan Lal argued that the only injury attributed to him — a lathi blow on the right side of the head — found no mention in the testimony of Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1), who referred only to an injury on the left side. The appellants contended that the High Court's characterisation of the injury as “serious” did not satisfy the requirement under Section 307 IPC, which mandates that the injury be sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death.

They further argued that the incident arose spontaneously when the complainant intervened in an altercation, and that no prior intention or premeditation to cause injury could be attributed to them. The Investigating Officer was never examined; the jeep driver who was allegedly being beaten was not produced as a witness; and a large number of persons said to be present at the scene were neither identified nor examined. The appellants also contended that the injured complainant had manipulated his referral to a Delhi government hospital and instead secured admission in a Railway Hospital to obtain a favourable medical report.

On sentencing, Roshan Lal argued that as a first-time offender who was not the principal assailant, he ought to have been considered for the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellants also argued that the Trial Court had denied them a real opportunity to prepare a defence on sentence, having convicted them at the close of proceedings on 2 May 2002 and awarded the maximum sentence by 10:30 AM the very next morning.

The prosecution responded that the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court were founded on admissible and relevant evidence, that no perversity had been shown, and that this Court ought not to interfere.

The Court's Framework: Concurrent Findings and the Limits of Interference

The Court began by setting out the principles governing interference with concurrent findings in a criminal appeal by special leave, drawing on Dalbir Kaur & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158. Those principles, as reproduced in the judgment, provide that the Court will not interfere with concurrent findings based on pure appreciation of evidence, will not re-appraise evidence unless the High Court's assessment is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or is based on a misreading of evidence, and will not substitute its own view on credibility. Interference is warranted where the High Court has disregarded judicial process or principles of natural justice, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and based on no evidence.

The Court stated that it would examine the appeals to determine whether any manifest error or illegality had occurred, or whether there had been a grave miscarriage of justice arising from a misreading of, or failure to consider, material evidence.

What Section 307 IPC Requires: Intention, Not Merely Injury

The Court identified the principal question as whether the essential ingredients of Section 307 IPC were satisfied. It held that two elements are essential: first, the intention or knowledge to commit murder; and second, the actual act of trying to commit the murder. To sustain a conviction, it must be established that had the accused succeeded and the victim died, the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC would have been made out.

Relying on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, and Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P., (2006) 8 SCC 799, the Court affirmed that an accused cannot be acquitted under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries were simple in nature, since the determinative factor is intention or knowledge and not the nature of the injury. At the same time, the Court held that the nature of injury does render considerable assistance in ascertaining intention, and that intention may also be inferred from the type of weapon used, words spoken, motive, parts of the body targeted, and the force and manner of blows.

The Court held that the words “such intention” in Section 307 IPC refer to the intention described in Section 300 IPC — that is, intention to cause death, intention to cause bodily injury which the offender knows is likely to cause death, or intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once the requisite intention is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes irrelevant unless death actually results.

Why the Section 307 Conviction Could Not Stand

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the prosecution had not established the requisite mens rea for Section 307 IPC. There was no history of enmity between the appellants and the injured. No material on record suggested prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention to cause Amar Singh's death. The incident arose suddenly when the complainant intervened in an altercation involving the driver of a jeep. The assault appeared to have been a spontaneous reaction to that intervention, not the product of any pre-conceived intention to eliminate the complainant.

The Court found that the object of the appellants appeared primarily to have been to deter or intimidate the complainant from interfering. The weapons used were ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt depending on the manner of use, could not in the facts of this case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There was nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the assault with such brutality or ferocity as to unmistakably disclose an intention to cause death.

The Court accepted that the injuries were grievous and that the medical evidence demonstrated serious complications. However, it held that the gravity of injury by itself cannot be determinative of Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea. The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence of prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, the Court held that Section 307 IPC was not attracted.

Conviction Altered to Section 325 IPC

The Court found, however, that the evidence unequivocally proved that the appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the complainant. The injuries — fractures in both parietal bones near the midline, neurological complications, and prolonged hospitalisation — fell squarely within Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC (fracture or dislocation of a bone) and also within Clause Eighthly (hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or unable to follow ordinary pursuits for twenty days). The ingredients of Section 325 IPC were accordingly held to be fully satisfied.

The conviction under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC was altered to one under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. The conviction under Section 506 IPC was not disturbed.

Outcome

On sentence, the Court noted the periods already undergone: Roshan Lal had served 2 years and 7 months; Sajjan Singh, 2 years and 8 months; and Satya Prakash, 1 year and 1 month. All three had been on bail since November and December 2011 respectively, pursuant to orders of this Court.

The Court sentenced each appellant to the period already undergone and imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000 each, to be paid to the injured informant. In default of payment, each appellant would undergo an additional six months' simple imprisonment. Upon payment, the bail bonds would stand discharged. In the event of non-payment, the bail bonds would stand discharged only after the default sentence was undergone.

The three appeals were partly allowed. All pending applications were disposed of in terms of the judgment.