Section 302 is a heinous offence under Juvenile Justice Act, Supreme Court holds

A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan held murder carries life imprisonment as its minimum punishment, making it a heinous offence, and dismissed the juvenile's appeal.

The Supreme Court has held that an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is a “heinous offence” under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, because life imprisonment operates as its minimum sentence. Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan rejected the argument that murder falls into the residual “serious offence” category simply because Section 302 does not use the word “minimum”. The Court also held that the power of a Sessions Court under Section 101(2) to take expert assistance while hearing an appeal is discretionary, not mandatory. Deciding an appeal by a juvenile aged 16 years 4 months at the time of the alleged crime, the Court affirmed the Patna High Court order and dismissed the appeal. The judgment settles how offences carrying “death or imprisonment for life” are classified for deciding whether a child is tried as an adult.

How the dispute reached the Court

The complainant, mother of the deceased, told police that on 1 May 2022 her son went out with the appellant and another boy. The next morning his body was found in the fields. An FIR was registered at Kopa Police Station under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

The appellant raised a plea of juvenility. The Juvenile Justice Board determined his age as 16 years 4 months on the date of the alleged offence and declared him a juvenile. Because the alleged offence was heinous and the appellant was above 16, the Board conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15.

By majority, the Board decided to dispose of the case itself, finding the appellant lacked the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence. The Presiding Magistrate dissented, holding the appellant should be tried as an adult.

The complainant appealed. The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chapra, set aside the Board's order on 21 December 2023 and held the appellant should be tried as an adult. The Patna High Court dismissed the appellant's revision on 24 July 2025, noting the trial had already commenced and that the appellant had, while in the Children's Home, allegedly committed the murder of the home's guard.

Why murder is a heinous offence

Counsel for the appellant argued the case fell within “serious offence” under Section 2(54)(b) — offences where the maximum sentence exceeds seven years but no minimum, or a minimum of less than seven years, is prescribed. Since Section 302 does not name a minimum sentence, the argument ran, murder belonged in this fourth category identified in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2020) 2 SCC 787.

The Court rejected this as “completely misconceived”. A court convicting under Section 302 cannot impose any sentence below imprisonment for life, so life imprisonment is by implication the minimum punishment. The Court relied on Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 13 SCC 631, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandu @ Nandua.

On the disjunctive “or” between death and life imprisonment, the Court said the word merely gives the court discretion to choose between the two punishments and does not permit anything lesser than life imprisonment. Drafting style that omits the word “minimum” cannot override the object of the provision.

The Court also addressed an argument built on Section 21, which bars sentencing a child to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of release. Counsel said this reduced the effective maximum to 14 years, pushing Section 302 into the serious-offence category. The Court held Section 21 operates only at the sentencing stage and modulates how the punishment is served; it does not alter the classification of the offence for deciding the forum of trial. To conflate the two “would be to confuse the nature of the offence with the consequence to be faced by the offender.”

A separate plea by the complainant's counsel that Shilpa Mittal required reconsideration was rejected. That decision identified a gap the legislature accepted and codified as Section 2(54)(b) through the 2021 Amendment, and Section 302 falls squarely within “heinous offence” under Section 2(33).

Section 101(2) expert assistance is discretionary

The appellant contended the Sessions Court committed an egregious error by not taking the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists, said to be mandatory under Section 101(2). He relied on Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, (2023) 12 SCC 401, which read “may” in the proviso to Section 15(1) as mandatory where the Board lacks a member qualified in child psychology or psychiatry.

The Court declined to transplant that ruling onto Section 101(2). Section 101(2) does not incorporate the proviso to Section 15(1). Applying State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford and Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd., the Court held “may” confers a discretion whose exercise depends on the facts of each case.

The Sessions Court, as an appellate forum, stands on a different footing. It can appreciate psychological or counsellor's reports already obtained by the Board without conducting a fresh independent assessment. The phrase permitting assistance “other than those whose assistance has been obtained by the Board” presumes such expertise was available at the Board stage. The Court declined to read “may” in Section 101(2) as “must” or “shall”.

Here, the Board had obtained a counsellor's report during the preliminary assessment. The Sessions Court's grievance was not the absence of expert input but that the Board erred in weighing the material — a different vice from that in Barun Chandra Thakur.

How a preliminary assessment must be conducted

The Court set out the approach the Board must follow under Section 15(1), which requires assessment of four distinct parameters: the child's mental capacity to commit the offence, physical capacity, ability to understand the consequences, and the circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed. Each must be considered independently and collectively.

Rule 10A(4) of the Model Rules requires the Board to assign reasons, a safeguard ensuring the decision is open to judicial scrutiny. The Board must not express any view on guilt or innocence, which would offend the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence.

The Court held the expert report is one significant input, not the sole consideration. It must be read alongside the Social Background Report, the Social Investigation Report, witness statements and other material. The Board cannot mechanically adopt an expert's conclusion without examining whether it is supported by the totality of the material, citing Pradeep Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat.

On the facts, the Board reached its conclusion solely on the expert opinion. Its majority opinion made no mention of the SIR or the SBR, and failed to consider the antecedents and recommendations of the Probation Officer and the Child Welfare Police Officer. The Court said these reports are not supplementary but pertinent inputs that must be accorded due weight. It clarified its observations were limited to whether the material was duly considered and would not influence the trial.

Order

The Court held no error of law was committed by the High Court and dismissed the appeal, with parties bearing their own costs. Pending applications were disposed of. The Registry was directed to forward a copy of the judgment to all the High Courts.