Supreme Court Sets Limits on Psychological Evaluation of Child Victims in Custody Disputes
A Division Bench of the Supreme Court has held that multi-expert psychological panels cannot be imposed on child victims in custody proceedings, laying down nineteen guidelines for trauma-informed adjudication.
The Supreme Court has modified two orders of the Bombay High Court that had directed a four-member panel of psychologists to evaluate a ten-year-old girl who is both the subject of a custody dispute and an alleged victim under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, deciding Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora on 11 June 2026, held that the High Court had failed to consider the risk of re-traumatisation and secondary victimisation before constituting the panel. The Court remitted the matter to the Family Court, Pune, with detailed directions, and issued nineteen guidelines governing psychological evaluation of child victims in custody and visitation proceedings across the country.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
The parties married on 10 February 2015 at Faridabad and subsequently moved to the United States. Their daughter was born on 24 June 2016 in New Jersey. The appellant-mother alleges that between 2018 and 2019, while the family was in the USA, the respondent-father subjected her to physical abuse and the child to sexual abuse. Following a domestic assault incident on 29 December 2019, proceedings were initiated before New Jersey Police. The mother returned to India on 30 December 2019 with the child.
After returning, the mother served a divorce notice on 18 January 2020 and later filed proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A complaint was lodged at Yerwada Police Station, Pune on 24 October 2020. On 12 April 2021, Zero FIR No. 0210 of 2021 was registered under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 4, 5(l), 5(n) and 6 of the POCSO Act. A second FIR, No. 315 of 2021, was registered at Faridabad. The Supreme Court, by order dated 21 February 2022, directed that investigation in both FIRs be conducted at Yerwada Police Station under the supervision of a woman ACP officer.
The respondent-father, meanwhile, sought custody and access through multiple proceedings. The Family Court, Pune, by order dated 10 February 2021, directed that custody of the child continue with the mother. On 28 April 2022, the Family Court rejected the father's application for appointment of an independent psychiatric expert, recording that the child was already under therapeutic care with Dr. Mridula Apte, that serious POCSO allegations were pending, and that exposing the child to further evaluative processes would be harmful.
The father challenged that rejection before the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 7315 of 2022. The High Court, by order dated 7 January 2023, partly allowed the petition and directed the Family Court to appoint one independent expert specialised in child psychology at Jalgaon. The father then filed Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2996 of 2023 before the Supreme Court, which declined to interfere but granted liberty to the father to move the High Court regarding suggestion of experts.
In April 2023, the father filed I.A. No. 4119 of 2023 before the High Court, contending that qualified experts were unavailable at Jalgaon and seeking a panel from a list he had himself compiled. The application also referred to specialists in “parental alienation syndrome” and “false memory creation”. By the first impugned order dated 27 April 2023, the High Court modified its earlier direction by substituting the word “expert” with “panel of experts”. By the second impugned order dated 7 December 2023, passed in a separate writ petition (Writ Petition No. 7560 of 2023) concerning virtual access, the High Court itself constituted a four-member panel comprising Dr. Anjali Chhabria, Dr. Kamala London, Dr. Yajyoti Singh and Dr. Bhooshan Shukla. One member was based in the USA and another outside the local jurisdiction.
The mother appealed both orders to the Supreme Court. Leave was granted and the appeals were heard as Civil Appeal Nos. of 2026 arising from SLP (Civil) Nos. 18701-18702 of 2024.
What the Court Held
The Court held that the High Court's approach suffered from a fundamental flaw: it had not examined the effect that repeated, multi-layered evaluation by numerous professionals would have on the psychological well-being of the child. The substitution of a single independent expert with a panel of four was not a mere semantic or procedural change. It directly bore upon the extent of psychological exposure to which the child could be subjected.
The Court found that the High Court, while passing the order of 27 April 2023, had confined its inquiry to whether the rights of the litigating parents would be affected. The primary question — the likely impact on the child herself — had not been addressed. The High Court had also failed to record reasons explaining why evaluation by one expert was inadequate, why multiple professionals were necessary, how the process would conform to the principle of minimum intrusion, and whether re-traumatisation had been considered.
The Court further held that the four-member panel had been constituted substantially from names proposed by the respondent-father himself, compromising the requirement of institutional neutrality. The order of 7 December 2023 did not record any reasons justifying the necessity of four separate experts, the specific role of each, or the manner in which interaction with multiple experts would serve the child's welfare. The dispersed structure — with one expert in the USA and another outside the local jurisdiction — was also not examined for its potential emotional burden on the child.
At the same time, the Court declined to accept the broad proposition that courts in custody proceedings are altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance wherever POCSO allegations are pending. Such an absolute rule, the Court said, would unduly restrict the ability of courts to secure informed assistance in appropriate cases.
The Reasoning: POCSO Framework, Child Welfare and Minimum Intrusion
The Court drew doctrinal guidance from the POCSO Act's statutory architecture, even though the dispute arose in custody proceedings rather than directly under the Act. Section 24 mandates that a child's statement be recorded in a child-friendly manner without exposing the child to fear or distress. Section 33(5) obliges the Special Court to ensure the child is not called repeatedly to testify. Section 36 requires that the child not be exposed to the accused during recording of evidence. Section 39 contemplates support persons and expert assistance to safeguard the child's welfare and dignity. The Court read these provisions as embodying a broader legislative principle of minimum exposure and minimum re-traumatisation, applicable as doctrinal guidance in custody proceedings involving child victims.
The Court relied on Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, for the proposition that repeated exposure of child victims to intimidating judicial procedures may itself aggravate trauma, and that preservation of psychological well-being constitutes an integral component of fair and child-centric adjudication. It also drew on Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka v. Hoshiam Shavaksha Dolikuka, (1982) 2 SCC 544, where the Court had cautioned that repeated interviews with a child in custody litigation cast a gloom on the sensitive mind and caused strain and depression.
On child welfare as the paramount consideration, the Court reaffirmed the position in Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42, that welfare must be understood in the widest sense, encompassing physical, emotional, moral and intellectual development. The Court held that emotional stability, psychological security, dignity and mental health are vital components of child welfare, and any process disruptive to those components must be avoided.
The Court drew a distinction between therapeutic engagement intended to support healing and repeated evaluation as part of adversarial processes undertaken to vindicate the claims of rival parties. The latter, it said, risks converting the child into an object of continuous forensic scrutiny — an unintended casualty in the legal contest between two parents.
On parental alienation syndrome, the Court referred to Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231, and Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, (2024) SCC Online 847, cautioning that courts must not prematurely label any parent as a propagator of alienating behaviour without identifying specific individual instances. The Court noted that parental alienation is not a diagnosable syndrome but a question of fact concerning specific alienating behaviours.
The Court also referred to a 2025 study by psychologists from the Department of Psychiatric Social Work and the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at NIMHANS, Bengaluru, published in the Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine, which identified seven themes affecting children in custody disputes, including parent-child dynamics, parental mental health, malicious acts by parents, and child mental health issues. The Court cited the study to emphasise the sensitivity required in such proceedings and the importance of coordinating child mental health professionals with the judicial system.
Directions Issued to the Family Court
Rather than simply setting aside the High Court's orders, the Court modified them and remitted the matter to the Family Court, Pune, with a structured set of directions:
(A) The Family Court shall appoint a psychologist to interact with both parents and assess their present mental and psychological conditions, with particular attention to the mother under whose custody the child currently resides.
(B) That psychologist shall then interact with the child psychologist currently providing therapeutic treatment to the child, and ascertain the child's current psychological status through that channel rather than by direct evaluation.
(C) The court-appointed psychologist shall submit a report to the Family Court based on those interactions.
(D) The Family Court, after considering the report on the parents and the child's condition as conveyed through the treating psychologist, shall pass appropriate orders on whether any direct psychological assessment of the child is desirable at that stage. If the Family Court finds such assessment unnecessary, none shall be conducted. If it finds assessment necessary, it shall be conducted by one independent child psychologist in consultation with the treating psychologist, with minimum interactions and utmost care.
(E) The Family Court shall review the position periodically as the child grows, recognising that a growing child's psychological needs change over time. The court's parens patriae jurisdiction requires it to remain alive to those changing needs.
(F) The Family Court shall also ascertain whether any adverse parental influence has fostered parental alienation syndrome or false memory creation in the child's mind against either parent. This inquiry shall be conducted through reports from the treating psychologist without necessarily requiring direct interaction with the child on that issue.
The Court also directed both parties to apprise the Family Court of the status of the POCSO proceedings, as those proceedings would have a significant bearing on any order concerning visitation or custody.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Court had by order dated 6 August 2024 directed the Family Court to appoint an expert child psychologist. That psychologist submitted a report in a sealed envelope. The Court opened and considered the report by order dated 3 January 2025 for the limited purpose of assessing the nature of processes to which the child might be subjected, and directed it to be re-sealed. The Court noted that the child appeared to be doing well.
Nineteen Guidelines for Courts Nationwide
Before parting with the case, the Court issued nineteen guidelines applicable to all proceedings involving psychological or psychiatric evaluation of minor children in custody, visitation or parental access disputes. The guidelines include: welfare, emotional security, dignity and psychological well-being of the child shall always be the paramount consideration; psychological evaluation shall not be directed as a matter of routine; courts shall record specific reasons demonstrating necessity, purpose and proportionality before directing any evaluative process; the principle of minimum intrusion and minimum exposure shall govern; repeated, overlapping or multi-layered evaluations shall ordinarily be avoided; where evaluation is necessary, it shall ordinarily be conducted by one independent court-appointed professional; a panel of experts shall remain an exceptional course; the appointed expert must be demonstrably independent and neutral; the process shall not assume the character of an adversarial or evidence-gathering exercise; courts shall regulate the number of sessions, duration and number of professionals interacting with the child; the process must remain consistent with Sections 24, 33(5), 36 and 39 of the POCSO Act; the child's identity and therapeutic records shall remain strictly confidential; evaluative reports shall not contain findings on criminal culpability; where the child is already under the care of a qualified therapist, substitution of that therapeutic environment shall ordinarily be avoided; virtual or hybrid interaction shall be accompanied by adequate safeguards; the directing court shall retain continuing supervisory jurisdiction; psychological assessment shall be conducted periodically as the child grows; courts shall call for psychological assessment of both parents as an aid to passing appropriate orders; and courts shall seek expert assistance on parental mental health as an additional tool, since judges are trained in legal principles rather than in managing emotional dynamics.
The Court clarified that these observations are not exhaustive or inflexible guidelines to be applied mechanically. Human emotions and a child's needs are inherently dynamic, and the controlling consideration at every stage must remain the best interest, dignity, emotional security and psychological welfare of the child.
Outcome
The impugned orders dated 27 April 2023 and 7 December 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay were modified to the extent indicated. The matter was remitted to the Family Court, Pune, to pass appropriate orders in terms of the directions and observations made by the Supreme Court. Writ Petition No. 7560 of 2023 was disposed of to the extent of the issue concerning psychological evaluation. The appeals were partly allowed. There was no order as to costs.